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Résumé court
Les décisions collaboratives sous incertitude dans les situations non urgentes peuvent être
retardées, surtout lorsque la santé humaine et des investissements élevés sont en jeu comme
c’est le cas des projets de R&D pharmaceutiques. Cette thèse étudie les causes des retards
récurrents dans la prise de décision collaborative sous incertitude et les pratiques efficientes
pour réduire ces retards. Pour mieux comprendre le problème des retards dans la prise de
décision face à l’incertitude, nous étudions d’abord la notion d’incertitude et proposons
une définition de l’incertitude adaptée au management de projet. Ensuite, le processus
de prise de décision dans les projets de développement de nouveaux médicaments est
modélisé, mettant en évidence le cycle de vie de l’information à partir de sa production
jusqu’à sa consommation c’est-à-dire la décision elle-même. Ce modèle comprend une
étape de réflexion individuelle et une étape de l’interaction en groupe, en clarifiant comment
l’information est traitée différemment par les décideurs. Afin d’analyser les conflits du passé
et anticiper ceux du futur, sur la base de ce modèle, un indice est défini pour mesurer le
risque d’invalidation d’une décision prise a posteriori. Finalement, à travers des entretiens
approfondis, 252 facteurs clés qui influent la prise de décision sont identifiés. Les trois
causes de retard les plus citées sont : la peur de l’incertitude, la peur de la hiérarchie et la
difficulté des décisions d’arrêt. Sur la base des facteurs identifiés, un recueil de bonnes
pratiques est construit pour les acteurs du processus de prise de décision qui aident à former,
mûrir, communiquer, digérer, respecter et finalement exécuter les décisions collaboratives.
Mots clés : indécision, incertitude, situation non urgente, modélisation de décision collabo-
rative, bonnes pratiques, projet
Short Abstract
Collaborative decisions may be deferred when faced with a high degree of uncertainty,
especially when public health and high investments are at stake and in situations that seem
non-urgent, as is the case in pharmaceutical R&D projects. This thesis investigates the causes
of recurrent delay in collaborative decision-making under uncertainty, and the efficient
practices to reduce this delay. To better understand the problem of delay in decision-making
under uncertainty, we first review the notion of uncertainty and propose a definition of
uncertainty adapted to project management. Then, the decision-making process in drug
development projects is modeled, highlighting the information life cycle from its generation
to its consumption i.e. the decision itself. It includes individual reflection and group
interaction, clarifying how information is processed differently by decision-makers. To
analyze past conflicts and anticipate future ones, based on this model, an index is defined
that measures the risk of invalidating a decision a posteriori. Finally, through an in-depth
interview-based approach, 252 key factors that affect decision-making are pointed out.
The three most-mentioned causes of delay are: fear of uncertainty, fear of hierarchy, and
difficulty of No Go decisions. Based on the identified factors, a compendium of practices is
constructed for the actors of the decision-making process that help collaborative decisions
to be formed, matured, digested, respected, and finally executed.
Keywords: Indecision, Uncertainty, Non-emergency situation, Modeling collaborative
decision-making, Best practices, Project
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General introduction
Once there is a calculation, there is no decision. Decision starts where
calculation stops2.
Bruno Jarrosson
Problem of delay in collaborative decision-making under uncertainty
In all industries, decision-making in R&D projects often implies coping with
uncertainty that is related to innovation. Uncertainty is related to, for example, the
properties and the development process of new products, competitors’ activities,
changes in regulation, the behavior of consumers, the market dynamics, the
shareholders’ conduct, etc. Faced with such uncertainties, it might be difficult to
make important decisions especially when public health and high investments are at
stake, as is the case in the pharmaceutical industry.
Drug development projects are composed of phases of tests and studies on new
compounds. At the end of each phase, a group of various experts has to decide
whether the development of a new medicine should be continued or stopped. These
decisions, called Go / No Go decisions, depend on the multidisciplinary results
of the tests that become progressively more accurate and complete throughout
the different phases of the projects. Sometimes, the results of the tests on a new
compound are conclusive enough to balance its benefits against its risks. Then, a
Go / No Go decision is easily and rapidly made. In other cases, the results are not
conclusive enough and consequently, it is difficult to assess the benefit-risk balance
of the new compounds. Additionally, Go / No Go decisions are collaborative which
makes it difficult to reach a compromise. In these cases, Go / No Go decisions under
high uncertainty may be either deferred, or invalidated a posteriori. However, to
improve public health and make projects profitable, it is essential to make decisions
effectively and quickly. Effective decision-making also prevents waste of time, and
human and material resources and reduces Time To Market (TMM) in a competitive
industrial context.
In addition to the high degree of uncertainty, some other elements may induce
decision-makers to delay or invalidate these decisions: 1) human health and high
2« Dès qu’il y a calcul, il n’y a plus décision. La décision commence là où cesse le calcul » [Jarrosson
1994].
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investments are at stake, 2) pharmaceutical R&D projects are long-lasting processes
and the consequences of decisions are known only after several months or even
years. Thus, decisions may seem non-emergency and delay may be tolerable, 3)
sometimes, especially in the early phases of the projects, Go / No Go decisions are
reversible.
The problem of delay in Go / No Go decisions in drug development projects has been
identified by our industrial partner, a specialist in pharmaceutical development
with 20 years of collaborative experience with several pharmaceutical companies.
The symptoms which have drawn the attention of our industrial partner and his
colleagues to a recurrent delay in difficult Go / No Go decision-making are as follows:
1) sometimes the same decision-makers discuss the same results several times. Thus,
meetings are held and re-held without decision outcomes, 2) sometimes decisions
are made but are not executed and are then invalidated a posteriori.
To investigate the problem of delay, we consider two distinct capabilities of decision-
makers pointed out by Marquès 2011: the capacity to evaluate a situation and the
capacity to decide. As Marquès 2011 states, statistical and simulation methods
help decision-makers to evaluate. In pharmaceutical R&D projects, statistical and
simulation methods and tools provide researchers and functional managers with
relevant information about the potentially interesting compounds, especially during
the research phases. At Go / No Go decision milestones, decision-makers have
already been provided with the simulation results which improve their capacity to
evaluate. At this level, the steering committee uses both explicit / formal and implicit
/ tacit / informal knowledge to shape a collaborative decision which is no longer a
matter of calculation, but a "matter of compromise" [Simon 1947].
In this regard, this thesis3 aims to identify the causes of delay and the efficient
practices that reduce this delay at a level wherein informal knowledge and group
interactions are involved.
Background
The situation of indecision in companies is perfectly described by Charan 2001:
when a project manager finishes a proposal for a heavy investment in a new product,
“the room falls quiet. People look left, right, or down, waiting for someone else
to open the discussion... the meeting breaks up inconclusively” and the scene is
repeated: “meetings, meetings, and more meetings...” without any decision being
taken. Charan 2001 points out some causes of indecision in organizations.
Ten years after Charan’s paper, a recent study indicates that, in the literature, “there is
a large body of research on when and how we make decisions, but little on when and
why we do not make them” [Brooks 2011]. Similar observations 4 are made in the
industrial world. For example, Davenport 2010 affirms that “very few organizations
3This thesis is a part of a research program lunched by FonCSI, entitled "Risk, Uncertainty and
Decision-making", see http://www.icsi-eu.org/english/research/CfP-2008/CfP-FonCSI-
2008-en.pdf
4Denis+ 2011 point out some astonishing examples of indecision: 17 years of stops and starts in
the project to construct the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, 20 years in a project of personal
public transportation in Paris, called Aramis that was never actually completed, 30 years in the new
international airport in Lisbon, indecision culture at Yahoo, Airbus, and Boeing.
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have undertaken systematic efforts to improve a variety of decisions” and Akdere
2011 points out that “organisational members are often left with making fast and
rapid decisions without being furnished with the knowledge and skills to make
them”. “The process employed, the information used, the logic relied on, have been
left up to them, in something of a black box. Information goes in, decisions come out
and who knows what happens in between?” [Davenport 2009].
Thus, as we have seen in the previous paragraphs, our research is triggered by the
identification of the problem of delay in decision-making by our industrial partner in
pharmaceutical drug development projects. It is motivated by a lack of study about
indecision, underlined in recent researches.
Approach
To understand the problem of delay in decision-making under uncertainty in
drug development projects, first, the context of the pharmaceutical industry
and the notions of uncertainty and indecision are reviewed. Through a brief
history of the pharmaceutical industry, we describe the increasing pressures on the
pharmaceutical industry and consequently, on the decision-makers in this field. We
present pharmaceutical R&D projects, Go / No Go decisions, benefit-risk balances
on which these decisions are based, and the difficulties relating to this balance.
After presenting the context, we seek to understand what uncertainty means.
Through a look at the etymology and the history of uncertainty and the study of
more recent literature, we point out the same etymological origin of decision and
uncertainty and highlight two main approaches to define and process uncertainty:
object-based and subject-based approaches. We show that to study the problem of
delay in decision-making, when faced with uncertainty, there is a need to bring
together these two approaches. Thus, we propose a more encompassing definition
of uncertainty which takes into consideration the role of object, subject, and context
in the generation and processing of uncertainty.
Secondly, since process modeling helps us to describe, visualize, and formalize
the decision-making process, and identify the dysfunctions of the process, we
model the decision-making process in pharmaceutical R&D projects. For this
purpose, we use the methods and tools of enterprise engineering. This process, at
a first level, highlights the activities of the different actors who contribute to the
information life cycle from information collection or production to its consumption,
meaning the point at which the decision is made. At a second level, to describe how
the information produced is processed by different decision-makers, we propose
a framework of collaborative decision-making. This framework visualizes and
formalizes how information is processed differently through cognitive processes by
various decision-makers. Based on this framework, an index of decision invalidation
is defined which helps analyze previous conflicts in past decisions and can be used
to anticipate future conflicts.
Thirdly, through an in-depth interview approach, the problematical activities of the
decision-making process, some causes of delay, and some efficient practices are
identified. A method is presented to analyze the content of the verbatim report of
in-depth interviews and to categorize the relevant causes and practices. The results
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of the categorization show that causes and practices are mostly related to the culture
and governance of companies, including organizational factors, and also to the
mutual expectations of the actors who play different roles in the decision-making
process.
Guideline for readers
As explained in the previous paragraphs, this thesis is constituted by: 1) bibliographi-
cal study, 2) process modeling through brainstorming with the industrial actors,
using methods and tools of enterprise engineering, and 3) collecting and structuring
efficient practices through in-depth interviews. These three items constitute the
three parts of this thesis. On the first two pages of each part, the main idea of the
part is presented including its Purpose, Design/methodology/approach, Findings,
Originality/value, and Research implications. All these elements are also described
within the parts, so some readers might want to skip these pages. Some margin notes
are added which give a title to the paragraphs to which they refer, explaining the
main idea of the paragraphs.
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Decision-making in drug
development projects
Context, particularities, and research statements
Purpose: decision-making under uncertainty is often difficult, especially when
public health and high investments are at stake, as is the case in the pharmaceutical
industry. The development of a new compound may be continued or stopped
depending on a series of Go / No Go decisions. These decisions are based on the
results of tests, which progressively become more accurate and complete over time.
Faced with a high degree of uncertainty, these decisions may be delayed. The first
chapter of this part aims to analyze the particularities of the pharmaceutical industry
and the difficulties of Go / No Go decision-making in this context. In the second
chapter, the notions of uncertainty and indecision are reviewed, so as to understand
and improve decision-making processes when faced with uncertainty.
Design/methodology/approach: the methods used for this part are a literature
review and a series of brainstorming sessions with our industrial partner.
Findings: an overview of the history and particularities of the pharmaceutical
industry is provided. A new definition of uncertainty is proposed, taking into account
four key aspects implicit in its creation and treatment: object, subject, context, and
time.
Originality/value: our bibliographical study on uncertainty is not limited to recent
research works. An overview of philosophical and academic definitions of uncertainty
underlines the two main approaches to defining it: an object-based approach (used
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in mathematics and economics), and a subject-based approach (used in human
sciences). The result is a more encompassing definition of uncertainty that merges
these two approaches and covers important aspects of processing uncertainty
in project management: the object (a project), the subject (actors), the context
(enterprise).
Research implications: this part contributes to a better understanding of the
problem of delay in drug development projects, where difficult Go / No Go decisions
need to be taken under conditions of uncertainty. The research questions that arise
from this first part, regarding indecision in organizations, will be answered in the two
following parts.
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Introduction - part I
At each of the milestones of a pharmaceutical R&D project, a group of multidisci-
plinary experts has to decide whether the development of a new compound should
be continued or stopped. These decisions, called Go / No Go decisions, are based
on the results of the tests and trials which aim to determine the safety, efficacy,
and quality of the new compound. The information about the properties of the
compound is incomplete and uncertain, especially in the early phases of the project,
and becomes more accurate and complete over time. However, even if the results are
not conclusive, a decision has to be made in order to push the project forward. The
problem is that a collaborative decision of this kind, when faced with uncertainty,
might be deferred, while awaiting more information, especially when the time
allocated to making the decision is not limited. This thesis investigates the problem
of delay in collaborative Go / No Go decisions under uncertainty, in non-emergency
situations.
This part includes two chapters. In the first chapter, the context of the pharmaceutical
industry and its specificities involving risky, expensive, and lengthy projects are
described, so as to better understand Go / No Go decisions.
In the second chapter, to investigate indecision in the face of uncertainty, two
notions of uncertainty and indecision are reviewed. First, the history of uncertainty
and its academic definitions are summarized and two main approaches to define
uncertainty are outlined: the object-based approach (used in mathematics and
economics), and the subject-based approach (used in psychology). However, in
project management, both object (a project) and subjects (actors) should be taken
into account to process uncertainty and reach the project’s goals. Thus, we propose
a definition of uncertainty in which the two main existing approaches converge.
Secondly, the notion of in/decision is reviewed, studying its potential causes and its
possible forms. This review reveals that although the problem of indecision has been
studied in depth in its individual dimension, its collaborative dimension has been
somewhat neglected. At the end of this part, our research questions are stated. These
will be answered in the two following parts.
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Difficult decisions in pharmaceutical
R&D projects
Poisons and medicines are oftentimes the same substance given with
different intents.
Peter Latham
“Things are better controlled if they are better understood” [Vernadat 1996]. Knowl-
edge acquisition in a given industrial field and its specificities helps to understand
the context in which projects are conducted. Internal reports, bibliographical and
field studies, including observation, interviewing, and questionnaires, are some
potential sources of knowledge that help describe and model a decision-making
process and then allow it to be improved. This chapter is based on a bibliographical
study and discussions with our industrial partner.
1.1 Specificities of the pharmaceutical industry
“Pharmacy is concerned with all aspects of the preparation and use of medicines,
from the discovery of their active ingredients to how they are used” [Anderson 2005].
The purpose of the pharmaceutical industry is to research, develop, manufacture,
and sell medicines for preventive or curative treatments [Gourc 2000]. The main
specificity of this industry is that public health is directly at stake, which today
implies close regulation and supervision by regulatory authorities, guaranteeing
the safety, efficacy, and quality of new medicines. Pharmacy research tools and
methods have evolved through the centuries and the regulations change every day.
To understand the context of the pharmaceutical industry today, it is useful to look at
the history of pharmacy, which is "as old as humanity itself" [Simon 2005].
1.1.1 A brief history of the pharmaceutical industry
The use of plants and animals as medicines goes back to the Antiquity [Zanders 2011].
The history of pharmacy is "a large and complex story" which has its specificities in
different countries [Anderson 2005]. However, three revolutions marked the course
of this history.
Before the late 19th century, pharmacists were making their drugs themselves from
various vegetable or mineral substances, using recipes collected in pharmacopoeias
[Dubois+ 1580; GMC 1864].
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Modern pharmaceutical research began in the 19th century with the development of
organic chemistry [Zanders 2011]. The late 19th - mid 20th century was marked by
the discovery of major active substances such as aspirin1 (1829), insulin2 (1922),Revolution of
chemistry and
biochemistry
penicillin3 (1928), and the first vaccines. Therapeutic research was booming and
gave birth to the pharmaceutical industry, with the development of synthetic drugs
in chemistry.
“Many drugs have been discovered by accident" [Zanders 2011]. Ban 2006 underlines
four types of serendipity4 in pharmacy, meaning finding a medicine:
– while looking for something else such as aniline purple, penicillin, lysergic
acid diethylamide, meprobamate, chlorpromazine, and imipramine. The
most famous new drug, penicillin, was discovered when one of Fleming’s
staphylococcus culture plates had become contaminated and developed a
mold that created a bacteria-free circle, while he worked on influenza,
– through "an utterly false rationale" such as potassium bromide, chloral
hydrate, and lithium. Potassium bromide, the oldest widely-used sedative5,
is used by internist Lockock to control epilepsy by reducing masturbation.
Lockock, like most physicians of his time, believed that there was a relationship
between masturbation and epilepsy and Bromides were known to decrease
the sex drive [Lehmann+ 1970],
– a valuable indication is found which was not initially sought such as iproniazid
which is used in the treatment of tubercular patients and its side effects led
to the development of monoamine oxidase inhibitors for the treatment of
depression,
– by "sheer luck" such as chlordiazepoxide in 1957 which is followed by diazepam
(Valium®) in 1963. The flask of chlordiazepoxide "was found, literally during a
laboratory clean-up".
It should be noted that serendipitous drug discoveries are also the result of the
curiosity and passion of the receptive minds of the pharmacists and chemists.
Unforeseen events have their place in research, as in any human activity [Dousset
2003], but as Pasteur states6 (1822-1895): “chance only favors the prepared mind”7
[Vallery Radot 1924]. During this "golden age" of drug discovery many drugs
1The Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine 1982 was awarded jointly to Sune K. Bergström, Bengt I.
Samuelsson, and John R. Vane. For more information see [Jack 1997].
2The Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine 1923 was awarded jointly to Frederick Banting and
James J. R. Macleod. For more information see [Bliss 1993].
3The Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine 1945 was awarded to Alexander Fleming. “The
improbable chain of events that led Alexander Fleming to discover penicillin in 1928 is the stuff of
which scientific myths are made” (100 People of the Century, TIME Magazine, http://www.time.
com/time/).
4The origin of this word is in a Persian fairy tale: The Three Princes of Serendipity (old Persian name
of Sri Lanka). The heroes of this tale were “always making discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of
things they were not in quest of” [Remer+ 1965].
5Bromide salts were "undoubtedly effective", although today they are eliminated from clinical use
because of their relatively low efficacy coupled with high toxicity [Ewing+ 1965], compared to new
products.
6Pasteur correctly developed the theory of immunization from an accident. Pasteur went on holiday.
His assistant, Charles Chamberland, did not inoculate a clutch of hens with cultures of chicken cholera
as he had been told to. Upon his return, Pasteur decided to test 1-month-cultures on the hens. The
results were unexpected. At first, the hens became ill and then recovered [Dixon 1980]
7« Dans les champs de l’observation, le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés. » Pasteur
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were developed that we use today [Zanders 2011]. Today, the comparison of
pharmacovigilance data bases helps drug repositioning8 based on unexpected
events. In recent years, the term "systemizing serendipity" [Datamonitor 2008] is
used to name rational approaches to drug repositioning that aims to discover /
explain new pharmacological mechanisms of action for known molecules. Sildenafil
is an important example of drug repositioning [Barratt+ 2012] which is an inhibitor
that dilates cardiac vessels with an unexpected side effect of penile erection and is
sold as Viagra® [Ban 2006].
The revolution in chemistry was followed by that of computers and robots which
changed, in turn, the mode of drug discovery and manufacturing. Sykes 1997 Revolution of
computersdescribes this revolution: “the old paradigm for drug discovery was one chemist, one
week, one molecule. Now, that one chemist, with one computer and one robot is
capable within one week of producing at least 10,000 molecules.”
The third revolution is that of biotechnology, which is the “use of living organisms
and their components in agriculture, food, and other industrial processes” [Bhatia
2005]. The pharmaceutical industry is probably the most affected, of all industries, Revolution of
biotechnologyby biotechnology. Biotechnology products include vitamins, hormones, more potent
antibiotics, and specific clinical substances used in pregnancy and diabetes tests
[USITC 1984]. Biotechnology is considered as the future of pharmacy. The success of
the biomedicines market is mainly due to monoclonal antibodies, in the field of
oncology9. In 2009, there were more than 20 monoclonal antibody-based drugs
on the market, including several blockbusters [Patlak 2009]. In 2010, 50% of the
drugs developed were in biomedicines10 [Bohineust 2010], where monoclonal
antibody-based drugs represent 40.1% of the biomedicines market11.
In parallel with these revolutions, the regulation of medicines also evolved: until the
mid-20th century, clinical observation of some patients was sufficient to demonstrate
the therapeutic benefits of a molecule. Today, thousands of observations are required
to obtain marketing authorization. The "modern" regulatory system came into force Changes in
regulationafter the Thalidomide®12 tragedy, also known as Contergan [Mussen+ 2010]. The
Thalidomide® catastrophe occurred because, at that time, the study of reproductive
toxicity in different animal species had not been elaborated. Reproductive toxicity
studies became very important after this tragedy [Gad 2008]. This catastrophe
demonstrated the failure of traditional regulations in the era of industrial research,
and "made it clear just how complex the medical market had become" [Quirke+
2008]. Consequently, the regulations have changed and become increasingly strict:
“in spite of the ever-increasing spending on R&D over the last decades, the number of
8“Drug repositioning is a promising field in drug discovery that identifies new therapeutic
opportunities for existing drugs.” [Macor 2011]. “Drug repositioning / indications discovery has
historically been the result of serendipity” [Barratt+ 2012].
9Source: http://www.glycode.fr/pages/les-enjeux-economiques.html
10« La biotech, science des organismes vivants, est considérée comme l’avenir de la pharmacie : 50 %
des médicaments sont aujourd’hui développés dans cet univers » [Bohineust 2010].
11Source: http://www.glycode.fr/pages/les-enjeux-economiques.html
12Thalidomide® “was undoubtedly the most significant adverse event in pharmaceutical industry”
[Mussen+ 2010]. It was introduced in 1957 as a sedative or hypnotic for morning sickness of pregnancy.
The extremely rare deformities of the newborn babies were reported such as the absence of hands
and/or feet [Burley 1988]. The latest news about Thalidomide® is that “makers of Thalidomide®
apologized after 50 years”, see http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1209/01/cnr.07.
html
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New Molecular Entity (NME) approvals has declined significantly” [Sanchez Serrano
2011]. In Europe, marketing authorizations dropped by half between 1992 and 2008
[Bohineust 2010].
Another change was that the Thalidomide® scandal was followed by Radio, TV, and
newspaper reporters. “The role of the public became visible... [and] drugs had
become an everyday consumer good” [Gaudillière+ 2008]. The role of media has
been studied in other affairs13.
Increasing pressure on healthcare finance is another reason for change in the
external business environment of the pharmaceutical industry. The healthcare
budget is a considerable part of public expenditure, “even in the USA where private
medicine is dominant” [Sykes 1997]. In the early 1990s, sluggish economic growth,
elevated unemployment rates, and ageing demographic profiles increased pressure
on welfare policies. European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) imposed
restraints on social spending. French and German authorities adopted reforms in
social-insurance policies such as healthcare [Vail 2009]. In 2008, the financial crisis
drove governments to take measures in order to restrict reimbursements, decrease
medicine prices, increase generic and substitute medicines, and demand strong
proof of value [Behner+ 2009]. This crisis forced laboratories to find sources of
savings rapidly through, for example, acquisitions. Four of the biggest American
laboratories thus restructured: Pfizer acquired Wyeth Group, Merck & Co. acquired
Schering-Plough Laboratory, Abbott acquired the pharmaceutical subsidiary of the
Solvay group... [LEEM 2012].
In sum, the main changes through this brief history of pharmacy can be summarized
as follows:
– scientific and technological changes have multiplied the number of choices
of new molecules in a reduced time and offered opportunities to discover
new medicines, but have not necessarily facilitated drug candidate selection.
Similarly, biotechnology is now essential in the discovery of new molecules,
but it operates in a different culture from the culture of origin of the chemical
laboratories. Therefore, uncertainty has increased in the new era of the
pharmaceutical industry. In this "very complex industry", companies need to
adapt to changes in order to make science and technology work with business
in a way to satisfy all stakeholders [Baines 2010],
– considerable changes in regulation which imply high safety, efficacy, quality,
and also innovation of a candidate drug, compared to existing medicines in
the market: health authorities have become "more demanding" [Bohineust
2010],
– rise in public awareness which changes the "traditional" relationship be-
tween industry, doctor, and patient. Internet now gives information to patients
who are becoming "more demanding of their healthcare providers" and
sometimes obliges companies to justify their development decisions [Sykes
1997]. Thus, patients have became the actors in their own health,
13Pieters+ 2008 study the role of TV in Halcion® (triazolam) affair. Gabe 1997 considers that scientific
information circulates in professional and non-professional circles and Lasagna 1980 states: “whatever
the final verdict on triazolam may be, there is reason to question whether regulatory decisions forced
by flamboyant media coverage are in the public interest.”
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Table 1.1: High expenditure rate in pharmaceutical R&D, presented in billions of
dollars and as a percentage of turnover [Bohineust 2010]
Laboratories Merck &
Co.
Roche Novartis Pfizer Sanofi-
Aventis
GSK
R&D budget $5.8 B $9.3 B $7.5 B $7.8 B $6.2 B $6.3 B
Turnover 21.2% 20.1% 17% 15.7% 15.6% 14.4%
– pressures on healthcare finances which represents an important proportion
of government expenditure in all developed economies. “Pressure on public
finances converts into pressure on healthcare costs” [Sykes 1997].
The history of the pharmaceutical industry shows that it is subject to various kinds of
changes, uncertainties, and pressures. These changes imply rapid adaptation to the
environment which demands safer, more innovative, and less expensive drugs, while
the pharmaceutical R&D expenditure is high and continues to increase. In this
context, the choice of molecules to be developed is primordial to ensure public health
and promote the economic growth of the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, the right
choices must be rapidly made at the outset of the project to take the opportunities of
developing safe and effective medicines and to limit the consumption of resources
by those that do not prove to be safe and effective. This pressure influences the
behavior of decision-makers who are perfectly aware of the impacts of their decisions,
especially in the particular economic context of pharmaceutical R&D projects.
In order to better understand this context, in the next section some economic
specificities of the pharmaceutical industry are outlined.
1.1.2 Economics of the pharmaceutical industry
Some specificities distinguish the economics of the pharmaceutical industry from
other industries:
– high expenditure rate in R&D. For example, in France, the total budget for
research is certainly lower in absolute value than for the car industry, but it
represents 12.3% of the turnover of pharmaceutical companies, compared to
only 4.2% for the car industry [LEEM 2008] and continues to increase. For the
six companies mentioned in tab. 1.1, the R&D budget reaches $42.9 billion in
total. It represents an average of 17.33% of their turnovers [Bohineust 2010],
– the pharmaceutical industry is highly fragmented, since no pharmaceutical
company held more than 10% of the market share in 2000 [Gourc+ 2000] and
despite the mergers and acquisitions that regularly make the headlines of the
financial press, the world leader, Pfizer, held only 6.6% of market share in 2011,
and the first five groups14 represent 26% of the global market against 40% in
the computer industry, 50% in the car industry, and 80% in the aerospace
industry [LEEM 2012],
14Pfizer (USA): 6.6%, Novartis (Switzerland): 6.0%, Merck & Co. (USA): 4.7%, Sanofi-Aventis (France):
4.6%, AstraZeneca (United Kingdom): 4.3%, source: Intercontinental Marketing Services-Health
(IMS-Health).
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– the duration of pharmaceutical R&D projects is, on average, more than 13
years [Paul+ 2010], while the length of drug patent protection is 20 years,
starting from the date of invention. Thus, as one project manager emphasizes,
“less than seven years remain before the entry of the first generic medicines
onto the market”. Until the mid-1980s, the revenues from branded drugs
decreased gradually after the expiration of their patents. Today, revenues
from multibillion-dollar blockbusters plunge by 90% in a few weeks after the
expiration of their patent protection [Garnier 2008].
In this rapidly-changing and highly-competitive context, it is crucial that pharmaceu-
tical actors make Go / No Go decisions effectively and rapidly in order to make
projects profitable. As Midler 2004 emphasizes, in pharmaceutical R&D projects,
speed is a decisive criterion, not only because of the economic bonus of being
first-to-market, but also because the authorities are now tending to refuse marketing
authorization for medicines whose effects are similar to existing ones15. However, as
some actors complain, some of Go / No Go decisions are frequently delayed. In
the next section, we explain different phases of the pharmaceutical R&D projects,
Go / No Go decisions, their specificities, and their difficulties.
1.2 Specificities of the pharmaceutical R&D projects
1.2.1 Phases of drug discovery and development projects
A drug development project is defined as a process of knowledge acquisition on a
presumably active chemical or biological entity that may become a new medicine
[Gourc+ 2000]. Developing a new medicine is very different from the creation of a
manufactured product. This is a long, risky, and technologically and commercially
complex process16 [Midler 2004].
A lot of questions have to be answered in order to know the behavior of a new
compound in the human body, including its absorption, distribution, metabolism,
mechanism of action, side effects, elimination, etc. Drug discovery and development
projects are composed of several phases of trials that aim to answer these questions
progressively, in accordance with the Notice To Applicant (NTA)17 [EC 2008].
Fig. 1.1 illustrates the phases of pharmaceutical R&D projects, composed of discovery
and development phases. Discovery phases18 are composed of Target-to-hit, Hit-to-
lead, and Lead optimization phases, which aim to identify disease mechanisms
15“Le critère de vitesse est ici tout à fait déterminant. Arriver au premier dans la course aux nouveaux
médicaments actifs pour une pathologie donnée est décisif, non seulement à cause de la prime
économique que donne naturellement cette position, mais aussi parce que, pour limiter l’augmentation
des dépenses de santé liées à la multiplication de nouveaux médicaments, les autorités régulatrices
tendent aujourd’hui de plus en plus à refuser l’autorisation de mise sur le marché de produits dont les
effets sont proches d’autres qui existent déjà” [Midler 2004].
16“Un développent en pharmacie est bien différent de la création d’un produit manufacturé, mais il
n’a rien à envier sur le plan de complexité, à un projet automobile par exemple. C’est une opération
longue, hasardeuse, complexe technologiquement et commercialement” [Midler 2004].
17The NTA produces a series of regulatory guidances to assist pharmaceutical actors in the preparation
of the results of studies on medical products, in an acceptable format. “NTA has been prepared by the
European Commission in consultation with the competent authorities of the Member States, the
European Medicines Agency and interested parties in order to fulfil the Commission’s obligations” [EC
2008].
18These research phases correspond to research into new chemical compounds and are a little
different for biomedicines.
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Figure 1.1: Different phases of drug discovery and development projects, adapted
from Paul+ 2010
and the functions of potential target drugs, to confirm the chemical structures
of new compounds, and to improve their properties. The development phases19
include preclinical, clinical, and submission phases. In these knowledge acquisition
processes, different information about the new molecules is produced gradually
when the results of each phase become available. At the end of each phase, based on
the available results of the trials, a Go / No Go decision must be made on transition
to the next phase.
In the preclinical phase, the compound is tested on animals, in order to determine
the maximum non-toxic dose and examine the efficacy of the drug. In phase I, the
compound is tested on some healthy subjects, to find tolerable dose ranges. The
main goal of the trials in phase II is to establish the efficacy and safety windows of the
compound in the target population (patients), by identifying the minimum effective
and the maximum tolerated doses on this population. In phase III, the compound is
tested on a large number of the target population, in order to identify side effects. In
parallel, the route of administration, the availability and mode of production of the
new compound are also studied. The results for the safety, efficacy, and quality
of the compound in animal and human subjects become progressively available
through the project phases. If, at the end of the phase III, a Go decision is made for
submission to launch, the results of the tests and studies must be presented in an
internationally accepted format, called a Common Technical Document (CTD)20, to
be submitted to regulatory authorities.
As fig. 1.1 shows, a pharmaceutical R&D project lasts on average over 13 years and
costs about $873 million, including the cost of the stopped processes to achieve one
NME launch [Paul+ 2010]. Garnier 2008 estimates a cost of more than $1 billion – a
figure higher than NASA’s budget for sending a rocket to the moon. The success rate
of pharmaceutical R&D projects is only 4%, meaning more than 24 Works In Process
(WIPs) are needed to achieve one NME launch [Paul+ 2010].
As we have seen in this section, pharmaceutical R&D projects involve considerable
time and financial investment. The accomplishment of these projects depends on
19These development phases are common to chemical medicines and biomedicines.
20“The CTD is an internationally agreed format for the preparation of applications to be submitted
to regulatory authorities in the three International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) regions of
Europe, USA and Japan. It is intended to save time and resources and to facilitate regulatory review and
communication... The CTD gives no information about the content of a dossier and does not indicate
which studies and data are required for a successful approval” [EC 2008].
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Go / No Go decisions wherein the degree of uncertainty is high and human health
and high investments are at stake. In the next section, we shall see on what basis
these high-stake decisions are taken.
1.2.2 Difficulty of Go / No Go decisions based on the benefit-risk balance
Go / No Go decisions are made by a steering committee which includes various
experts: chemists, pharmacologists, toxicologists, clinicians, marketeers, etc.
According to the phase of the project, different weights may be given to different
experts’ opinions.
To decide whether to continue the project, experts assess a benefit-risk balance of the
new compound. In the European pharmaceutical legislation, benefit-risk balance is
defined as “an evaluation of the positive therapeutic effects of the medicinal product
in relation to the risks”21. The benefits of the new medicine, which are “the helpful
effects you get when you use the medicine”, and the risks, which are “the chances
that something unwanted or unexpected could happen to you when you use the
medicine”, are evaluated and balanced out [FDA 2002].
At the end of a phase, the results of the trials and studies may be conclusive enough,
meaning good enough to continue the development or bad enough to stop it. In
these cases, the benefit-risk assessment is clearly conclusive and the Go / No Go
decision is rapid. Today, when a molecule is toxic in one species, its development is
stopped in line with the principle of precaution and the respect of ethical values.
Toxicology suffer no procrastination and a No Go decision is thus easy and rapid.
Such standards mean that some drugs approved in the past and currently on the
market would not be approved today because of their contradictory results on
different animal species: “aspirin would not be approved today” [Pizzorno+ 2010],
since poorly tolerated by rabbits [Kohn+ 1997]. “Aspirin and Tylenol® kill cats,
penicillin kills guinea pigs, Advil® and Motrin® cause severe gastric problems in
dogs, Dristan® is harmful to cats, [and] eye drops can cause blindness in animals”
(Dr. Roy Kupsinel in [Silverman 2004]).
In other cases, the results are not conclusive enough to assess the benefit-risk
balance and Go / No Go decisions are difficult to make. For example, efficacy tests on
different kinds of animals during the preclinical phase may give contradictory results
and then not be conclusive enough to begin tests on human subjects at the clinical
phase. In these cases, a Go decision implies taking risks on human health and the
additional investments that might be lost if the results of the next phases are bad
and development is ultimately stopped at a later date. A No Go decision stops the
development of a medicine that may be safe and effective on human subjects. It
also implies accepting the loss of the investment in the performed phases, while
decision-makers are unsure about the properties of either the studied compound, or
the potential competitive drugs.
To understand the problem of delay, the difficulties22 of the benefit-risk balance are
reviewed in the next section.
21Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001, available
in http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2001_83_cons/dir2001_83_
cons_20081230_en.pdf
22Most of these difficulties are discussed, from the point of view of the health authorities, in more
detail by Mussen+ 2010.
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1.2.2.1 Great deal of information required to assess the benefit-risk balance
Benefit-risk assessment involves reviewing a large amount of relevant information
generated over several years of tests and studies to know the properties of a new
compound. Different dosages and forms of the compound are tested on various
animal species, and different sub-populations of the target population such as old
people, children, pregnant and nursing women. Additionally, drug-drug interactions
should also be considered for the possible cases of co-administration of multiple
drugs [Wang 2007].
Often a development candidate is tested for several therapeutic indications or in
different formulations [Kennedy 1998] and a benefit-risk assessment is necessary for
each therapeutic indication [Mussen+ 2010]. The seriousness of the disease also
needs to be taken into consideration: “acceptable risks for anti-cancer medicines are
not acceptable for most other indications”, according to one expert.
The difficulty of benefit-risk balance is not only related to the quantity of multidisci-
plinary information to be taken into account. The uncertainty of this information
also causes difficulty in assessing the benefit-risk balance.
1.2.2.2 Uncertainty of the benefit-risk balance
Benefits and risks cannot be completely known, particularly in the early phases of a
project, because:
1. the paradigm of these projects is that the information about the safety, efficacy,
and quality of the molecules is produced progressively throughout the different
phases. At the end of each phase, decision-makers would like to know more
to make a Go / No Go decision. The question is whether it is relevant /
appropriate to seek to know more before deciding, or whether the available
elements are sufficient,
2. the results of studies may include some incomplete or even contradictory
information, which becomes available and more accurate progressively,
3. the results of studies and trials on thousands of patients, even when coherent
and complete, cannot incontestably predict the benefits and the risks of a new
compound for the millions of patients of the final target population.
At the end of the project, regulatory authorities assess a final benefit-risk balance to
approve a new medicine. At that time, all trials and studies are finished on a relatively
small number of patients, 4,000-10,000, compared to the several millions that may
use the medicine after its commercialization. Therefore, even at the time the product
is ready to be launched on the market, it is difficult to assess the benefit-risk balance
over a long-term period and on a large target population. “This difficulty can also be
shown by some divergences of opinion of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) about the same molecules. It shows how
benefit-risk assessment can be less obvious during development phases, when all
results are not yet known” an expert indicates.
As fig. 1.1 shows, for each successful process, about 23 development processes are
stopped in different phases. For example, in a full 50% of projects that are ultimately
abandoned, failure is due to lack of therapeutic efficacy compared to placebos, and
31% to lack of safety [Gordian+ 2006].
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1.2.2.3 Different natures of the benefits and risks
Benefits and risks are not of the same nature and dimensions [Herxheimer 2001].
Benefit is a quantity and risk is a probability. A minimal benefit with a probability of
99% is usually not tempting and a tiny risk with a probability of 1% cannot always be
ignored [Cheung+ 2001]. Additionally, the long-term benefits have to be balanced
against the short-term risks, or vice versa. For example, with a contraceptive, the
benefit of not getting pregnant tomorrow must be balanced with the risk of venous
thrombosis in 15 to 25 years [Herxheimer 2001]. Thus, in most cases neither the
benefits nor the risks can be compared quantitatively in a simple and appropriate
way [CIOMS 1998].
1.2.2.4 Evolution of the benefit-risk balance
A benefit-risk balance evolves as new data comes to light through the various
phases of the project. This assessment is dynamic over time, for two reasons: first, a
revealing of information about the medicine itself: a medicine can be considered
safe for several years, but ultimately deemed unsafe after the discovery of new
risks. Such was the case for rofecoxib, for example. Secondly, new information may
emerge about a competing medicine that affects the benefit-risk balance of the
studied medicine, such as a new anti-cancer drug when compared to previous ones
[Mussen+ 2010]. About 19% of ultimately- abandoned projects concerned medicines
that were not safer or more effective than the medicines already available on the
market [Gordian+ 2006].
Furthermore, the benefit-risk balance of a compound may be considered differently,
depending on the new information about the other projects in the firm’s pipeline.
1.2.2.5 Subjectivity of the benefit-risk balance
In addition to the objective difficulties, benefit and risk, as fundamentally evaluative
terms, involve subjective value judgments. This judgment must be based on facts
about the effects of the medicine. But it is also superimposed by cultural, social,
philosophical, political, and religious values [Veatch 1993]. “Benefit-risk assessment
is essentially a value judgment, inevitably it will be prone to a number of biases”
[Bowen 1993]. Thus, benefits and risks are compared and perceived differently by
various actors, using different criteria [Bowen 1993]. Mussen+ 2010 and Spilker 1994
present these actors: 1) pharmaceutical companies, who produce medicines, “view
benefits in terms of their ability to demonstrate sufficient efficacy”, 2) regulatory
authorities who approve medicines, “view benefits and risks for the nation as a
whole rather than for individuals”, 3) third-party payers who reimburse, 4) physicians
who prescribe, and 5) patients who use medicines and as Veatch 1993 indicates
often have a very personal point of view. Thus, the pharmaceutical actors, who are
the first to assess the benefit-risk balance of a new compound, should consider
the possible reflections of the regulatory authorities, health insurance institutions,
physicians, and patients. It makes assessing this balance more difficult, compared to
an objective evaluation that has more chance of being accepted by everyone. Even
within a company, focuses on risks and benefits are not the same for different actors.
Traditionally, R&D staff focus primarily on risks, whereas, marketers and advertising
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staff focus on benefits [Mussen+ 2010]. Thus, in addition to the objective difficulties
of benefit-risk balance, subjective value judgments make reaching a compromise on
this assessment more difficult, given that a benefit-risk assessment in a firm has to
be accepted by society in the future.
Two other elements, which are not considered as difficulties, might induce decision-
makers to postpone or invalidate Go / No Go decisions. First, Go / No Go decisions
are often reversible. New information about the compound may call into question a
previous decision. Such a decision does not have a "stable" but rather a "fragile"
status. Secondly, Go / No Go decisions may not seem urgent, compared to emergency
situations such as accidents, crises, or disaster contexts wherein an immediate
decision and reaction is necessary and its consequences can often be known
immediately. Pharmaceutical R&D projects last more than ten years and the
consequences of Go / No Go decisions are not immediate, thus delays of several
months may be ignored or tolerated.
1.3 Formulation of the problem of delay in drug development projects
In this chapter, we have seen that pharmaceutical R&D projects are risky, expensive,
and long-lasting projects that have to be accomplished in a changing and uncertain
context, with strict regulation and ever tighter healthcare budgets. Several Go / No Go
decisions have to be made throughout these projects to continue or stop the
development of the new compounds, depending on their benefit-risk balances.
In this context, Go / No Go decisions are characterized by: 1) a high degree of
complexity: a large amount of inter-connected information from various fields
must be taken into account to make Go / No Go decisions, 2) a strong degree of
uncertainty: Go / No Go decisions are taken under uncertainty due to the lack of
knowledge about the safety, efficacy, and quality of the new compounds, and also
about competitors’ activities, 3) reversibility of decisions: Go / No Go decisions are
not definitive and can be revised, 4) non-emergency situations: the long duration of
these projects may induce experts to think that they have enough time to decide, 5)
the collaborative aspect: Go / No Go decisions are made by a steering committee
wherein individual differences and interactions between experts may complicate the
decision (or indecision) process.
All these elements, related to the context of Go / No Go decisions, may end up as
brakes on decision-making. However, if a compound is going to become a successful
drug, it should be commercialized quickly to minimize Time To Market (TTM) and
optimize the profits before the entry of the generic (see section 1.1.2 on page 13),
in order to cover the cost of the failed projects. If a compound is going to fail, it
should fail as soon as possible to prevent wasting more investments. Therefore,
delays in decision-making in the development process may cause heavy losses in the
commercialization period. Hence, it is necessary to understand and analyze the
problem of delay in order to reduce it.
In order to better understand the problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go decisions
and to define and position our research questions, the notions of in/decision and
uncertainty are reviewed in the next chapter.
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Indecision problem in the face of
uncertainty
The only thing that makes life possible is permanent, intolerable
uncertainty; not knowing what comes next.
Ursula K. Le Guin
The survival and evolution of Homo sapiens, through natural selection, is due to
his decision-making capacities which result in flexible behavior [Mithen 1990]
under uncertainty. Conscious decision-making is maybe our most fundamental
capability. “In order to understand this capability, we need to understand the notion
of uncertainty first” [Klir 2005], especially when decisions are delayed in the face of
uncertainty. Thus, in the first section of this chapter, we aim to understand what
uncertainty means. Through a look at the etymology and the history of uncertainty
and the study of more recent literature, we highlight two main approaches to define
and process uncertainty: object-based and subject-based approaches. We show that
to study the problem of delay in decision-making, when faced with uncertainty, there
is a need to converge these two approaches. Thus, we propose a more encompassing
definition of uncertainty, taking into account the role of object, subject, and context
in the generation and processing of uncertainty.
After defining uncertainty, coming back to the problem of indecision, an overview of
the causes of indecision is presented. We show that the causes of indecision are
tightly interconnected with the factors that generate uncertainty or help process it.
Specifically, the causes of indecision related to: 1) the object i.e. to imperfection
of information about an object, which is studied in AI, 2) the subject i.e. to the
personality of the decision-maker, which is widely studied in psychology, 3) the
context i.e. to the situation and organization wherein decisions are made. The
causes related to the context, as some recent works indicate, are less frequent in the
literature [Davenport 2010; Denis+ 2011]. We present a summary of the few existing
studies on indecision in organizations. Finally, we formulate our research questions,
so as to investigate the problem of delay in collaborative decisions in organizations.
2.1 Characterizing uncertainty
Uncertainty is commonly found in daily life and in several scientific fields. In daily
life, uncertainty is associated either to the unpredictability of an unexpected event
and its consequences, or to the consequences of an intended, programmed event or
action. In the first case, things do not turn out as expected; for example: the attacks
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on the Twin Towers on September 11th 2001, the financial crisis in 2008, the A H1N1
pandemic1 in 2009, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill caused by British Petroleum
in 2010, the Icelandic volcano eruptions: Eyjafjöll in 2010 and Grímsvötn in 2011
that cause the cancellation of thousands of flights. Thus, an unexpected event
immediately disturbs the course of actions and its evolution and consequences are
unknown. In the second case, the consequences of something programmed remain
indeterminate for a long time, for example the result of a presidential election,
the consequences of a court verdict, the exhaustive consequences of Genetically
Modified Organism (GMO), the impacts of Greece’s renewed budget plan, etc.
In scientific fields, uncertainty is a factor either in understanding the world or in
controlling it and adapting decisions and actions. In the first case, scientists aim
to understand the world and an immediate control is not intended. For example,
NASA sends the Curiosity Rover2 to Mars or palaeontologists will study the frozen
mammoth found in Siberia, which died around 30,000 years ago 3. In the second
case, uncertain information is processed to forecast weather or the trends on the
stock markets, to make smarter robots, etc.
What are the common points in all these uncertainties in various fields? To under-
stand why sometimes decisions are deferred in the face of uncertainty, we aim to
define and characterize uncertainty. In this section of this chapter, we answer the
following questions4. What is the etymological root of uncertainty? What is the link
between uncertainty, decision, and risk? How is uncertainty perceived and treated in
different periods by human beings? How is uncertainty defined in dictionaries and in
the scientific literature?
2.1.1 Etymology of uncertainty and its link with decision
The word uncertainty comes5 from vulgar Latin certanus, which is from Latin certus,
originally a variant past participle of cernere, meaning "to distinguish, decide",Same root of
uncertainty and
decision
literally "to sift, separate". Cernere comes from Proto-Indo-European root krei which
is also the root of "crisis". The verb "decide" comes from the Latin decidere, "to
decide, determine", literally meaning "to cut off".
This origin indicates: 1) uncertainty and decision have the same root and are
tightly interconnected, 2) making a decision implies not possessing a whole after
cutting and thus a sense of loss, 3) crisis branches from the same root. In the next
section, to better understand the notion of uncertainty today, we present an overview
of the philosophical visions of uncertainty through the centuries. It shows how the
conception of uncertainty evolved in human awareness.
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Question knowledge acquired.
Answer metaphysical questions.
Explain natural phenomena to 
improve human life.
Process uncertainty to survive.
Figure 2.1: Motivations of human beings for dealing with uncertainty
2.1.2 A brief history of uncertainty
A common point of the different reactions of human beings to uncertainty is an
effort to eliminate it. The motivations and means used by humanity to eliminate
uncertainty were diverse in different ages. In this regard, we can identify four major
motivations: to survive, to live, to answer questions on human existence, and to
question the knowledge obtained. Fig. 2.1 shows the four levels that we distinguish:
1. in prehistoric times, the treatment of uncertainty was a vital issue for our
ancestors Homo sapiens. They lived in a predator environment. The survival
instinct was thus the first decision tool faced with uncertainty. Evolution
chose a brain anatomy which best dealt with uncertainty6.
2. in the age of the Antiquity, human beings began to ask less vital questions,
seeking out explanations to understand natural phenomena. The question of
survival was transformed into a question of living conditions. Four levels of
uncertainty
treatment
throughout
history
3. then, human beings dealt with uncertainties regarding their own existence.
In those ancient times, the myth was probably the first attempt to reduce
uncertainty [Bronner 1997]. Witchcraft, by predicting the future, was a means
to guide decisions. Religion in turn, by providing answers to metaphysical
questions, provided an account to create certainty. Logic and mathematics
proposed reasoning rules to reduce uncertainty and provide methods and
tools to create certainty, such as surveying and accounting [De Wilde 2010].
4. having survived and begun to better understand their physical environment,
and found or invented some answers to metaphysical questions, humans
1Steyer+ 2010 study the treatment of uncertainty in the time of the A H1N1 flu pandemic in
companies.
2http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/msl/msl5things20100916.html
35th October 2012: “the remains of a woolly mammoth have been found by an 11-year-old boy in a
remote part of northern Russia”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/19848152
4A more complete version of this section is presented, in French, in the FonCSI industrial notebook
[Hassanzadeh+ 2011a], available in: http://www.foncsi.org/media/PDF/CSI-incertitude-
approches.pdf
5http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=certain&allowed_in_frame=0
6History of decision-making under uncertainty, presentation of Philippe De Wilde, 2010, Department
of Computer Science Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh [De Wilde 2010], available in: http://www.
macs.hw.ac.uk/~pdw/main1.pdf
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Figure 2.2: Platonic view of knowledge path, from [Allert 2002]
began to question their own knowledge. The philosophers were the first to
formulate questions on the objectivity and subjectivity of certainties.
The ancient philosophers underlined the importance of distinction between subjec-
tivity and objectivity through the illusion in subjectivity and the contribution of
reason in objectivity:
– Socrates (5th century BC) said that believing in some uncertainties was the
worst possible mistake. He affirmed that his wisdom was limited to the
awareness of his ignorance [Plato 360 BCa].
– Plato (4th century BC) examined "the illusion of knowledge", describing the
path from ignorance to knowledge [Plato 360 BCb], as is shown in fig. 2.2:
opinion7 can be apprehended via perception or illusion and knowledge via
reasoning and understanding [Allert 2002]. Therefore, an immediate certaintyUncertainty
about knowledge (or opinion) should be distinguished from reality, since it can have external
appearances without being a fact [Plato 360 BCb].
– Carneades (2nd Century BC), a sceptic philosopher, affirms that there is
no criterion to state with certainty the truth of a representation, “since
representation, which should simultaneously reveal the condition of the
subject and the reality of the external object, is often a source of error”
[Brunschwig+ 2003]. Carneades also rejects reason, since it is based on
sensation which may lead to error [Cicero 2007; Brunschwig+ 2003].
Thus, the notion of subjectivity emerged with the demonstration of the role of our
representations in our judgments.
After the development of several schools of thought in ancient Greece, during
the Middle Ages, philosophy was overshadowed by religion in Europe. In the
Middle East, Ghazali (1058-1111), the author of The Incoherence of the Philosophers,
evoked doubts about the validity of knowledge. Ghazali points out two sourcesDominance of
religion in Middle
Ages
of knowledge: subjective and objective sources. Revelation and intuition shape
subjective knowledge "without any objective help or means" [Khan 1976]. In
1095, Ghazali, through a spiritual crisis of doubt, opted for Sufism and subjective
knowledge, explaining that “knowledge is completely subjective. It is neither the
result of pure intelligence, nor dogmatism. It belongs to the heart as the superior
organ”8 [Jabre 1958].
7“An opinion is an incomplete holding-to-be-true based on insufficient grounds, from which I
derive nothing” [Kant 2004].
8« Connaissance est d’une nature complètement subjective. Elle n’est ni le fruit de l’intelligence
pure, ni de la dogmatique. Elle appartient au cœur comme l’organe supérieur aux autres organe. » (La
notion de certitude selon Ghazali dans ses origines psychologiques et historiques [Jabre 1958]).
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During the Renaissance, the history of certainty is deeply marked by the philosopher
René Descartes (1596-1650) who considers mathematical certainty as absolute Dominance of
perfect rationality
in Renaissance
certainty [Descartes 1996], assuming that all phenomena should be explained in
terms of mathematical reasoning [Descartes 1637].
The vision of Descartes continues to endure through the following centuries: “an
intelligence which for a given instant knew all the forces by which nature is animated,
and the respective situations of the existences which compose it;... nothing would be
uncertain to it and the future as the past would be present to its eyes”9 [Laplace 1986,
translated by Pearson 1978]10.
Similarly, Lord Kelvin reduces scientific knowledge to something expressible in
number: “in physical science the first essential step in the direction of learning any
subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning and practicable methods for
measuring some quality connected with it. I often say that when you can measure
what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something
about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, Scientific
knowledge in the
19th century
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of
knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of science,
whatever the matter may be” [Kelvin 1891]. “This statement captures concisely the
spirit of science in the 19th century: scientific knowledge should be expressed in
precise numerical terms; imprecision and other types of uncertainty do not belong
to science” [Klir 2005].
However, some other philosophers have a different attitude in the face of uncertainty.
They accept some limits in its treatment and admit that human beings do not answer
all their questions by logic, mathematics, and physics:
– Blaise Pascal (1623-1662): “all that I know is, that I must soon die;... this only I
know, that when I leave this world, I must either fall forever into nothingness, Limits of
certainty in
metaphysical
questions
or into the hands of an incensed God...” [Pascal 1849],
– Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804): “no one, it is true, will be able to boast that he
knows that there is a God and a future life;... No, my conviction is not logical,
but moral certainty” [Kant 1855].
These metaphysical questions show some limits in the treatment of uncertainty.
Subjective un/certainty is only recognized in metaphysical philosophy. In science,
the emphasis is on objective certainty that aims to completely eliminate uncertainty,
giving explanations and predictions for all phenomena. This mode of thinking had
been dominant in science prior to the 20th century affirms Klir 2005, explaining that Limits of
certainty in
particle physics
“while ordinary life without uncertainty is unimaginable, science without uncertainty
was traditionally viewed as an ideal”. Mechanic questions are answered thanks to the
laws of Newton. In the late 19th century, Newton’s laws reached their limits in the
study of very small particles, such as electrons. Statistical mechanics were then used
to study microscopic systems. Thus, uncertainty is recognized and studied as a real
9Original statement in French: « une intelligence qui, à un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les
forces dont la nature est animée et la situation respective des êtres qui la compose embrasserait dans la
même formule les mouvements des plus grands corps de l’univers et ceux du plus léger atome, rien ne
serait incertain pour elle, et l’avenir, comme le passé, serait présent à ses yeux » [Laplace 1986].
10For more explanations see [Keuzenkamp 2000]. For the entire translation of Laplace’s book see
[Laplace+ 2007].
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physics problem and “the negative attitude toward uncertainty was for the first time
revised” [Klir 2005].
Later, in 1921, Frank Knight underlines “the fundamental difference between a
determinate uncertainty or risk and an indeterminate, unmeasurable one” [Knight
1921]11. This measurement, according to Knight, is the probability of occurrence of
an event and this distinction extends the notion of uncertainty beyond probability,
in theory. But it was not until the second half of the 20th century that uncertainty
was liberated from "its probabilistic confines", thanks to two generalizations in
mathematics [Klir 2005]: generalization of the classical measure theory [Hawkins
2001] and generalization of classical sets to fuzzy sets [Zadeh 1965].
As explained in section 2.1.1, uncertainty and decision come from the same root.
There are also common points in their history. Before the 20th century, decision-
making has a perfect image that supposes a "perfect rationality". This myth
reached its end with "boundary rationality", presented by Simon 1955. The implicit
hypotheses assumed by classical decision theories are [adapted from Simon 1955;
Moscarola 1984; Tsoukiàs 2008]:
– decision-makers know the problems, can formulate them, know all options and
their consequences, and can process information with a "perfect rationality"Implicit
hypotheses of
classical decision
theories
to find an optimal" solution,
– information is available,
– the behavior of the environment is identifiable, regarding the consequences of
each option.
Simon questions these elements, specially the idea of perfect perception and
rationality: “every human organism lives in an environment that generates millionsPhysiological
limits of human
organism
of bits of new information each second, but the bottleneck of the perceptual
apparatus certainly does not admit more than 1000 bits per second, and probably
much less. Equally significant omissions occur in the processing that takes place
when information reaches the brain” [Simon 1959]12.
The portrait of "rational man" is also blemished by bias in decision-making, as
studied by Kahneman+ 198213, and the role of emotion in decision-making byReason, emotion,
and bias neurologist Damasio 1994 who affirms: “I never wished to set emotion against
reason, but rather to see emotion as at least assisting reason... nor did I ever oppose
emotion to cognition since I view emotion as delivering cognitive information.”
In sum, some scientists (such as Aristotle, Descartes, Laplace, Lord Kelvin) emphasize
objective certainty based on a perfect reasoning that allows us to predict the state of
(deterministic) systems in the future. Others (such as Socrates, Plato, Carneades,
Ghazali, Pascal, Kant, Wittgenstein, Damasio, Simon, Tversky, Kahneman, Berthoz)
evoke subjective certainty, based on an imperfect reasoning, affected by bias and
emotion. After tracing the history of uncertainty through the centuries, to study
delay in decision-making when faced with uncertainty, we need to know how it is
defined today. In the next section, we see how uncertainty is precisely defined in
dictionaries and in the recent literature.
11http://www.econlib.org/library/Knight/knRUP.html
12Tsoukiàs 2008 explains the impacts of the "radical" invention of Simon on "classic" decision
theories and continues with two other major innovations, namely the works of Zadeh 1965 and Tversky
1967.
13Daniel Kahneman is a psychologist and winner of the 2002 Nobel prize for economics, fruit of a
long-time collaboration with Amos Nathan Tversky, cognitive and mathematical psychologist.
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Table 2.1: Two approaches to define uncertainty
Uncertainty in object-based approach is:
– a lack of information [Thiry 2002],
– a difference between required and available information [Galbraith 1973; Klir
2005],
– an attribute of information [Zadeh 2006],
– a lack of numerical probabilities of various outcomes [Knight 1921].
Uncertainty in subject-based approach is:
– a state of mind characterized by a conscious lack of knowledge [Head 1967],
– a sense of doubt, in the context of action, that blocks or delays action [Lipshitz+
1997],
– an individual’s perceived inability to predict something [Milliken 1987],
– an inability to act deterministically [Thompson 1967].
2.1.3 Two approaches to define uncertainty in the academic literature
To name things wrongly is to add to the misfortune of the world14.
Albert Camus
We identify two aspects in definitions of uncertainty given by dictionaries: 1)
"something that is not known"15, 2) "the state of being uncertain"16. The first
describes uncertainty through the state of an unknown object and the second
through the state of an unsure subject.
The most popular academic definition of uncertainty is probably given by the
influential economist Knight 1921: a situation wherein it is not possible to specify Knight’s
definitionnumerical probabilities of various outcomes. Knight’s definition is a good introduc-
tion to new mathematical theories to process uncertainty. It appeared in the second
half of the 20th century (see section 2.1.2).
In the same definition, Knight 1921 specifies risk as a situation wherein the probabili-
ties of outcomes can be known. The term risk is introduced, in 1907, by another
economist, Irving Fisher, who proposes a reduction of each expected gain according
to its risk [Buchanan+ 2006]. Therefore, historically, the notion of risk is associated Risk and
uncertaintywith a probable loss. Knight 1921 affirms that “the word "risk" is ordinarily used in
a loose way to refer to any sort of uncertainty viewed from the standpoint of the
unfavorable contingency, and the term "uncertainty" similarly with reference to the
favorable outcome; we speak of the "risk" of a loss, the "uncertainty" of a gain.”
For Knight 1921, a determinate uncertainty is equal to risk. Similarly, “the area of
incalculable risks17 is thus marked by uncertainty. It is in this area of uncertainty
that decision becomes a peculiar responsibility of an entrepreneur” [Dwivedi 2002].
Therefore, risk and uncertainty are a different degree of a same thing, namely "lack
14« Mal nommer les choses, c’est ajouter au malheur du monde. » – Œuvres complètes, tome 1, Paris,
La Pléiade, p. 908
15http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/
16http://www.oxfordreference.com
17or opportunities, with the relatively new vision of uncertainty [Perminova+ 2008].
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of information". Bouyssou+ 2006 give a clear explanation in this regard: there
exist a wide range of situations of uncertainty, depending on the type of available
information about the states of the world, between the two following extremes
situations:
– risk: a probabilizable uncertain situation i.e. there exists a unique probability
distribution P on (S, A) that can be known objectively, where S is the setRange of
uncertainty of possible states of the world and A is the subset of pertinent events for a
problem18,
– total uncertainty: a situation characterized by the absence of any information
on events.
In this way, any new information helps in reducing uncertainty and "its conversion
into a measured risk" [Knight 1921].
Some other definitions are more general, compared to Knight’s one, emphasizing the
lack of information in a more general sense than a probability:
– “uncertainty is an attribute of information” [Zadeh 2006],
– “the concepts of uncertainty and information are tightly interconnected.
Uncertainty is viewed as a manifestation of some information deficiency,
while information is viewed as the capacity to reduce uncertainty” [Klir 2005],
– uncertainty is the gap between the information required "to perform a task"
and the available information [Galbraith 1973],
– “uncertainty is defined by the difference between the data required and the
data already possessed; it is a "lack of information"” [Thiry 2002],
– uncertainty is to be unable to answer a question in a given context, because of
e.g. lack, variability, or contradictory nature of information19 [Dubois+ 2010b].
This definition takes into account the role of context.
The focus of some other definitions of uncertainty is not on information, its
properties, or its availability. In these definitions, uncertainty is defined regarding an
individual (an actor), through:
– a state of mind or a sense:
– “in psychology, uncertainty denotes a state of mind characterized by
doubt, or a conscious lack of knowledge about the outcome of an event”
[Head 1967],
– “uncertainty in the context of action is a sense of doubt” [Lipshitz+ 1997].
– its consequences on action:
– uncertainty is “an individual’s perceived inability to predict something
accurately” [Milliken 1987],
– “uncertainty is the inability to act deterministically” [Thompson 1967].
– uncertainty “blocks or delays action” [Lipshitz+ 1997].
18« Un ensemble S [est] appelé ensemble des états de la nature (ou états du monde), en identifiant les
événements à des sous-ensembles de S. En fait, nous n’aurons pas besoin que de la sous-famille
d’évènements ‘pertinents’ pour le problème posé et nous prendrons alors la plus petite σ-algèbre ou
tribu A contenant cette sous-famille. » [Bouyssou+ 2006].
19« L’incertitude : ne pas pouvoir répondre à une question dans un contexte donné » [Dubois+ 2010b].
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Object
Context
results
decision/action
observation, experimentation, information research
Subject
Figure 2.3: Definition of uncertainty
In the definitions mentioned, as with definitions given by dictionaries, we can identify
two different aspects emphasized in economic and psychological approaches.
Economists are interested in defining uncertainty in order to identify and control it.
In the economic approach, definitions focus on the information about the state of
an object or a situation that is unknown or evolves in time. The subjects (actors)
are not clearly taken into account or are ignored in these definitions [Knight 1921;
Galbraith 1973; Klir 2005; Thiry 2002]. In the same way, in mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence (AI), uncertainty is considered as a property of information in order to
model it [Zadeh 2006].
Psychologists aim to understand the functioning of the mind. In contrast to the
decision-theory approach, “uncertainty is a psychological phenomenon existing only
within the mind of the person who doubts". In the psychological approach, the focus
is on the subject (actor). Uncertainty “is not a part of the external environment; such
uncertainty may be a mental reaction to the external environment” [Head 1967].
A question arising from these approaches is: when a subject is uncertain about an
object, where does the uncertainty come from? Is it in the subject’s mind or does
it come from the unpredictability of the behaviour of the object? Which of these
aspects should be taken into account in the study of indecision under uncertainty?
How can uncertainty be defined taking into account both object and subject? In the
next section, we propose a more encompassing definition of uncertainty that brings
together the object-based and subject-based approaches.
2.1.4 Defining uncertainty and structuring its influential factors
Uncertainty cannot be defined either as only pertaining to the subject or only to the
object, because a subject could be uncertain about an object, while another subject
was certain about it. Hence, uncertainty is a relationship between subject and object.
Furthermore, context is an important factor in defining uncertainty.
A subject could be uncertain about an object but if he does not need to make a
decision nor perform an action, this situation is not considered to be an uncertain
situation. For example, I am not sure whether the laboratory building is accessible
during the weekend or is closed due to construction, but since I do not plan to
go there this weekend, this question does not concern me. I am in a situation of
ignorance and not uncertainty.
To account for the considerations mentioned regarding the notion of uncertainty, its
history, its etymology (its link with decision), and definitions in the literature, we
define uncertainty as follows.
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Figure 2.4: Typology of uncertainty factors
“Uncertainty is a subject’s conscious lack of knowledge about an object,
which is not yet clearly known, in a context requiring a decision (an
action) within a certain time frame” [Hassanzadeh+ 2012a].
This definition takes into account three elements that may generate, increase,
process, and decrease uncertainty and contribute to its characterization and
identification. In project management, these elements can be specified as follows:
1. subject: actor(s) who perceive and intend to act,
2. object: project that has an evolutionary state,
3. context: environment that includes the enterprise, the market, and society.
Based on this definition, we propose a typology for the factors that impact the
generation, perception, and processing of uncertainty. The typology contains three
main classes: object (the project), subject (a group of actors involved in the project),
and context (the environment). This typology structures the factors that generate or
affect uncertainty - and thus decision-making - in an organization (see fig. 2.4).
2.2 Indecision in its individual, collaborative, and organizational
dimensions
“There is a large body of research on when and how we make decisions, but little on
when and why we do not make them” [Brooks 2011].
Indecision / indecisiveness have been studied across several disciplines, from
clinical psychology to vocational choice, marketing, and management [Potworowski
2010]. Both indecision and indecisiveness are used to describe decision latency,
reluctance to decide [Rassin+ 2005a], and difficulty / inability to make decisions:
“indecisiveness is an individual difference measure associated with chronic difficulty
and delay in decision-making” [Frost+ 1993]. “Indecision is an inability to select a
goal or, having selected a goal, to experience significant feelings of uncertainty about
the goal” [Callanan+ 1990; Callanan+ 1992].
As for uncertainty factors (see section 2.1.4 on the previous page), the causes of
uncertainty can be classified according to:
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– subject: personality of decision-makers,
– object: quality and quantity of available information about an object or an
event,
– context: conditions of decision-making.
Tables of appendix A show the examples of the causes20 of indecision, mentioned in
the literature21, that we classify according to these three dimensions, which are
detailed in the three following sections.
2.2.1 Causes of indecision relating to the subject
As Patalano+ 2011 affirm, the causes related to the actors (subjects) are mostly
studied at an individual dimension. We distinguish three interrelated groups of
individual causes (see tab. A.1 on page 174 in appendix), explained in the following
sections.
2.2.1.1 Personality of decision-makers
Some causes of indecision are related to a deep level of a personality that does not
“allow one to reach a decisional state of mind” to make a decision [Salomone 1982;
Frost+ 1993], for example:
– low self-esteem [Effert+ 1989],
– low life satisfaction [Rassin+ 2005b],
– instability [Germeijs+ 2002] or not knowing what one wants [Frost+ 1993],
– tendency to consider the negative consequences of decision more harmful
than negative consequences of inaction [Brooks 2011],
– responsibility avoidance [Janis+ 1977] or divestment of responsibility [Bacanli
2006],
– perfectionism [Frost+ 1993; Bacanli 2006], a maximizing tendency, especially
in components of information search [Reed 1985; Schwartz+ 2002; Diab+
2008],
– low competitiveness [Effert+ 1989].
Some other causes are related to our past.
2.2.1.2 Negative experiences of decision-makers
Experience of difficulty [Chartrand+ 1990] or negative experience [Elaydi 2006] may
cause indecision. Duguay 2008 gives the example of the investors "paralyzed by
indecision" because of the pain associated with loss in a negative stock market
experience. The author explains that even though there is no reason that a new
investment would provide the same result, losing money can be a "traumatic"
experience after which it is hard to adopt a rational attitude. The painful memories
20These causes may be considered as symptoms of indecision, if they are repeated in a recognizable
way.
21For more details, see [Potworowski 2010; Patalano+ 2011]
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of negative experiences are often associated with (material / intangible) losses that
may delay decision-making / acting in similar situations. Negative experiences and
personality traits are interrelated and may reinforce and weaken each other.
2.2.1.3 Needs and emotions of decision-makers
As Damasio 1994 explains, emotion assists reason in decision-making (see sec-
tion 2.1.2 on page 23). Emotions that may help us make decisions may become
excessive in some circumstances and cause decision latency. In this section, we
present an overview of needs and emotions, mentioned in the literature as causes of
indecision. These needs and emotions, resulting from personality traits and negative
experiences, may cause emotions that delay decision-making:
– hypersensitivity to threat [Rassin+ 2005a],
– inherent fear of (responsibility for) change [Rassin+ 2005a],
– fear of mistakes and missing opportunities [Bacanli 2006],
– doubt about the accuracy and completeness of the available information
[Frost+ 1993],
– doubt about the pertinence of the eventually / selected alternative [adapted
from Reed 1985],
– worry about the consequences of the decision (undesirable effects) [adapted
from Germeijs+ 2002],
– lack of clarity as to what the worry is about [Germeijs+ 2002],
– post-decisional doubt / worry [Frost+ 1993],
– post-decisional regret about what would be lost (missing opportunities)
[Germeijs+ 2002; Bacanli 2006],
– intolerance of uncertainty [Buhr+ 2002] or need for certainty [Bacanli 2006],
– difficulty and panic under time pressure [Bacanli 2006].
Difficulty and panic under time pressure is considered in both subject and context
classes, since it depends on both the individual and the decision-making situation
(see appendix A on page 173). Some individuals may be indecisive only under time
pressure. According to Ferrari+ 1997, indecision is not associated with intelligence.
The causes of indecision relating to the subject may be different in individual and
collaborative cases within a group of decision-makers.
2.2.1.4 Group dynamic
Patalano+ 2011 indicate that little work has been carried out on individual indecision
and group processes. This study presents an empirical examination of the rela-
tionship between indecision in individuals versus small groups of three people.
The results show that the group process increases confidence and that individual
indecision, even that of the most indecisive individuals, does not appear in the
group and “might not be a critical factor in the composition of decision-making
groups” [Patalano+ 2011]. It should be noted that this result concerns small groups
of three people.
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Charan 2001 underlines some causes of indecision relating to group dynamics: lone
heroes and self-interest, misfiring in personal interactions, intimidation by the group
dynamics of hierarchy. These elements may harm the dialogue within a group.
Freeman 1999 and Harris 2005 underline ambiguity of the responsibility as a
disadvantage of collaborative decision-making that we consider as a possible cause
of indecision in groups, especially when individuals have responsibility avoidance
[Janis+ 1977] or divestment of responsibility [Bacanli 2006], leaving the decision to
others (buck-passing) [Germeijs+ 2002].
Regardless of personalities and experiences of individuals and group processes, each
decision-maker needs information about the object, events, and possible options to
decide. The imperfection of this information and the quality of the options may
cause decision latency.
2.2.2 Causes of indecision relating the object or events
2.2.2.1 Imperfection of information
Information is fundamental; it constrains and conditions each decision [Simon
1960; Pomerol+ 2008]. The role of quality, quantity, searching for and processing
information in indecision is taken into account by the authors who work on
indecision in psychology (see tab. A.3 on page 176 in appendix):
– difficulty in searching for information [Bacanli 2006],
– limits on the quantity and quality of information [Paivandy 2008] such as
vagueness of information [Scheffler 1979],
– information processing in an inefficient manner [Chang 2007].
The limits on the quantity and quality of information are well studied in AI, to
automatically process uncertain information, with no link to human indecision. To
better understand the limits of information, we review the notion of imperfection of
information in AI.
In the case of decision-making under uncertainty, the information available does not
allow actors to answer questions on possible options and their consequences. This
information is qualified as "imperfect"22. This imperfection may be of different
natures in different forms.
Several typologies of imperfection of information are described by Tacnet 2009.
The typologies mentioned by Tacnet 2009 are studied with a view to processing
uncertainty. All of them consider uncertainty as a form of imperfection of information.
We consider uncertainty as a result of the imperfection of information. We present
an overview of different forms of imperfection of information that cause uncertainty
and consequently may cause indecision:
– absence: information is totally unavailable,
– incompleteness: information is partially unavailable,
– contradiction (incoherence): existence of paradoxical information,
– noise: information is subject to random errors [Dubois+ 2001],
22Inspired by the description of Dubois+ 2010b, see section 2.1.3.
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– bias: information is subject to systemic errors [Dubois+ 2001],
– imprecision: information is not exact,
– volatility: information can change rapidly,
– randomness: information is subject to “variability of observed repeatable
natural phenomena” [Dubois+ 2010a],
– ambiguity: existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations for the same
information [Thiry 2002],
– multidisciplinarity: information concerns multiple domains. Multidisciplinar-
ity is not a defect in itself, but may make information difficult to understand,
– reliability: information whose source is not reliable,
– redundancy: existence of several forms for the same information. Redundancy
is not always a defect and may makes information explicit [Dubois+ 2001],
– abundance: a great deal of information is available.
These imperfections and their degrees might be differently perceived by different
actors according to their backgrounds, competences, preferences, etc. One reaction,
in the face of uncertainty caused by these imperfections of information may be the
postponement of the decision, especially when high investments are at stake.
It should be noted that, as Johansen 2007 states, “the dangers are characterized by
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. But these same dangers create
leadership opportunities... in terms of vision, understanding, clarity, and agility.”
Imperfection of information is not the only cause of indecision, caused by the object.
The quality and quantity of options (choices, alternatives) influence decision-making.
2.2.2.2 Quality and quantity of possible options
In a decision-making process, possible options depend on the (evolutionary) state of
an object (a project in the case of project management) and the outcomes of some
events. Some causes of indecision may be related to the options:
– lack of option quality i.e. absence of a satisfactory option [Brooks 2011],
– lack of option clarity i.e. unclear or ambiguous options [Brooks 2011],
– conflict between equally attractive alternatives [Osipow+ 1976],
– not accepting that the options are equally desirable [Neumann+ 1944],
– option similarity, since decisions between similar options are difficult to make
and also to justify to others [Brooks 2011],
– external barriers to preferred choices [Osipow+ 1976].
The external barriers are not inherent in choices but depend on the context of
decision-making. Hence, the barriers are considered in both object (options) and
context classes (see appendix A on page 173). In the same way, other elements of the
organizational context may favor or not delay decision-making.
2.2.3 Causes of indecision relating to organizational context
In companies, other factors beyond individual and collaborative ones, namely those
related to the organizational culture, may also play an important role in indecision.
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An organization has its own culture and history, can be public or private, quoted on
the stock market or not. These characteristics of an organization strongly affect its
decision-making processes.
The problem of indecision as an organizational pathology is studied by Denis+ 2011
who label it "escalating indecision" or "network of indecision", a phenomenon in
which people invest time and energy in decision processes without any clear result.
Davenport 2010 affirms that “very few organizations have undertaken systematic
efforts to improve a variety of decisions” and consequently, there is a need for
a systematic approach to improve a variety of decisions. Similarly, Denis+ 2011
indicate that little attention is given to indecision in the organizational literature.
In the following sections, we classify the causes of indecision relating to orga-
nizational context mentioned in some of the few existing studies [Charan 2001;
Davenport 2010; Denis+ 2011]. Tab. A.3 on page 176, in appendix, shows the
examples of the causes relating to organizational context.
2.2.3.1 Work environment
Charan 2001 points out some causes of indecision in organizations, that probably
have their individual causes, which can grow in an unhealthy work environment e.g.:
– lack of intellectual honesty which harms open, honest, and decisive dialogue
and decreases mutual trust,
– lack of trust to protect oneself in an unsafe environment,
– lack of conviction, meaning people “speak their lines woodenly”,
– lack of emotional commitment, meaning people do not perform planned
actions decisively.
Charan 2001 affirms that "breaking a culture of indecision" requires a leader who
can promote intellectual honesty and trust between people.
2.2.3.2 Leadership
Some causes of indecision relating to leadership are as follows:
– strategic ambiguity [Denis+ 2011],
– “pluralistic settings characterized by diffuse power and divergent interests and
conceptions” [Denis+ 2011],
– lack of candid dialogue and lack of emotional fortitude in leaders [Charan
2001],
– lack of follow-through [Charan 2001],
– constraints of formality [Charan 2001],
– lack of closure23 coupled with a lack of sanctions [Charan 2001].
More directly and specifically than the work environment and leadership issues, the
process of decision-making may cause decision latency.
23“Closure means that at the end of the meeting, people know exactly what they are expected to do”
[Charan 2001].
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2.2.3.3 Status of decision and the process of decision-making
Davenport 2009 makes the criticism that decisions are generally considered as "the
prerogative of individuals - usually senior executives" and “the process employed,
the information used, the logic relied on, have been left up to them, in something of
a black box. Information goes in, decisions come out and who knows what happens
in between?” Only a few organizations have "reengineered" their decisions.
2.3 Conquering a culture of indecision
To “conquer a culture of indecision”, Charan 2001 proposes implementing an
"organization’s social operating mechanisms"24 that enable honest debate through
which the work of shaping a decisive culture gets done. Such mechanisms include
four characteristics:
1. openness, meaning that the outcome of the decision is not predetermined,
2. candor, meaning "willingness to speak the unspeakable",
3. informality to encourage candor,
4. closure, meaning that at the end of the meeting, everyone knows exactly what
he is expected to do.
Charan 2001 underlines some other elements that can help: cross-functional
collaboration, asking the right questions, identifying and resolving conflicts, creating
mechanisms that encourage this open dialogue, speedy execution, appropriate
follow-through and constructive feedback, and differentiating people with sanctions
and rewards.
Davenport 2010 identifies 14 interventions that managers, mostly in IT functions,
have employed to make better decisions: use of a rigorous statistical system,
improving the integrity of data, changing the culture or leadership, trying to
communicate the process and the results of a decision to affected parties, making
changes in the decision-making process, educating decision-makers, etc.
24Social operating mechanisms are “the executive committee meetings, budget and strategy reviews,
and other situations through which the people of a corporation do business” [Charan 2001].
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Conclusion - part I
In this part, we have, in the first instance, seen that pharmaceutical R&D projects
are risky, long-lasting and expensive projects composed of several phases of tests
and studies on new compounds. At the end of each phase, the results of the tests
are examined to make a Go / No Go decision, meaning to continue or to stop
development. Go / No Go decisions are based on benefit-risk balances which are
sometimes very difficult to assess, because of a high degree of uncertainty caused by
imperfect information which becomes progressively more accurate. Additionally,
Go / No Go decisions are made collaboratively by various experts who may perceive
uncertain information differently.
In this context, decisions may either be deferred, because of the non-emergency of
situations, or be invalidated a posteriori, since Go / No Go decisions are often re-
versible. However, the delay in decision-making may engender heavy consequences
in terms of investments and also damage the image of the company. Moreover, as
Denis+ 2011 argue, perpetual decision-making without decision outcomes consumes
material and especially human resources. Beyond the dollar values, the considerable
cost to individuals in terms of emotional stress and frustrated effort has to be taken
into account.
Secondly, in order to better understand delay in decision-making when faced with
uncertainty, we have examine the notion of uncertainty. Through an etymological
study, we point out that uncertainty and decision have the same root and are tightly
interconnected. We underline two approaches to defining uncertainty: object-
based and subject-based approaches and propose an encompassing definition of
uncertainty that brings together these approaches, since in the study of the causes of
indecision under uncertainty, both causes relating to the object and those relating to
the subject should be considered. Context and time are two other key elements of
our definition.
Thirdly, the notion of indecision is reviewed. We classify some causes of indecision,
mentioned in the literature, according to three dimensions:
– subject(s): the personality, negative experiences, needs and emotions of the
decision-maker at an individual level, and group dynamics in collaborative
decisions,
– object: the quality and quantity, search and processing of information about
an object or an event and the available options,
– context: work environment, leadership, status of decision and the process
applied to making decisions.
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The four following points draw our attention:
1. contrary to decision and uncertainty, which have a history as old as the
Antiquity, indecision is a more recent notion which is less widely considered in
the literature: as an indication, the number of papers found with "Indecision"
or "Indecisiveness" as keywords on the Science Direct website, on October
11th 2012, was only 3525. If "Business, Management and Accounting" is
selected as "subject" in advanced research options, this number is reduced to
13. On the Springer website, the number of papers found for "Indecision" or
"Indecisiveness" within title and abstract was 68. If "Business and Economics"
is selected as "collection", this number is reduced to 4. On the Web of
Knowledge website, 1064 papers were found in a search for "Indecision" or
"Indecisiveness" in topic. If "Operations Research Management Science" and
"Business Economics" are selected as "research areas", this number is reduced
to 47,
2. among the causes of indecision, the role of personality is relatively well studied
in psychology:
– from 35 papers with indecision as a keyword found on the Science Direct
website, 29 are in the field of psychology (selecting "Psychology" as
"subject" in advanced research options),
– from 68 papers found for "Indecision" or "Indecisiveness" within title
and abstract on the Springer website, 31 are in "Humanities, Social
Sciences and Law" and "Behavioral Science" collections,
– from 1064 papers found on the Web of Knowledge website, search-
ing for "Indecision" or "Indecisiveness" as a topic, 707 papers are in
"Psychology", "Psychiatry", and "Behavioral Sciences",
3. limits on quality and quantity of information have been widely studied in AI
[Dubois+ 2001; Bouyssou+ 2006; Dubois+ 2010b; Aven+ 2011],
4. as some recent research works indicate, the role of the organizational context
is less widely considered in the literature [Davenport 2009; Davenport 2010;
Denis+ 2011; Brooks 2011; Akdere 2011].
This bibliographical study confirms the importance of improving decision-making
and the lack of studies about indecision in organizations. The studies mentioned
propose areas for global improvement, but there is little explanation in detail about
decision-making processes, the causes of delay, and the way these causes might be
controlled. In this regard, we answer these questions in two next parts:
– why are some difficult Go / No Go decisions frequently delayed?
– what are the characteristics of delayed decisions?
– why are decisions not respected once made, or unmade and remade over time?
– what are the processes applied to making Go / No Go decisions?
– what are the current practices implemented by the actors to make collaborative
decisions and are the current practices efficient or are some changes necessary
to reduce delay?
25On the same day, on the Science Direct website, the number of papers found with "Decision" and
"Uncertainty" as keywords were respectively 17,154 and 8,922.
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Method, application, and results
Purpose: in complex industrial contexts, decision-making at a high level often
requires the contribution of various actors to the information life cycle, from the
production of the information to its consumption, the latter being the decision itself.
This is true in the pharmaceutical industry. Although pharmaceutical projects are
perfectly defined in terms of operational tasks, the information life cycle is not
clearly defined. To diagnose the pathology of recurrent delay in difficult decisions, it
is necessary to describe how information is transformed into decision. The purpose
of this part is, first, to model the Go / No Go decision-making process, thus clarifying
the information life cycle. This model is based on enterprise-engineering methods.
It visualizes the contributions to this cycle of different actors, such as functional
managers, project managers, and experts. We shall then focus on the last stage of
this cycle i.e. collaborative decision-making, to understand how multidisciplinary
experts perceive and evaluate various scientific and economic information in the
process of coming to a decision. We detail this stage in a framework, through a
fuzzy-based approach. This will help in understanding how a consensus is reached
in a collaborative decision and why it is sometimes difficult to reach. A measure
to quantify the risk of invalidating decisions is proposed, which is based on the
acceptability of the collaborative decision by different experts.
Design/methodology/approach: a literature review, collaboration with an indus-
trial partner, enterprise engineering methods, and a fuzzy-based approach are used
to model the collaborative decision-making process in drug development projects.
Findings: the model of the collaborative decision-making process highlights the
contribution of different actors to the information life cycle. The focus on the last
39
Decision process modeling
stage of this process illustrates the different perceptions, evaluations, and reasoning
about the same information by different experts. Based on fuzzy inference rules, the
behavior of each expert is modeled and a confidence index is defined to measure the
risk of invalidating collaborative decisions a posteriori.
Research limitations: the framework that details the last stage of the collaborative
decision-making process, as with all models that try to simulate human behaviors,
makes several (simplifying) assumptions which inevitably influence its results.
Originality/value: drug development projects are already perfectly defined in the
operational tasks of performing tests and producing information, respecting strictly
regulatory measures. Little attention is given, however, to the activities in which
the results are aggregated, prepared, and presented. Our model of the Go / No Go
decision-making process takes into account the transformation of information
before its transmission to decision-makers. Our framework for the last stage of
this process models the behavior of different decision-makers and formalizes
the differences in the cognitive processes they use to transform information into
decision.
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Introduction - part II
Information constrains and conditions each decision [Simon 1960; Pomerol+ 2008].
In pharmaceutical R&D projects, information about potential new medicines is
progressively produced throughout different phases of the tests and studies in
several fields, such as chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, medicine, industrial
production, regulation, law, economics, finance, marketing, etc. This information is
then used by the experts in the different fields to assess the risk-benefit balances
of the new compounds, taking into account their safety, efficacy, and quality, in
order to make collaborative Go / No Go decisions26. The Go / No Go decisions are
easy to make when the results are incontestably good or bad. In the other cases,
when the results are uncertain for decision-makers, it can be difficult to make a
collaborative decision. As the actors of the pharmaceutical industry point out, in
these cases, Go / No Go decisions are frequently delayed or are sometimes made and
then invalidated a posteriori.
In this context, the aim of our research, in this part, is to describe the activities
that should be performed to generate and transform information into Go / No Go
decisions, so as to find out when these decisions are delayed and why.
In chapter 3, the decision-making process is reviewed. Some decision-making
processes are presented in general terms, to determine how information and decision
are connected and to specify the main stages of a decision-making process. Modeling
the Go / No Go decision-making process from the point of view of enterprise
engineering helps visualize, describe, and analyze the Go / No Go decision-making
process, taking into account the important aspects specific to enterprises that are
mentioned in the literature. To achieve this objective, the notion of a model and the
main steps of some modeling processes are reviewed. Some methods and modeling
tools in enterprise engineering are then presented.
In chapter 4, our method of modeling, based on the CIMOSA reference architecture
and using BPM notation, is presented. Simplifying and refining loops are clearly
explained in this method.
In chapter 5, the proposed method of modeling is applied to Go / No Go decision-
making processes: to investigate the problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go
decisions, we model the Go / No Go decision-making process underlying the
information life cycle from production to consumption (decision). This model is
26A Go / No Go decision determines whether the development of a compound should be continued
or stopped in view of the available results about its safety, efficacy, and quality.
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presented in three levels of detail where each level of detail answer some questions
and raises some others.
First, Go / No Go decision-making is modeled in a macro vision that takes into
account the different actors who collaborate in making Go / No Go decisions:
those who generate and prepare information and those who consume it to make
decisions. The information flow between them is also considered by the model.
This macro vision of the model describes four macro stages in the Go / No Go
decision-making process: the first three macro stages consist in searching for
information and preparing decision-making. The last stage consists in making a
choice, based on prepared information. An example based on the stability of a new
compound illustrates the four macro stages. This macro vision takes into account
the collaboration between actors who produce and prepare information and those
who use it to decide. However, the activities of each stage are not detailed enough to
study their possible dysfunctions.
Through the refining loop, a second level of detail in modeling is obtained wherein
the activities of each macro stage of the decision-making process - their inputs
and outputs - are illustrated. In pharmaceutical projects, the operational tasks
to produce information, especially scientific parts that involve public health, are
carefully described, respecting regulatory measures (descending information). Little
attention is given to activities related to transforming this great deal of evolutionary
information which is presented in a concise form to the experts who decide. The
originality of our model is that the activities related to the preparation of information
(ascending information) are also taken into account. But collaborative decision-
making remains a black box at this level of the model. Since the purpose of this study
is to investigate the causes of delay in decision-making, this "special" activity is
detailed through another refining loop in a third (and last) level of detail.
The last stage of this process i.e. the collaborative Choice stage, is modeled in
a framework. Its originality, compared to the models in the literature, is that it
takes into account both "individual reflection" and "group interaction", aspects
initially pointed out by Roy 1996. Based on fuzzy sets and fuzzy inference rules, this
framework formalizes the individual information processing and decision-makers’
interactions. It makes explicit the differences and similarities in the decision-makers’
perceptions, evaluations, and reasoning. Finally, this framework leads us to define an
index of decision invalidation that measures the risk of invalidating a decision made.
It allows us to study previously invalidated decisions and predicts the behavior of the
groups of decision-makers, depending on the inference rules used by individuals
and groups.
This framework, focused on cognitive processes, does not give information about the
practices of the actors who perform the activities of the decision-making process.
But it can be used as a baseline to discuss and interview the actors about their
practices. This is the subject of the next part (see part III on page 107).
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Decision as a process
A decision is not an act, but a process.
Herbert Alexander Simon1
3.1 Decision-making process in the literature
Simon criticizes the images that “falsify decision by focusing on the final moment”
and considers decision as a process [Simon 1960]. This change of attitude ends
certain mythological or epic visions of decision, i.e. Julius Caesar crossing the
Rubicon or De Gaulle launching the Concorde, and brings it back to the domain of
scientific and systematic observation [Pomerol+ 2008]. Similarly, Roy 1996 explains
that “the concept of a decision cannot be completely separated from that of a
decision process. It will, therefore, be useful to think of the decision as unfolding
within the framework of a process whose progress is punctuated by a certain number
of critical points, one of which is the final action.”
The English word process is from old French "proces", from the Latin processus,
"process, advance, progress, go forward". In the mid-14th century it meant "course
or method of action" and its main modern meaning is: "continuous series of actions
meant to accomplish some result"2. This origin associates the notion of process with Etymology of
processan expected result, a method, and a continuous series of actions. A process is a
(partially) ordered sequence of steps, triggered by an event to reach a given goal.
In this definition, the result is observable or quantifiable. As a decision is neither
observable nor quantifiable, we extend this definition to include an intangible result
[Vernadat 1996].
Decision is also considered as a process by Colonel John Boyd, who studied the
military decisions of US fighter pilots in the Korean War (1950-1953) and proposed a
loop of four boxes to model these decisions: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (four
box method or OODA loop, see fig. 3.1). The Observe stage involves collecting and Boyd’s model
communicating the information about the environment. The Orient stage consists
in understanding and appreciating the situation and its possibilities. The Decide
stage includes investigating responses to threats and opportunities, and determining
an action, and finally, the Act stage is playing out the decision [Stenzel+ 2010].
Similarly, Simon 1960 proposes an iterative decision-making process: Intelligence,
Design, Choice, and Review (see fig. 3.2). The Intelligence stage as the first stage Simon’s model
1from Tsoukiàs 2008
2http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=process&allowed_in_frame=0
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Observe
Act
Orient
Decide
I: collecting and communicating the 
information about the environment
II: understanding and appreciating 
the situation and its possibilities
IV: playing out the decision
III: investigating responses to threats and 
opportunities, and determining an action
Figure 3.1: Boyd’s four box method, based on the descriptions of Stenzel+ 2010
includes observation of reality, understanding of the problem, collection and
understanding of information. The Design stage is composed of two sub-stages:
identification of the criteria and construction of the alternatives. The first sub-stage
focuses on identification and specification of the important criteria for decision, and
measurement of the relationships between them. The second sub-stage focuses
on identification, analysis, invention, development, and conceptualization of the
alternatives. The Choice stage is what most people think of as making a decision
[Forman+ 2001]. This stage focuses on the evaluation of the alternatives and
development of the actions that satisfy the criteria of decision [Simon 1960]. The last
stage is added by later researchers [Tweedale+ 2008]. The review implementation
stage consists in weighing the consequences of the actions, gaining confidence in
the decision, and planning actions.
Both the Boyd and Simon models are sequential, iterative, including a feedback
loop. These models are similar in information collecting and processing, making a
choice, and acting on information [Tweedale+ 2008]. The notion of communication
appears in the Observe stage of Boyd’s model, and evokes the notion of collaboration
between actors. Additionally, Boyd emphasizes a fast appreciation of a situation and
the need for agility in an "irregular, disorderly, unpredictable" world. Therefore,
the collaborative aspect of war and its emergency and evolutionary context are
reflected in the Boyd’s model, while the Simon’s model emphasizes identifying the
problem, the criteria, and the alternatives. But none of these processes integrate new
information that may complement available information or bring into question its
accuracy.
The notion of new information is clearly taken into account in a "vigilant" decision-
making process proposed by Janis+ 1977:
1. exploring possible options,
2. reviewing objectives to be fulfilled and personal values to be respected,
3. weighing up benefits and risks of each option,Janis and Mann’s
model 4. searching new information relevant to choice,
5. assimilating new information,
6. re-examining the consequences of each option,
7. making provision for risks related to the chosen option.
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Intelligence
Design
Choice
I: observing reality, identifying the problem, 
collecting and understanding information
- II- a: identification of the criteria,
- II-b: construction of the alternatives
III: evaluation of the alternatives and development 
of the actions that satisfy the criteria of decision
IV: weighing the consequences of actions, gaining 
confidence on decision, and planning the actions
II:
Review
Figure 3.2: Simon’s process [Simon 1960]
In this way, any new information or expert judgment to support the choice process
should be taken into consideration, even if the new information invalidates the initial
perception [adapted from Janis+ 1977 and Foskett 2001]. This model is particularly
useful when information is imperfect3 and becomes progressively more accurate.
The models mentioned consider decision as a process instead of an act, give a
structure to decision, and connect information and decision. They allow us to study
different activities that contribute to transforming a decision from information. They
also help in studying the role of different actors in each stage, when decision is
collaborative, as is usually the case in projects in enterprises4.
In enterprises, decision-making involves various actors in the information life
cycle. When decisions are frequently delayed, several questions arise: what are
the activities that need to be performed to make decisions? Who contribute to
these activities? What is the information flow between the actors throughout these
activities? Which dysfunctions caused this delay? “Modeling is an essentially
important way of exploring, studying, and understanding the world around us”
[Gabor+ 2003]. A model of decision-making processes will highlight the sequence
of activities5, the contribution of each actor, and the flow of information. Such
a model can be used to analyze the decision-making process and helps identify
the problematical activities i.e. those that are delayed, in order to improve them.
Enterprise engineering literature offers a wide range of methods and tools for process
modeling. After reviewing the notion of a model, some methods and tools for
modeling are briefly presented in the next section.
3.2 Process modeling to help decisions
“Better processes won’t guarantee better decisions, of course, but they can make them
more likely” [Davenport 2009]. Models can help “represent, understand, manage,
3A typology of imperfection of information is given in section 2.2.2 on page 33.
4An enterprise is defined as a "socio-economic organization" that makes profit from producing
products or services [Vernadat 1996].
5Adopting the hierarchy of the activity theory, an activity is composed of actions or tasks, and an
action is composed of operations [Leontjev 1978].
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and improve complex processes” [Browning 2002]. Enterprise engineering provides
industrial actors with enterprise models that help analyze, restructure, and improve
the performance of enterprises [Vernadat 1996]. The purpose is to understandModels to
improve processes the functioning of an enterprise, either to help decision-making, or to improve
operations [Hammer+ 1993]. The objective of our study in this part is the first of
these, namely to improve the decision-making process in an enterprise, through
modeling. In this section, first, some basic definitions of process modeling, mostly in
enterprise engineering, are introduced. Secondly, the main steps of modeling are
reviewed. Finally, some methods and tools to model processes are presented.
3.2.1 Model in enterprise engineering
3.2.1.1 Definitions of model
The concept of the model is widely used in various fields, such as mathematics,
physics, computer science, engineering, human sciences, art, etc. There is no
consensus to defining this "common denominator" concept [Deguil 2008]. We aim
to model the decision-making process in enterprises wherein problems of delay in
decision-making occur. Before defining a model in enterprise engineering, we shall
review the definitions of a model in some other fields, highlighting thier different
constituent elements and their different degrees of formalism.
The word model comes from the Latin modulus, meaning "a small measure,
standard". In the 1570s, it meant "likeness made to scale" and in the 1630s, "thing or
person to be imitated"6. This origin shows that model is strongly connected to aEtymology of
model relationship of likeness and imitation between two objects. These three elements,
including two objects and their likeness relationship, are the basis of each model.
The degree of likeness, degree of formalism, language, and form of models vary
according to their purposes and their fields.
The most formal model is a mathematical one, which can be defined as “a mathe-
matical construct designed to study a particular real-world system or phenomenon”
[Giordano+ 2008] or “a mathematical model is a mathematical interpretation ofMathematical
models assumptions concerning real-world problems” and can be in the form of equations,
inequalities, matrices [Albright 2011], graphs, topologies, etc. Apostel 1960 general-
izes the concept of the mathematical model to non-formal sciences, through this
definition: A is a model for B , if A neither directly nor indirectly interchanges with B
and A can be used to obtain information about B .
In software modeling7, “a model is a simplification of a system built with an intended
goal in mind. The model should be able to answer questions in place of the actual
system” [Bézivin+ 2001]. Notions of "goals" and "questions" are put in the centre in
this definition. A similar definition, that proposed by Minsky 1968 in informationModels to
answers questions processing, is adopted by Vernadat 1996 in enterprise engineering: “to an observer B ,
an object A′ is a model for an object A to the extent that B can use A′ to answer
questions that interest him about A.”
6http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=model&allowed_in_frame=0
7applied to Model Driven Architecture of Object Management Group (OMG/MDA®), see http:
//www.omg.org/mda/
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Figure 3.3: Different points of view for modeling, adapted from Deguil 2008
In the definitions mentioned, the starting point consists of the questions to be
answered about a complex reality through a simpler (often visual) representation,
called a model. Thus, a model should help knowledge acquisition of the reality
represented, while not interchanging with it. In sum, a model:
– is "inherently purposive" [Gluck+ 2005] e.g. description, visualization [Brown-
ing 2002], analysis, simulation, calculation (solution, maximization, estimation
[Fischer+ 2009], prediction about some aspects of a phenomenon [Gluck+
2005], or the behavior of a system, Characteristics of
a model– is from a point of view that, as its name indicates, can be defined as a particular
perception of something to be modeled, an enterprise for example, which
highlights certain aspects of it and makes the others transparent [Darras 2004]
(see fig. 3.3),
– has a scope that limits its range, meaning "domain covered by the model, also
called the universe of discourse" [Ross+ 1977], in order to "make the problem
manageable" [Albright 2011],
– is expressed in a form or representation language with a syntax, a semantic
and a degree of formalism [Vernadat 1998],
– has a detail level, i.e. the level of precision or granularity [Ross+ 1977].
3.2.1.2 Typology of models
Models can be classified according to several perspectives, depending on their
properties or purposes:
– structural, functional, and behavioral models: a structural model8 repre-
sents the architecture of a system, a functional model9 describes the operations
8such as UML class/object diagrams [Atkinson 2002]
9such as operation specifications [Atkinson 2002]
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Figure 3.4: Black, gray, and white box models where the "darkness" of the model
depends on the missing information [Gabor+ 2003]
of a system, and a behavioral model10 predicts how a system behaves, re-
sponding to stimuli [adapted from Atkinson 2002]. Functional models can be
divided into two groups:
– function-based and process-based models: the central constructs of
these models are respectively function and process. Function-based
models11 use only one basic construct, meaning function (activity)
at all levels of the model. Hierarchical functional decompositions
are used to "map the organizational boundaries". In process-based
models12, processes as "ways of chaining activities" are modeled with
no consideration of the "organizational boundaries" of the enterprise
[Vernadat 1996],
– analytic and systemic models: analytic models decompose the studied prob-
lem into several simpler problems, while systemic ones consider “a system in
its totality, its complexity, and its own dynamics” [Rosnay 1979]. Analytic and
systemic models can be the bases of two different analysis approaches of the
same names. A systemic approach reasons that “behavior is serial, not a mere
succession. It can be resolved - it must be - into discrete acts, but no act can be
understood in isolation from the series to which it belongs” [Dewey 2008]. The
analytic approach is “understanding by taking apart” [Wilson+ 2010]. Tab. 3.1
compares these two approaches of analysis. According to Le Moigne 1990, the
analytic approach is appropriate to resolve complicated problems and the
systemic approach is suitable for complex ones13. The analytic approach is
one- discipline-oriented and concentrates on detailed information about one
10such as UML statechart diagram [Atkinson 2002]
11such as SADT and IDEF methods
12such as CIMOSA, Petri nets
13A simple system has few component parts that are linked by a small number of rules [Simpson
2011]. A complicated system has many more component parts, related by more numerous and more
inter-related rules [Simpson 2011], which can be studied separately and be reassembled without
damage. A complex system also has numerous component parts that may be "less clearly defined"
[Simpson 2011] and that lack meaning if they are separated from each other [Gianfranco+ 2010]. “A
motor could be considered complicated, but a human being is complex” [Gianfranco+ 2010].
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isolated variable at a time. It studies the nature of simple linear interactions,
independent of duration. The analytic approach provides precise and detailed
models, that are less useful in actual operation, such as econometric models.
The systemic approach is multidisciplinary, taking into account global infor-
mation on the effects of non-linear interactions within a group of variables,
over time. The systemic approach gives insufficiently rigorous models to be
useful in decision and action [Rosnay 1979],
– black box, gray box, and white box models: as fig. 3.4 shows, the structure
and parameters of a black box model are not known. In a gray box model, the
structure is known but the parameters are not known. In a white box model,
both structure and parameters are known [Gabor+ 2003],
– formal, semi-formal, and informal models: formal models are expressed in
“well-defined language with precise, mathematical semantics in terms of
set theory, for example14” [Meyer+ 2000]. Formal models describe modeled
objects through accurate, precise, unambiguous information [Schürr+ 2009].
One example of a semi-formal model is standard graphical notations [Vernadat
1998]. Informal ones are expressed in natural language [Vernadat 1998] and
are characterized by "rich sets of objects and relations", giving "overviews and
initial understanding" [Schürr+ 2009]. Informal models are "ambiguous" and
"vague" and can be used for discussion or documentation [Aalst 2011],
– static and dynamic models: time is not taken into account in static models,
while dynamic models include time as one of their variables [Anderton 1977],
– deterministic and stochastic15 models: "uncontrollable" input values are
respectively known / unknown, in advance, in deterministic / stochastic
models [Anderson+ 2012].
3.2.2 Key principles of modeling
Gabor+ 2003 outline three key principles that have to be considered in system
modeling: separation, selection, and parsimony. Separation means determining the
boundaries between the system to be modeled and the rest of the world (meaning
defining the scope of the model, see section 3.2.1.1). Selection means determining
"certain essential aspects of a system" to be considered in the model. All interactions
between the components of the system and those between the system and its
environment cannot be taken into account. The notion of "aspect" is tied into
"point of view" (see section 3.2.1.1). Points of view take the names of the aspects
that they cover16. Parsimony means that in modeling it is preferable to create "as
simple model as possible"17. “This means that a model is always imperfect, it is a
14Other examples of formal languages are first- order logic, computer languages [Vernadat 1998],
description logic, etc.
15From Greek, stokhastikos, the sense of "randomly determined" is first recorded for Ger-
man stochastik in 1934, see http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=
0&search=Stochastic&searchmode=none.
16These two notions, namely point of view and aspect, are sometimes used interchangeably in the
literature, e.g.: to model a system, following the MECI method, a formalism is developed in four "points
of view or aspects" [Darras 2004].
17The parsimony principle is also known as simplicity principle or Occam’s (or Ockham’s) razor:
“if theory T is simpler than theory T∗, then it is rational (other things being equal) to believe T
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simplified representation of a system, it only approximates a system” [Gabor+ 2003].
Consequently, a model may differentiate from reality by:
– its limited scope: e.g. taking into account only a segment of a supply chain,
– the elements that are not taken into account in its defined scope: Difference of
model and realitye.g. taking into account only some elements18 of this segment,
– its level of detail: e.g. taking into account only some properties of the selected
elements.
These limitations simplify construction and manipulation of models, especially
when the questions to be answered concern only a part of this reality or the reality to
be modeled is very complex. Thus, choices of scope, elements, and detail level
depend on the purpose of the model and its intended level of complexity. Kreimeyer+
2011 warn against the errors that can be induced by these choices, since an element
relevant to the purpose can be ignored in an "unclean" model. To decrease the
errors induced by ignoring a relevant aspect in a model, we can take into account
significant aspects of enterprises found in the literature.
Enterprise engineering literature offers a scope of enterprise modeling which
includes five “basic aspects to be modeled in an enterprise” [Curtis+ 1992; Vernadat
1996]:
1. what - functional aspects - object: operations performed and object pro-
cessed,
2. what - informational aspects - object: data produced and used, Scope of
enterprise
modeling
3. how - behavioral aspects: way activities are carried out i.e. practices,
4. when - organizational aspects - time: time related to events that change the
state of the enterprise,
5. who - organizational aspects - subject: resources.
On the one hand, these aspects cover important facets of an enterprise and on the
other hand, our research questions i.e. the role of each aspect in the problem of
delay in decision-making (see section 2.3 on page 37). In the next section, some
methods and tools of process modeling are reviewed with a view to choosing those
that enable us to investigate these aspects.
3.2.3 Steps of modeling
A modeling process is a "set of activities" to be performed in order to construct a
model of something, with the purpose of "representation, communication, analysis,
design or synthesis, decision-making, or control" [Vernadat 1996]. In the literature,
the steps of modeling are often described through mathematical approaches either
in mathematics [Giordano+ 2008; Albright 2011] or in other fields such as system
identification [Gabor+ 2003], environmental systems [Ford 2009], etc.
Gabor+ 2003, in their paper on neural networks in system identification, distinguish
some main steps in "all modeling": defining the goal of modeling, collecting
rather than T∗” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Principal Editor: Edward N. Zalta, available in
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/).
18In mathematical modeling, some variables may be aggregated, considered constant, neglected, or
their relationships might be ignored in order to simplify the model [Giordano+ 2008].
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The goal of modeling
Collecting a prior knowledge
Final model
A prior model, model structure selection
Parameter estimation using observations
Experiment design
Model 
validation
Correction
Figure 3.5: Iterative nature of modeling [Gabor+ 2003]
prior knowledge, selecting the structure of the model (white, gray, or black box
model depending on available information, see fig. 3.4), designing and collecting
information (design of the "circumstances of input-output data"), estimating the
parameters of the model (relationships between inputs and outputs), validating
the model (determining if the model serves its purposes or whether correction is
necessary). The iterative aspect of modeling is illustrated in this description (see fig.
3.5).
Giordano+ 2008 19 propose a similar modeling process, but clearly taking into
account simplification and refining loops20: if the modeler cannot formulate or solve
a model, it should be simplified, and if the results are not precise enough to answer
the research questions, the model should be refined (see fig. 3.6).
Ford 2009 presents 8 steps of modeling which include both qualitative and quantita-
tive modeling progressively. Fig. 3.7 illustrates these steps. “The first four steps
are conceptual and qualitative in nature.” A wall separates the qualitative and
quantitative parts of this modeling process. As Ford 2009 explains, some modelers
prefer concepts and interrelationships within a systems, arguing that “parameter
estimation and computer simulation are too difficult and too time-consuming.”
Others prefer to make sense of the numbers, arguing that “qualitative discussions
need to be tested through computer simulation. The major environmental problems
of our day involve complicated dynamics that cannot be simulated in our head.” We
agree with this argument for environmental problems, however it is very difficult (if
not impossible) to quantify problems which involve a strong human component
with all its complexity.
19Giordano+ 2008 also point out the similarity between mathematical modeling processes and 6
steps of “the scientific method as follows: 1) make some general observations of a phenomenon, 2)
formulate a hypothesis about the phenomenon, 3) develop a method to test the hypothesis, 4) gather
data to use in the test, 5) test the hypothesis using the data, 5) confirm or deny the hypothesis.”
20Simplification is explained in section 3.2.2 through separation, selection, and parsimony principles
[Gabor+ 2003]. Refining is obtained by "the opposite way to simplification" such as expanding the
scope of the model [Giordano+ 2008].
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Figure 3.6: Simplifying and refining loops in modeling [Giordano+ 2008]
A more complete description of the modeling process is given by Albright 2011 who
describes 8 steps of mathematical modeling, as follows:
– step 1: “state the question to be answered.” At first, questions are narrow
enough in order to manage the problem. Further questions can later arise
from the knowledge obtained,
– step 2: “select the modeling approach.” This step can begin with "some
simple observations". The form of the model is determined, depending on
observations and "the nature of assumptions".
– step 3: “define variables and parameters.” Variables are the "quantities" that
can change within a problem and parameters those that remain constant
within a problem,
– step 4: “state the assumptions” in four categories:
– to simplify the model,
– to choose variables that are taken into account in the model,
– to establish relationships between variables,
– to determine the values of parameters,
– step 5: “formulate the model.” As Albright 2011 considers “this is where the
"mathematics" starts.” Mathematical notions are used to describe observed
data in order to find a pattern, such as an equation.
– step 6: “solve the model and state the solution.” Solving an equation, con-
structing a graph, running a simulation, describing the behavior of the model
are some examples of solving the model.
– step 7: “verify the model” to check the "reasonableness" of the assumptions,
by comparing the information obtained through the model to the values
calculated in real world,
– step 8: “refine the model.” Refining a model means to improve it in some way,
through additional observations or data, for example by21:
– adding variables, parameters, or relationships between them that are
intentionally ignored in step 3 [Albright 2011; Giordano+ 2008],
21In this list, items mentioned by Albright 2011 are enriched by those mentioned by Giordano+ 2008.
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Figure 3.7: Qualitative and quantitative modeling [Ford 2009]
– allowing variation in the variables that were considered as constant for
simplification purposes [Giordano+ 2008],
– reducing the number of assumptions [Giordano+ 2008],
– expanding the problem [Giordano+ 2008],
– generalizing the model to cover the similar problems [Albright 2011].
In the modeling processes mentioned, as in the definitions of a model (see section
3.2.1.1), the starting point is a problem or the questions to be answered about a
phenomenon or a system. The next main steps include knowledge acquisition about
the problem, construction, testing, correction and validation of the model, and
finally, knowledge production. These are the common steps of these approaches.
Their differences are in their focus and clarity in certain steps. Gabor+ 2003 explicitly
consider knowledge acquisition. Albright 2011 connects the selection of a modeling
approach to the nature of the assumptions made. Giordano+ 2008 describe both
simplifying and refining loops. These modeling processes are used, in the following
chapters, to construct our model. Since we aim to model the decision-making
process in enterprises to investigate the problem of delay, in the next section some
methods and tools of enterprise modeling are reviewed.
3.3 Methods and tools of process modeling in enterprise engineering
Methods and tools for enterprise modeling have appeared since the late 70’s - early
80’s. In the early 90’s, the sharing of representative frameworks between different
industrial actors, using enterprise modeling, became a general trend. Several
methods, techniques, languages, notations, and architectures for process modeling
were subsequently proposed [Vernadat 1996]. We briefly22 review some of these
methods, so as to adopt one that enables us to investigate the problem of delay in
collaborative decision-making in enterprises. Our research questions, presented in
section 2.3 on page 37, will guide our choice.
First, two reference architectures23 are presented. These architectures consider
different aspects (facets) of enterprises from different points of view24. Some
modeling methods, languages, and notations will then be presented with a view to
implementing these aspects.
22These methods are described by Vernadat 1996 and are compared by Darras 2004 and Ferchichi
2008 who give rich syntheses in their theses.
23An architecture is a set of components that are related together and construct a "whole defined by
its functionality" [Vernadat 1996].
24As defined in section 3.2.1.1 on page 46, a point of view is a particular perception of an enterprise
which highlights certain aspects of it and makes the others transparent [Darras 2004]. Points of view
take the names of the aspects that they cover.
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3.3.1 Zachman™, a framework for information systems architecture
The Zachman framework25 is a "framework for information systems architecture"
[Zachman 1987] for "identifying and disciplining the various perspectives involved
in an enterprise architecture" [McGovern 2004]. These perspectives are presented in
a 6 x 6 "matrix" with Communication Interrogatives as columns and Reification
Transformations as rows. Communication Interrogatives consist of 6 areas to be
considered: What (Structure), How (Activities), When (Time), Who (People), Where
(Localisations), and Why (Motivation). Reification Transformations consist of 6
perspectives: Scope contexts (scope identification lists), Business concepts (business
definition models), System logic (system representation models), Technology physics
(technology specification models), Tool components (tool configuration models),
and Operations instances (implementations). The descriptive representations
constituted by this matrix are "relevant for describing something... anything: in
particular an enterprise" [Zachman 2008; Salvendy 2001].
Zachman 1987 considers his framework valuable to improve professional com-
munications within the information systems. It relates a variety of tools and
methodologies. It helps to rethink, in an organized way, "the nature of the classic
application development process as we know it today". However, “the Zachman
framework is not capable of being directly implemented into an information system
and the relationships between the description fields are not entered systematically.
Furthermore, the relationship of Zachman’s framework with the specific creation of
output within the business process is not apparent” [Salvendy 2001].
3.3.2 CIMOSA, an enterprise reference architecture
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Open System Architecture (CIMOSA26) [AMICE
1993] is an enterprise reference architecture27 to construct and analyze production
systems. CIMOSA is proposed by the European Computer Integrated Manufacturing
Architecture (AMICE), within the European Strategic Program on Research in
Information Technology (ESPRIT) [Vernadat 1998].
CIMOSA includes three axes: instantiation, derivation, and generation. The instanti-
ation axis consists of three levels: generic, partial, and particular levels. At generic
level, the basic constructs of modeling language are defined. Partial level includes
partial models, i.e. pre-defined and reusable structures for a given application field.
Particular level corresponds to specific models of an enterprise. Generic and partial
levels constitute the CIMOSA reference architecture (subject to normalization) and
the particular level corresponds to the particular architecture of a given enterprise
(developed for special needs).
25“The Zachman™ Framework IS NOT a methodology for creating the implementation (an instantia-
tion) of the object. The Framework IS the ontology for describing the Enterprise. The Framework
(ontology) is a STRUCTURE whereas a methodology is a PROCESS. A Structure is NOT a Process. A
Structure establishes definition whereas a Process provides Transformation” [Zachman 2008]. See the
site of the Zachman Institute for Framework Advancement (ZIFA) on http://www.zifa.com/
26CIMOSA is the basis of European Pre-standard ENV 40003 now published as a joint European and
ISO standard norm known as EN/ISO 19439 [Lillehagen+ 2008].
27“A reference architecture for a given domain is a generic architecture from which other architectures
can be compared or derived” [Vernadat 1996].
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The derivation axis comprises three description levels in conception: requirements
definition, design specification, and implementation description [Vernadat 1996;
Salvendy 2001].
The generation axis covers four aspects of enterprise modeling [Vernadat 1998]:
1. function view (object): to describe the functionality and behavior of an
enterprise in terms of processes, activities and operations i.e. what is to be
done,
2. information view (object): to describe the objects of an enterprise, their
relationships and their possible states i.e. which objects are treated and how
they are managed,Generation axis
of CIMOSA 3. resource view (subject): to describe the resources needed to perform op-
erations, their roles and their management i.e. who does what, when and
how,
4. organization view (context): to describe hierarchical relations and responsibili-
ties i.e. who is responsible for what.
Enterprise modeling, using CIMOSA, passes through the following steps [Vernadat
1998; Darras 2004] :
1. analysis of the functional business areas of the enterprise and their relation-
ships,
2. identification of the processes to be modeled,
3. detailed analysis of the processes in terms of events, sub-processes, activities,
etc.,Steps of CIMOSA
4. consolidation of the model through design specifications i.e. to describe
each activity in terms of its inputs, its functional operations, resources, and
sequence of activities,
5. adaptation of the model to implementation constraints,
6. the translation model in the language of systems used.
In complex industrial contexts, these multiple points of view make it possible: first,
to filter some aspects of the enterprise, in order to temporarily concentrate on one
aspect, then to study relations between different aspects.
3.3.3 IDEF modeling languages
Among the first works to appear on the subject of modeling was the Integrated
Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) program, which was developed for the US
Air Force [Vernadat 1996]. The ICAM program aimed to increase manufacturing
productivity by application of computer technology [Zhao+ 2011]. At that time, the
ICAM program had identified the need for better technical analysis and communica-
tion for people who worked on improving productivity [Darras 2004]. The ICAM
DEFinition (IDEF) modeling languages were produced to analyze and communicate
the functional aspect of systems [Lakhoua+ 2011]. These languages were based on
Structured Analysis Design Technique (SADT) [Vernadat 1996] and are primarily
used for modeling the functional point of view [Darras 2004].
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Transformation activityInputs Outputs
Controls/Criteria
Supporting mechanisms/Resources
Figure 3.8: Syntax of SADT diagrams
The syntax of IDEF is largely graphical [Rouse+ 2007]. A model produced in IDEF
consists of a set of box graphical forms, representing functions, that are linked by
arrows [Jaulent 1992], representing inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms (see
fig. 3.8).
The IDEF family of languages includes modeling languages such as IDEF0, through to
IDEF14. IDEF0 was not developed to communicate relationships between functions,
“it has no way of specifying a recipe or process, nor descriptions of the specific logic
or timing associated with functions” [Rouse+ 2007]. IDEF1 is designed to produce
models that integrate information in an enterprise. IDEF1 offers a set of rules and
procedures to create an informational model [Darras 2004]. The notions of entity,
relation, data base are then developed in IDEF1 [Ferchichi 2008]. Other languages of
the IDEF family are designed to model different aspects of complex systems by
simulation modeling, data modeling, process description capture, etc. [Darras 2004].
3.3.4 GRAI modeling method
Graph with Results and Actions Interrelated (GRAI)28 is a modeling method that
focuses on the decision system of an enterprise to improve its performance [Roboam
1993]. The GRAI method was developed at the University of Bordeaux in the early
80’s [Ferchichi 2008].
Models built by this method use a grid, called the GRAI grid, which represents
"the points where decisions are made (decision centres29)" and the information
relationships between these centers, in order to analysis and design the way decisions
are synchronised in the enterprise [Doumeingts+ 2006]. The GRAI grid (see fig.
3.9) is a table including types of decisions and information needed over distinct
horizons30 and periods31, "from near term operational to long term strategic". The
rows and the columns respectively correspond to horizons and to types of activities
or functions [Rouse+ 2007].
28Graphes à Résultats et Activités Interreliés (GRAI) a été développé à l’origine par le groupe de
recherche GRAI du Laboratoire d’Automatique et de Productique de l’Université Bordeaux 1 [Ferchichi
2008].
29“Decision centres are the locations where decisions are made about the various objectives and
goals that the system must reach and about the means available to operate consistently with these
objectives and goals” [Doumeingts+ 2006].
30“A horizon is the part of the future taken into account by a decision” [Doumeingts+ 2006].
31“A period is the time that passes after a decision when this decision must be re-evaluated”
[Doumeingts+ 2006].
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Figure 3.9: Concepts of the GRAI grid [Doumeingts+ 2006]
The GRAI grid offers a “one-page summary of the architecture of a decision-making
system, providing an overview in a way no other technique matches.” In this
macroscopic, schematic representation, decisions are classified according to period
and horizon. The grid makes it easy to distinguish operational, tactical, and
strategic decisions. One disadvantage of the GRAI method is the lack of a rigorous
methodology to construct a GRAI grid [Browne+ 1995].
3.3.5 OLYMPIOS model
The OLYMPIOS model is “an algebraic specification for modeling the information
system of a manufacturing enterprise” [Haurat+ 1993]. The purpose of the OLYMPIOS
model is to construct the information system (IS) for a given operator (a user, supplier,
customer,...) of an enterprise. It focusses on the stages of the life cycle of an IS:
specification, design, implementation, validation, and maintenance [Braesch
2002]. The OLYMPIOS model is based on abstract data types and algebras32. Its
implementation and maintenance are made in conventional programming languages
such as C++ [Darras 2004].
3.3.6 MECI modeling method
MECI33 is a method to analyze and design the complex systems of enterprises
[Pourcel+ 2002]. MECI was developed for the AICOSCOP34 project [Bennour 2004].
The MECI modeling method consist of three steps:
– identifying the system to be modeled: identification of the key processes and
the primary industrial objects,
– decomposing the system: the decomposition of the main processes into
sub-processes or activities, defining objects related to the activities and
industrial processes,
– identifying and characterizing the activities of the processes: the identification
and specification of the activities and objects.
32Spécifications Algébriques de Type Abstrait des données (SATA)
33Modélisation d’Entreprise pour la Conception Intégrée
34AIde à la COnception des Systèmes de COnduite des Processus (AICOSCOP)
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Figure 3.10: Activity viewed in MECI
To model a system following this method, a formalism is developed in four "points
of view or aspects" (see fig. 3.10): functional, informational flow, decisional, and
organizational [Darras 2004].
3.3.7 BPMN, a notation for process modeling
Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) is a standard notation to represent
complex business processes. BPMN is the result of two streams of work from the late
90’s - early 21st century: one on workflow management and planning and the other
on modeling and architecture. One primary goal of BPMN is to be user-friendly for
both business analysts and modelers and for business users [White+ 2008]. BPMN
helps improve the traceability and transparency of business processes [Ferchichi
2008].
The BPMN notation is similar to that used in Unified Modeling Language (UML)35.
In BPMN, activities, information flow, and actors are respectively represented by
rectangles, arrows, and pools (lanes as the sub-partitions in a pool)36. BPMN is
integrated in the standards of Object Management Group (OMG) [Benson 2009].
3.4 Synthesis and choice
The objective of this study is to investigate the problem of delay in collaborative
decision-making in enterprises. As we have seen in this chapter, the decision-
making process is decomposed into several stages which contain different activities:
identifying and understanding a problem, seeking and processing information on
possible options and their consequences, creating other options if needed and
possible, considering new information, choosing an option and reviewing this
choice [Stenzel+ 2010; Simon 1960; Janis+ 1977]. These activities trace the trajectory
of information to decision and allow the decision-making process to be studied in
order to understand and improve it.
As is shown in the literature [Vernadat 1996; Browning 2002; Davenport 2009;
Hammer+ 1993], modeling helps represent, understand, analyze, manage, and
improve complex processes. In the study of delay in collaborative decision-making,
modeling the decision trajectory: 1) defines each activity specifically, including its
35BPMN includes the technical detail necessary to "specify messages involved in web service delivery
and the generation of XML-based Business Process Execution Language (BPEL)" [Benson 2009].
36http://www.omg.org/bpmn/Documents
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Table 3.2: Different methods of enterprise modeling, adapted from Darras 2004
Method/Point of view Func. Info. Reso. Orga. Deci.
IDEF YES NO NO NO NO
GRAI NO NO NO NO YES
OLYMPIOS YES YES NO NO NO
MECI YES YES NO YES YES
input, output, and the actor(s) who perform it, 2) identifies the causes of delay
related to each activity and also the possible improvements, 3) allows actors to
"visualize where they are in a process", when they intervene, what they need, and
what they have to do [Browning 2002]. In order to model decision-making processes
in enterprises, we have reviewed some tools and methods, mostly proposed in
enterprise engineering.
At first glance, the columns of the Zachman framework seem attractive, since
they relate to the wh-questions on the decision-making process (see section 2.3
on page 37). But “the Zachman framework can lead to a documentation-heavy
approach”, argues McGovern 2004 who adds that each cell of the framework needs to
be informed and supported, which potentially implies a lot of documentation, “so
you have to really think about what information you actually need versus what
information it is nice to have...”
IDEF was not primarily designed to cover resource and organization aspects. Only
IDEF12 specify these aspects. Additionally, as tab. 3.2 shows, it does not take into
account decisional aspects [Darras 2004].
The GRAI grid is a practical modeling tool, giving a comprehensive, "one-page
model" to explain the structure of the management system to the executives of an
enterprise. It gives considerable weight to the identification of decision centers in
order to manage a system. But“the GRAI grid does not aim at the detailed modeling
of information processes... Other formalisms may be used for modeling the internal
behaviour of decision centres, i.e. to describe how decisions are made; e.g. GRAI
nets” [Doumeingts+ 2006]. However, GRAI nets are "unnecessarily complex" for this
application [Browne+ 1995].
The purpose of the OLYMPIOS model is to construct the IS of a given operator, while
our objective is to model the decision-making process.
Inspired by CIMOSA, MECI offers functional, informational flow, decisional, and
organizational views, but derivation and instantiation are not explicitly taken into
account by MECI.
The generation axis of CIMOSA covers four aspects of enterprises: functional,
informational, resource, and organisational. These aspects are those that appear in
our research questions, presented in section 2.3 on page 37 and also those considered
as important in the scope of enterprise modeling, presented in section 3.2.2 on
page 49 [Curtis+ 1992; Vernadat 1996]. Its derivation axis helps construct our model
and its instantiation axis helps specify the level of our model. In sum, the advantages
of CIMOSA are its modularity, its approach by views, its stepwise derivation, and its
re-usability [Kosanke+ 1994]. Therefore, we have chosen the CIMOSA architecture to
model the Go / No Go decision-making process in drug development projects.
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We now need a notation or language to represent the elements of the CIMOSA
architecture. As a notation, we have chosen BPMN to represent Go / No Go decisions,
because of its several advantages [Benson 2009]:
– showing explicitly who does what, where, and in what sequence, including
trigger events,
– including preceding and following messages of each activity,
– managing the level of details, using sub-processes.
In the next chapter, we present our method to provide a model of Go / No Go
decisions using CIMOSA as an architecture and BPMN as a notation.
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Modeling the decision-making
process - our method
Method is much, technique is much, but inspiration is even more.
Benjamin Cardozo
Recurrent delay in decision-making reveals a dysfunction in the activities that should
be performed within these processes to make decisions. Process modeling represents
these activities and their links in a model. Such a model can be used as a "baseline"
to improve the process that it represents [Browning 2002], through examination of
its activities in terms of quality, time, and cost of their results. To investigate the
indecision problem in enterprises, the process applied to decision-making should be
modeled in order to be examined.
In the previous chapter (in section 3.2.3 on page 51), some modeling processes,
existing in the literature, are presented and some of their strong points are pointed
out. In this chapter, to model collaborative decision-making processes, we propose
guidelines which contain 12 steps of the modeling methods mentioned (see fig. 4.1):
1) identify, understand, and characterize the problem to be solved by modeling [Ford
2009], 2) specify the purposes and characteristics of the chosen model [Gabor+ 2003],
3) collect prior information about the system to be modeled [Gabor+ 2003], 4) state
questions to be answered [Albright 2011], 5) make hypotheses about the answers to
the questions asked [Giordano+ 2008], 6) select modeling approach [Albright 2011],
7) select the structure of the model [Gabor+ 2003], 8) state assumptions [Giordano+
2008; Albright 2011], 9) construct model and simplify if needed [Giordano+ 2008;
Albright 2011], 10) answer questions and refine model if needed [Giordano+ 2008;
Albright 2011], 11) plan the next step of the study using the model created, 12)
validate the model and the plan of study by experts. In the following sections,
each step is adapted to the problem of delay in collaborative decision-making in
enterprises.
4.1 Identification and characterization of indecision problem
4.1.1 Symptoms of indecision in enterprises
Fig. 4.1 illustrates the steps of modeling as a guideline in the form of a process. The
first step to make decisions more effectively and rapidly, is to diagnose potential
difficulties in decision-making. The main pathology of indecision is persistent delays
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in decision-making, resulting from either postponement of decisions or invalidation
of decisions a posteriori. Some causes of indecision are given in appendix A on
page 173. If these causes are repeated in a visible / recognizable way, they warn of
possible decisional pathology and can be considered as symptoms of indecision.
All these causes / symptoms may also be revealing in the context of indecision in
enterprises. However, collaborative and contextual factors related to indecision are
less widely taken into account. The following, more or less strong, symptoms help
identify a decision1 pathology at collaborative level in an enterprise, at four key
times:
1. before decision meeting: decisions are not considered as "results" for which
quality, time, and cost are defined and planned. If the quality of a decision is
difficult to define, the time devoted to making a decision and the cost of a
decision in terms of information and expertise are quantitative values that are
easier to plan. Vigilance at this stage is a preventive measure to prevent delay
in decision-making,
2. during decision meeting:
– lack of discussion in decision meetings,
– endless contradictory discussions in meetings,
– decision postponement is not explicitly assumed,
– holding and re-holding meetings by the same people for the same
decisions on the same information,
3. after decision meeting and before decision execution: lack of determination
in the execution of a decision,
4. after decision execution, when its consequences are known: the ultimate
symptom that confirms a problem in decision-making is frequent lack of
results that depend on a decision, such as a low quality, time-consuming, or
high-cost product or service, compared to what were planned.
When an indecision problem is diagnosed, the decisions delayed should be charac-
terized in order to study the impacts of their characteristics on delays.
4.1.2 Characteristics of decisions delayed
The characterizations of the delayed decisions and also the specificities of their
industrial context offer areas of research into the causes of the problem, and also
reveal the improvement areas. For example, if delayed decisions concern only a
particular phase of a project, the particularity of this phase should be examined to
understand what held up the decisions. This characterization may be guided by the
verification of the factors related to the decisions:
– subject of decision: what decisions are about,
– type of decision: individual or collaborative,
– type of the projects: R&D, production, marketing, etc.,
– phases of the projects: steps of the projects wherein decisions are frequently
delayed,
1Our purpose is to accelerate decision-making, improving its quality and effectiveness. Thus,
throughout this study, we consider the factors related to the quality of decisions.
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– degree of uncertainty: whether the degree of uncertainty related to object,
subject, and context is particularly high (see definition of uncertainty in
section 2.1.4 on page 29),
– degree of complexity: see definition of complexity in section 3.2.1.2 on
page 47,
– reversibility of decisions: whether decisions can be revised or are definitive,
– emergency of situations: depending on the time available to decide and
lapse of time between decision-making and appearance of the consequences,
– context of decision-making: specific factors related to the context of a given
enterprise, such as its sector (public, private) that may affect way decisions are
reached,
– functions of decision-makers: functions of decision-makers in the informa-
tion life cycle, meaning whether they also prepare information relating to the
decision.
The specificities of the industrial field may add other characteristics to the problem.
After identification and characterization of the problem (step 1, fig. 4.1), the purposes
of the model should be specified.
4.2 Purposes and characteristics of the intended model
“Models are used when it is easier to work with a substitute than with the actual
system... They are useful when they help us learn something new about the systems
they represent” [Ford 2009]. In the case of our study, the purpose of modeling the
decision-making process is to improve and accelerate the process. A model of the
decision-making process is then intended to:
1. include and clarify the information life cycle, including the activities to be
performed, the contribution of the actors, specifying their roles e.g. those who
generate information and those who use it to make decisions,
2. help to understand how a consensus is reached in a collaborative decision and
why sometimes it is difficult to reach, Purposes of model
3. be used as a baseline to discuss issues with industrial actors in order to
identify the activities that are frequently delayed in this process and to collect
information on the way activities are performed (current practices). An
understandable graphical model ensures the process is understood by the
modeler and facilitates communication between modeler and industrial
actors. This use of the model is the subject of part III on page 107,
4. help actors "visualize" [Browning 2002] the entire decision-making process to
favor collaboration and transparency.
In addition to being inherently purposive [Gluck+ 2005], the model of the decision-
making process is specified by its:
– point of view [Vernadat 1996]: four views of the generation axis of CIMOSA
[AMICE 1993], namely the function view, information view, resource view, and
organization view,
65
Decision process modeling
– scope [Curtis+ 1992; Vernadat 1996]: initially, the scope is limited to the
information life cycle. Some supplementary questions may arise which cannot
be answered using the model. In this case, the model can be refined, evolvingCharacteristics of
model in breadth (expanding its scope), if an activity or an actor is not included or
evolving in depth, if more details are needed (an activity should be detailed in
several tasks / actions and a task should be detailed in several operations)
[Giordano+ 2008; Albright 2011],
– representation language, notation [Vernadat 1998]: since the model is in-
tended to be used as a "baseline" to discuss the decision-making process with
industrial actors, an understandable graphical form is suitable to visualize this
process. Diagrams, flowcharts, BPMN2 (see section 3.4 on page 59) are some
examples,
– instantiation level [Vernadat 1996]: generic, partial, or particular levels of the
instantiation axis of CIMOSA (see section 3.3.2 on page 55) that depend on
the use of model, meaning respectively a basic construct of the modeling
language, a reusable model for a given sector, or a particular model of a given
enterprise.
Some other characteristics such as detail level [Ross+ 1977] and degree of formalism
[Vernadat 1998] can be specified progressively during the construction of the
model, through simplifying and refining loops. After specifying the purposes and
characteristics of the desired model (step 2, fig. 4.1), we collect information about the
systems to be modeled (step 3, fig. 4.1). This information concerns the elements of
the enterprise that should be taken into account in the model, such as the activities,
their combinations, their inputs and outputs, the actors and their roles, etc. In
industrial contexts, it might be difficult, even impossible, to observe a whole process
in the case of long-lasting or distributed processes. Additionally, observation in
complex sectors is not sufficient to understand the decision-making process and
thus explanation by experts is necessary. Our approach is based on the descriptions
of the decision-making process through a bibliographical study and especially the
descriptions of actors involved in the industrial sector studied. The information
collected helps to formulate the questions to be answered.
4.3 Questions and hypotheses
Based on the points of view of the generation axis of CIMOSA, questions related to
the decision-making process in an enterprise or an industrial sector, can be (step 4,
fig. 4.1):
– what are the stages / activities of the decision-making process? (function
view): as described in section 3.1 on page 43, the stages of the decision-making
process include the information life cycle from information research to
decision-making. The model should highlight the purpose of each stage, the
activities that should be performed in each stage, and the inputs and outputs
of each activity,
– what is the information flow? (information view): the model should take
into consideration the information flow through the activities of the process
2http://www.omg.org/bpmn/Documents
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in order to track information, support transparency, and identify potential
difficulty in the transfer of information,
– who are the actors of the decision-making process? (resource and organiza-
tion views): the role of the actors in each activity should also be taken into
account in the model in order to help their collaboration,
– how activities are performed? (practice view, added to CIMOSA): as the ISO
19439 norm states, if necessary, an additional modeling view can be added to
CIMOSA. In order to study the practices implemented by the decision-makers,
to assess causes of delay and to propose some improvements to reduce it, we
have added the practice view to the generation axis of CIMOSA. This view
corresponds to the behavioral aspects (the way activities are carried out i.e.
practices) in the scope model proposed by Curtis+ 1992 and Vernadat 1996,
presented in section 3.2.1.1 on page 46. However, similarly to CIMOSA, other
tools and methods of enterprise modeling presented in section 3.3 on page 54,
to the best of our knowledge, do not cover practice aspect in their formalisms.
We consider this aspect in our study, but do not aim to study practices directly
through modeling. In part III on page 107, an interview-based approach is
adopted to answer this last question, using the model constructed in this part.
These questions guide model building and its contents. The next step is to make
hypotheses about the answers to these questions (step 5, fig. 4.1). In an exploratory
study, we may only ask questions. In a more advanced study, we may have some
ideas to make hypotheses that can be tested.
4.4 Systemic analysis approach found on process-based model
In section 3.2.1.2 on page 47, some typologies of models are presented, such as
structural, functional, behavioral models, etc. The choice of model depends on its
purposes.
“An enterprise is by nature a complex dynamic system” [Vernadat 1996]. Collaborative
decision-making, in such a complex environment, often implies the contribution of
several multidisciplinary actors to numerous activities.
In order to investigate dysfunctions in a collaborative decision-making process that
lead to problems of delay, this process should be considered in its entirety from
information seeking to decision-making. The effects of the actors’ interactions
should be considered. Thus, a systemic approach (see tab. 3.1 on page 50) founded on
a process-based model, which takes into consideration "ways of chaining activities"
[Vernadat 1996] and consequently the actors’ interactions, is appropriate to studying
the complex problem of delay in collaborative decision-making (steps 6, 7, fig. 4.1).
4.5 Simplifying and refining loops
The next three steps, namely making assumptions, constructing the model, and
answering questions are interconnected (respectively steps 8, 9, 10, fig. 4.1). The first
assumption, concerning the scope of the model, is already stated in step 2. More
assumptions are often needed in order to construct and formulate the model.
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Table 4.1: Simplifying and refining loops in modeling, adapted from Giordano+ 2008;
Albright 2011
Simplifying loop Refining loop
1. Limit the scope of the model. 1. Expand the scope of the model.
2. Neglect some components (or variables /
parameters) of the system.
2. Consider more components of the
system.
3. Aggregate some components 3. Consider components in more detail.
4. Neglect changes in some components of
the system (consider some variables as
constant).
4. Allow changes in the behavior of
components.
5. Neglect / simplify some relationships
between the components of the system.
5. Consider more (complicated)
relationships.
⇒ The number of assumptions increases. ⇒ The number of assumptions reduces.
The steps of CIMOSA (see section 3.3.2 on page 55) can be followed to construct the
model. Then, a checklist should be applied to verify whether the model answers the
questions stated in step 4. Otherwise, refining / simplifying loops should be repeated
until a "manageable" model can be formulated that answer questions. Tab. 4.1
summarizes the simplifying and refining loops through changes in assumptions3.
As explained in section 4.3, the questions about the practices implemented by the
actors in performing the activities of the decision-making process is not intended to
be answered through modeling. It requires the interview-based approach adopted in
part III on page 107. Thus the last step of modeling is to prepare the model and to
plan the study of practices (step 11, fig. 4.1). The quantitative models can be verified
by testing on real data or by simulation. The qualitative models, meaning those with
no quantitative results, should be verified by the experts of the industrial sector
(step 12, fig. 4.1). In the next chapter, we follow these steps to model the Go / No Go
decision-making process in drug development projects.
3See also the principle of selection in section 3.2.2 on page 49, and the four categories of assumptions
in the fourth step of the modeling process proposed by Albright 2011 in section 3.2.3 on page 51.
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5
Process modeling - application and
results
The purpose of models is not to fit the data but to sharpen the
questions.
Samuel Karlin
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a model of the Go / No Go decision-making
process and its underlying information life cycle in drug development projects. This
model helps in understanding and analyzing the decision-making process in order
to reduce delays, answering and refining our questions (see section 2.3 on page 37).
It also facilitates collaboration, coherency, and transparency between different
actors. To construct this model, we have followed the modeling steps presented in
chapter 4 on page 63.
5.1 Identification and characterization of the problem of delay in
Go / No Go decisions
As explained in chapter 1 on page 9, our study focuses on difficult Go / No Go
decisions. When the safety of a compound is questionable, a No Go decision is
always easy and rapid. It is more difficult to make a Go / No Go decision when the
competitiveness of a molecule is questionable, compared to the existing medicines
on the market and the competing products. For the latter, little is known about the
competitors’ activities and their products under development, which makes the
context much more uncertain. In these cases, several symptoms may alert us to a
delay pathology in decision-making.
5.1.1 Symptoms of delay in difficult Go / No Go decisions
The problem, namely delay in decision-making, is underlined by our industrial
partner, a specialist in pharmaceutical development with 20 years of collaborative
experience with several pharmaceutical companies. It should be noted that our
study is based on the various collaborative experiences of our industrial partner
and also thanks to collaboration with a set of pharmaceutical R&D actors who are
working or have worked in different pharmaceutical companies. Thus, the results
concern the pharmaceutical industry and not a given enterprise. The symptoms
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which have drawn the attention of our industrial partner and his colleagues to a
recurrent delay in difficult Go / No Go decision-making are as follows1:
1. before decision meeting: some decision-makers wait for more accurate
information,
2. during decision meeting:
– some decision-makers do not participate in debates,
– endless contradictory discussions in meetings,
– some meetings end without a (clear) decision, not explicitly assuming
the postponement of decisions at the end of meetings,
– holding and re-holding of meetings by the same people for the same
decisions on the same information,
3. after decision meeting and before decision execution:
– some decisions are made but not respected,
– some actors try to change a decision that has already been made,
4. after decision execution, when its consequences are known: no new prod-
uct is launched.
5.1.2 Characteristics of Go / No Go decisions delayed
In order to investigate delay in decision-making, delayed decisions should be
characterized. Each characteristic may potentially cause or reduce delay in decision-
making. Go / No Go decisions are characterized by the following elements (defined
in section 4.1.2 on page 64):
– subject of decision: whether the development of a new molecule should
be continued or stopped, depending on the results of the tests, which are
inconclusive,
– type of decision: collaborative in enterprises, since Go / No Go decisions are
made by a steering committee wherein individual differences and interactions
between experts may complicate the decision (or indecision) process,
– type of the projects: drug development projects,
– phases of the projects2: five Go / No Go decision milestones mark:
1. the beginning of the development: transition between the last phase
of research, meaning Lead optimization phase to the first phase of
development, namely Preclinical phase,
2. the first tests on human beings: transition between Preclinical phase to
phase I,
3. the end of an exploratory study and the beginning of a pivotal study with
statistically significant evidence of efficacy: transition between phase
II-a to II-b,
1These symptoms are confirmed through in-depth interviews with some other industrial actors,
which are presented in part III on page 107.
2Phases of development projects are explained in section 1.2.1 on page 14.
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4. the tests on a large number of patients: transition between phase II to
III which is one of the most crucial Go / No Go decisions, because it
implies taking risks to human health and involves considerable time and
financial investment,
5. the end of the development: transition between phase III to submission
to launch.
– degree of uncertainty: Go / No Go decisions are taken under uncertainty,
inherent in innovation, due to the lack of knowledge about the safety, efficacy,
and quality of the new compounds, changes in regulation, and also the
competitors’ activities,
– degree of complexity: a large amount of interconnected information from
various fields must be taken into account to make Go / No Go decisions (see
section 1.2.2 on page 16),
– reversibility of decisions: Go / No Go decisions can be revised and remade,
– emergency of situations: non-emergency due to long duration of the projects,
since pharmaceutical R&D projects take more than ten years, thus decisions
may not seem urgent, compared to emergency situations such as accidents,
crises, or disaster contexts wherein an immediate decision and reaction is
necessary. The consequences of Go / No Go decisions are not immediate, so
some delays may be ignored or tolerated,
– context of decision-making:
– internal context: some elements specify the context in a given enter-
prise: enterprise size (start up, medium, large), type of governance
(family, private or public) specifying percentage quoted on the stock
market, pipeline flow (and its stability), etc.,
– external context: the pharmaceutical industry has an environment with
a lot of uncontrollable factors such as regulatory changes, market dy-
namics, competitors’ activities, stakeholders’ expectations, practitioners’
conviction about a new drug,
– functions of decision-makers: chemists and pharmacologists, pre-clinical
experts, and clinicians are the major R&D actors of the steering committee in
charge of making Go / No Go decisions, where most of these experts do not
possess the multidisciplinary knowledge to decide.
5.2 Purposes and characteristics of the model intended for Go / No Go
decision-making
The purposes and characteristics of the model of the Go / No Go decision-making
process are those presented in section 4.2 on page 65. Clarification is needed
regarding the instantiation level: is it a generic, partial, or particular level? [Vernadat
1996] (see the instantiation axis of CIMOSA in section 3.3.2 on page 55). The model
intended is neither a basic construct of the modeling language, i.e. a generic
model, nor a model for a given enterprise i.e. a particular model. It is a partial
model for a given sector, namely the pharmaceutical industry. The intended model
is based on the description of the Go / No Go decision-making process in the
pharmaceutical center, by the actors who have been worked in several enterprises
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and propose a partial model for these decisions. Since public health is at stake in
drug development projects, different phases of these projects are strictly defined by
regulatory authorities. This makes it possible to create a model that can be used as a
"basic" to drive "particular models" for enterprises (see Vernadat 1996).
The questions are those introduced in section 4.3 on page 66, and the approach
adopted is a systemic approach explained in section 4.4 on page 67.
5.3 A model for Go / No Go decision-making, first level of detail in a
pyramidal form
The Go / No Go decision-making process, including its underlying information life
cycle, is modeled at three levels which are the results of three major refinements: 1)
at the first level, the Go / No Go decision-making process is presented in 4 macro
stages (from understanding the problem to decision-making), 2) at the second
level, each stage is detailed in terms of the activities to be performed, 3) at the third
level, the last macro stage (decision-making itself) is detailed in terms of cognitives
processes involving in information processing at individual level and consensus
shaping at collaborative level.
5.3.1 Description of the model in a macro vision - first level
Fig. 5.1 illustrates the model of the Go / No Go decision-making process, at its first
level of detail, in a pyramidal form. The main views expressed in the generation axis
of CIMOSA are the basis on which to collect information and model the Go / No Go
decision-making process:
1. organization view (context), i.e. the position of the actors in a pyramid
form: at the top of the pyramid, we see the steering committee in charge of
decision-making. In the middle of the pyramid, we can see the project manager
who pilots the project in collaboration with experts and some experienced
functional managers who together form the core team, and at the bottom of
the pyramid the technicians who perform tests and studies,
2. resource view (subject), i.e. the actors: the members of the steering committee,
project manager, experts, functional managers, and technicians,
3. function view (object), i.e. activities in italic font: activities of the information
life cycle, including determining information required to make decision,
generating and collecting information, interpreting and contextualizing it in
order to be used in decision-making,
4. information view (object), i.e. the flow of information by perpendicular arrows:
on the left side of the pyramid, information goes down, from the steering
committee to technicians. On the right side of the pyramid, the raw data is
transformed to information and goes up to the steering committee.
Four large arrows which surround the pyramid correspond to four macro stages of
decision-making, based on the decision-making processes proposed by Simon 1960
and Janis+ 1977 (see section 3.1 on page 43): 1) Intelligence and Design stage, 2) Test
stage, 3) New Information Analysis stage, and 4) Choice and Review stage. The stages
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1 and 4 take root in the simple and clear decision-making process proposed by Simon
1960 which corresponds to the first and last stages of the Go / No Go decision-making
process (see below descriptions). But Simon 1960 does not taken into account
seeking and analyzing new information and updating previous knowledge as a
stage, which is the case in the process proposed by Janis+ 1977 and also in drug
development projects (through new tests and studies). Thus, the explanation of the
second and third stages of the Go / No Go decision-making process are based on the
process of Janis+ 1977.
The first stage, Intelligence and Design, on the left side of the pyramid (see fig. 5.1),
corresponds to the first two stages of the Simon model (see fig. 3.2 on page 45):
– Intelligence stage: observing reality, identifying the problem, collecting and
understanding information,
– Design stage: identification of the criteria and construction of the alternatives.
In the case of drug development projects, the process of Go / No Go decision is
triggered when the research department obtains some a priori "good" results on a
new compound and the steering committee must decide whether research and
development of this compound should be continued or stopped.
The steering committee observes the primary results on the molecule, its therapeutic
axis, etc. The committee defines the project goals and establishes a list of questions
about the properties of the molecule, its activity and behavior in the human body,
etc. The steering committee transmits the list of the project goals and related
questions to the project manager who, in collaboration with the core team, should
collect information to answer questions, identify the criteria that can help, first,
design the development plan, then construct the alternative, and finally, make a
Go / No Go decision. The core team is formed by the project manager, some internal
and external experts, who have various levels of expertise in dealing with different
aspects of drug development, and finally some functional managers, depending on
their expertise and experience.
The project core team is in charge of defining the Target Product Profile (TPP) as a
key strategic tool guiding drug development. TPP is the key design template for
creating the development plan and should be defined by the project team, as it is a
multidisciplinary activity [Kennedy 1998].
Focusing on the TPP, and in accordance with the Notice To Applicants (NTA)3,
the project team determines the development plan, including the list of tests and
operational conditions.
Both TPP and development plan should be validated by (some members of) the
steering committee or the R&D director, before transmission to the technicians who
perform the tests.
The second stage, test, at the bottom of the pyramid (see fig. 5.1), corresponds to the
fourth stage of the process proposed by Janis+ 1977: searching for new information
relevant to the choice. In the Test stage, the technicians carry out the tests and
transmit the raw data to the functional managers.
3NTA produces a series of regulatory guidance norms for development of medicinal products.
“NTA was drawn up by the European Commission in consultation with the competent authorities
of the Member States, the European Medicines Agency and interested parties in order to fulfil the
Commission’s obligations” [EC 2008].
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Figure 5.1: Four macro stages of Go / No Go decision-making process
The third stage, new information analysis, at the right side of the pyramid (see fig.
5.1), corresponds to the fifth and sixth stages of the process proposed by Janis+ 1977:
– “assimilating and taking account of any new information or expert judgment,
even when the information does not support the initial choice of course of
action,
– re-examining the positive and negative consequences of all known alternatives,
including those originally regarded as unacceptable, prior to making a choice.”
In this perspective, the raw data will be interpreted by functional managers. Project
managers and experts contextualize the information depending on the project goals
and consult functional managers to carry out the new tests, if necessary. Finally, the
contextualized results of the tests and also the recommendations of the project
manager are presented to the steering committee.
The last stage, Choice and Review, at the top of the pyramid (see fig. 5.1), corresponds
to Simon’s model: “weighing the consequences of actions, gaining confidence in
the decision, and planning the action” (see fig. 3.2 on page 45). During this stage,
the steering committee uses a benefit-risk analysis to decide whether to continue
or not. During the Choice and Review stage, based on the presented results and
the recommendations of the project manager, the steering committee makes a
Go / No Go decision, if the results are conclusive and allow the benefit-risk balance
of the new compound to be assessed. If the results are not conclusive enough due,
for example, to incomplete or contrary results, the steering committee may ask for
some additional trials and studies and the process is iterated. Information becomes
progressively accurate and complete and decision-makers should take into account
the results of the new tests to make a decision or revise a decision made4.
4We have proposed a decision support system to take new information progressively into account in
decision-making when faced with uncertainty and give an illustrative example in (see Hassanzadeh+
2011c)
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Table 5.1: Example of the simplified results of stability measurement tests
Time/Temperature 0° 5° 25°
t0 13,0000 µg /l 13,0000 µg /l 13,0000 µg /l
t1month 12,9999 µg /l 12,9999 µg /l 12,9995 µg /l
t6month 12,9998 µg /l 12,9997 µg /l 12,9980 µg /l
t12month 12,9997 µg /l 12,9995 µg /l 12,9935 µg /l
t1month + H2O — 12,9994 µg /l 12,9945 µg /l
t6month + H2O — 12,9993 µg /l 12,9942 µg /l
t12month + H2O — 12,9991 µg /l 12,9934 µg /l
5.3.2 Illustration of the model - first level
This process is illustrated by an example of one of the criteria on which Go / No Go
decisions is based. The purpose of this example is to highlight which type of
information the Go / No Go decisions are based on, how this information is concretely
produced in the form of initial raw data, and which elements are taken into account
to interpret this raw data.
Many questions need to be answered to prove the safety, efficacy, and quality of a
molecule in order to make a Go / No Go decision. The toxicity of the molecule, its
stability, clinical and side effects, mechanism of absorption and distribution in /
elimination from the human body, are a few examples of these questions.
The stability question is a part of the quality question: is the product stable under
conditions of use? Many environmental factors affect the stability of a product.
Depending on the project goals and also the available quantity of the product, the
project team establishes a list of tests to be conducted in order to obtain data on
product degradation in different climatic zones. Operational conditions such as
temperature, humidity, and light are also determined, so that the real packaging and
storage conditions are simulated. A protocol that includes this information and also
the number of tests, quantity of the product, time intervals, measurement, and
analysis methods have to be followed by technicians.
Tab. 5.1 presents a simplified example of the stability results. The purpose is
to highlight how the raw data of this table about the degradation rate5 of a new
compound is interpreted and contextualized by the project manager and the
experts. Each cell of the table shows the concentration of the compound at a given
temperature (0°, 5°, or 25° - in dry and humid environments) and after a lapse of time
from the beginning of the study (1, 6, or 12 months). In this way, the degradation
rate of 13 µg /l of a new compound is measured during one year, in three different
temperatures and in dry and humid environments.
At time t0+12 months, meaning after one year, technicians register – 0,05% of
degradation at ambient temperature. The functional manager’s interpretation is
that the molecule is approximately stable. The project team, in collaboration with
functional managers, contextualizes this interpretation in terms of project goals and
5“Progressive decomposition of a chemical compound into a less complex compound, as by splitting
off one or more groups of atoms”, source: http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.
com/degradations
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tries to answer the following questions. Does this degradation rate affect the efficacy
of the molecule in usage conditions? Could the degradation rate be reduced in
another container such as a blister? In relation to the results of other studies, such as
toxicity, is this degradation rate acceptable? The answers to these questions are often
tainted with a degree of uncertainty.
5.3.3 Questions answered in / arising from the pyramidal model
The first level of our model (see fig. 5.1) highlights the global structure of the resource
organization, the role of each actor in the information life cycle through the four
macro stages of the decision-making process, and the flow of information from the
top to the bottom of the pyramid and vice versa. Additionally, this representation of
the information trajectory, within the decision-making process, makes it possible to
analyze the role of the three classes of uncertainty factors, presented in section 2.1
on page 21, in this process, namely factors relating to object, subject, and context.
During the first two stages (Intelligence and Design stage, and Test stage), the factors
related to the object (molecule) play an important role in creating uncertainty
by incompleteness or contradiction of information, since the properties and the
behavior of the molecule, and consequently its benefit-risk balance, are mostly
unknown. Thus, the definition of the tests and protocols is relatively6 objective,
factual, and rational. Therefore, the impact of the subjective and contextual factors is
limited compared to the next stages.
During the third stage (New Information Analysis stage), the results of the tests
in various fields (the raw data) are progressively available and should first be
interpreted. In this stage, factors related to subjects, especially individual factors,
such as perception, reasoning mode, and the experience of each expert are also
important. During the contextualization of information, factors related to the context
are taken into account: internal factors, such as the condition of other projects in the
pipeline and external factors such as market dynamics. During the representation of
information, the role of subjects in the communication of results is crucial.
Finally, during the last stage (Choice and Review stage), meaning Go / No Go decision,
factors related to subjects, especially collaborative factors, such as debates and
different ideas about the doubtful results contribute to creating uncertainty.
The pyramid illustrates how objective, subjective, and contextual layers are progres-
sively superimposed in the Go / No Go decision-making process. This analysis is
validated by the experts, as it allows them to take into consideration the importance
of each class of uncertainty factor in the different stages of the process, and especially
because it raises the following questions. When decisions are frequently delayed,
dysfunctions in the decision-making process and information life cycle are caused
by which class of uncertainty factors? In order to identify the dysfunctions and
the factors involved in these dysfunctions, the activities described in the pyramid
should be detailed in more elementary activities to be examined. For example, the
activities that allow the TPP, or the development plan to be defined, or the results of
6Sometimes the results of the tests on different kinds of animals or different populations of target
patients are contradictory. In these cases, supplementary tests are needed to explain the contradictions.
The choice of the supplementary tests is based on the interpretation of the first results which is, by
definition, more or less subjective.
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the tests to be prepared, should be detailed. Additionally, the possible outcomes of
the decision-making are not explained in the pyramid.
One purpose of the model is that it can be used as a baseline to discuss issues with
the actors in order to point out the delayed activities, the causes of delay, and the
way to improve the process (see section 4.2 on page 65). But, the pyramidal form of
the Go / No Go decision-making process is not precise enough to support such a
study. Therefore, a refinement of the model is necessary. The refined model is more
detailed than the pyramid, while its scope is the same, meaning the information life
cycle in decision-making.
In the next section, we represent the four macro stages of the process, presented in
BPMN, that show more details in an understandable, graphical form.
5.4 Second level of detail, information life cycle in BPMN
5.4.1 Description of the model in a detailed vision - second level
A more detailed description of the Go / No Go decision-making process is presented
in fig. 5.2, compared to the pyramid (see fig. 5.1 on page 76). This process, thanks to
elements of BPMN (see section 3.3.7 on page 59), shows more exactly the inputs,
outputs, and the sequence of the activities, the role of the actors, and the information
flow.
In the first stage, Intelligence and Design, we can see that contrary to the project
goals, which are directly defined by the steering committee, drawing up the TPP and
the development plan involve, first, the collaboration between the project manager
and the expert committee, and then the final validation by the steering committee.
This representation traces the collaboration of the actors to provide the important
documents: project goals, TPP, development plan, and planning.
The second stage, Test, is not more detailed compared to the pyramidal form.
The third stage, New Information Analysis, illustrates the activities performed to
transform the raw data into information presented to decision-makers: interpreta-
tion, contextualization, synthesis, aggregation, and finally presentation of the results.
In addition to the results, the project manager makes some recommendations about
the continuation of the project. These recommendations, like the treatment of the
raw data, are made in collaboration with the expert committee.
The last stage, Choice and Review, highlights in a formal way, thanks to the logic
operators of BPMN, the four possible outputs of the activity Analyze the results and
recommendations:
– Go: if the results of studies are sufficiently good and demonstrate the objectives
of the phase, such as efficacy for animals in the preclinical phase, the decision
will be to continue to the next phase (tests on humans),
– No Go: if the results are bad and prove toxicity or inefficacy of the molecule,
the project will be stopped,
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– Go + tests: if the results are not completely satisfactory and some points need
to be clarified, transition to the next phase takes place. But at the same time,
the steering committee (consulting the project team) requests supplementary
tests and studies. The next phase of the project begins. The process iterates,
defining and performing the new tests and interpreting the new results which
may confirm or question the Go decision,
– No Go + tests (temporary stopping): if the results are not entirely satisfactory,
supplementary tests are requested and the project is temporary stopped,
awaiting the results of the new tests which clarify and complement the
previous results.
The second level of the model, as is also the case for the first level of the model
(fig. 5.1 on page 76), is based on the description of the industrial actors and is
validated by others as a "particular" model (see section 3.3.2 on page 55) which
represents the Go / No Go decision-making in a drug development project.
5.4.2 Questions answered in / arising from the BPMN presentation
The second level of the model presented in BPMN (see fig. 5.2) gives a more detailed
vision of the Go / No Go decision-making process, compared to the pyramidal form
(see fig. 5.1 on page 76). It highlights the collaboration between the actors through
the way of linking the activities performed by different actors. This model draws
attention to three levels of collaboration:
– collaboration within the core team between the actors who produce and
prepare information,
– collaboration between the core team (especially the project manager) and the
steering committee when the project manager presents information to the
steering committee,
– collaboration within the steering committee between the decision-makers
(experts in various fields, such as chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, pre-
clinical and clinical studies, etc.) who use prepared and presented information
to decide.
The first and second collaboration levels are clear in the BPMN presentation,
since the actors of the project team are represented in three different lanes (see
section 3.3.7 on page 59): project manager, expert committee, and technicians. It is
also true for the second collaboration between the project team and the steering
committee, presented in different lanes. However, one question remains unanswered:
is there any problem, misunderstanding, or dysfunction in the collaboration of
the project team and the steering committee? The same question arises for the
collaboration within the steering committee, presented in the same lane in fig. 5.2 on
the next page: how do decision-makers collaborate to make a decision? They are the
experts in the various fields, but how do they perceive, evaluate, and reason on the
results presented by the project manager?
In the second level of the model the Choice stage of the model is not sufficiently
elaborated. The collaboration, between decision-makers within the steering
committee is not at all clear. The Choice stage remains a black box7 in this model.
7See fig. 3.4 on page 48.
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Furthermore, activities to transform information to decision are specified, but data,
information, and knowledge transformation by cognitive processes throughout the
decision-making process is not outlined. Thus, the refinement of the model at the
last stage of the decision-making process is necessary to find out how the members
of the steering committee, as the unique (group of) actors in this stage, reach a
consensus to make a decision, and when and why such a decision is delayed or
invalidated.
In the next section, a framework is proposed to understand the Choice stage in the
case of collaborative decision-making.
5.5 Third level of detail, a framework for the collaborative Choice stage
All decision is a matter of compromise.
Herbert Alexander Simon
“All decision is a matter of compromise. The alternative that is finally selected never
permits a complete or perfect achievement of objectives, but is merely the best
solution that is available under the circumstances” [Simon 1947]. In the case of
collaborative decisions, this compromise should be reached collaboratively. As Roy
1996 indicates, a collaborative decision-making process would usually be composed
of a period of individual reflection and group interaction. A collaborative “decision
will generally be the product of an interaction between this individual’s preferences
and those of others... The playing out of these confrontations and interactions,
under the various compensating and amplifying effects of the system, makes up
what we shall call the decision process” [Roy 1996].
As the pharmaceutical R&D actors describe, before the Choice stage, the project
manager sends the results of the tests and studies to the members of the steering
committee. Then, the Choice and Review stage begins through a meeting. This
means that the Go / No Go decisions are "face-to-face", i.e. “several decision-makers
are implicated in the decisional process and meet together around a table. This is a
very frequent situation” (see tab. 5.2 [Zaraté+ 2004]).
Go / No Go decision meetings consist of two steps: 1) presenting the results of the
studies by the project manager to the steering committee, 2) decision-making by the
steering committee.
In this section, we detail the Choice stage of the Go / No Go decision-making process
(see section 5.3.1 on page 74 and section 5.4 on page 79), in order to understand,
describe, visualize, and analyze how:
– each decision-maker individually processes information, before the meeting
and at the beginning of the meeting when the project manager presents the
results,
– after the presentation of the results, a consensus is reached within the steering
committee.
To achieve this objective, first, we present some models of collaborative decision-
making in the literature. Then, our description of the Choice stage is presented
which helps to define an index to measure the risk of invalidating a decision. Finally,
an example illustrates the model.
82
Process modeling - application and results
Table 5.2: Collaborative decision-making situations [Zaraté+ 2004]
Synchronous Asynchronous
Same place Face-to-face decision-making Asynchronous decision-making
Different places Distributed synchronous
decision-making
Distributed asynchronous
decision-making
5.5.1 Collaborative choice in the literature
Collaborative decision-making involves a group of individuals who focus on the
same situation to make a decision [Maier 1967]. Freeman 1999 and Harris 2005 point
out some advantages and disadvantages of collaborative decision-making:
– advantages:
1. a more complete knowledge base may be available thanks to professional
knowledge and experiences of individuals,
2. more alternatives and opportunities may be considered from different
perspectives, thanks to diversity of views,
3. ownership of decision by the people who participate in decision-making
and have understood the process by which decision is achieved,
4. more legitimacy of decision,
– disadvantages:
1. time-consuming process which may limit the ability to respond quickly,
2. social pressure to conform and to avoid conflict which can squash
disagreement, differences, and favor conformity8,
3. possible decrease of effectiveness because of the domination of the
group by one person or a few individuals perceived as more powerful or
more intelligent,
4. ambiguity of the responsibility.
The first two advantages, i.e. more complete knowledge, experience, views, and
alternatives in a collaborative decision-making process have ambivalent effects on
it. On the one hand, the decision made can be well-informed and on the other
hand, often more time is needed to discuss issues and reach a consensus. We
focus on these two ambivalent advantages to understand collaborative information
processing based on various knowledge, experiences, and views.
In section 3.1 on page 43, some decision-making processes suggested by Boyed
[Stenzel+ 2010], Simon 1960, and Janis+ 1977 are presented. As explained in that
section, these processes give a structure to decision and highlight the macro stages
of decision-making which allow structuring of the Go / No Go decisions, taking into
account the activities, such as understanding the problem, searching for information,
creating options, evaluating alternatives, determining actions (see section 5.3.1 on
page 74 and section 5.4 on page 79). But the Choice stage, though it might be the
8Conformity is related to groupthink defined by Janis 1972 as “a mode of thinking that people
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” To read
about other bias in decision-making see Hassanzadeh+ 2012b.
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Figure 5.3: Model of SA in dynamic decision-making [Endsley 1995]
most intellectually difficult part of the decision-making process [Forman+ 2001],
is not sufficiently developed in these models. For example, Pomerol+ 2008 state
that Simon’s model “makes it possible to connect decision and information, even
though it is not rich enough in terms of understanding choice and analyzing the
role of future events.” Additionally, the factors that affect decision-making, such as
experiences and views, are not taken into account. Another shortcoming of these
processes is that even if the stages are separated, which allows the contribution of
the actors in each stage to be studied, the collaboration of the actors who perform
the same stage cannot be examined.
Team 
member 1
SA 
elements
Team 
member 2
SA 
elements
Team 
member 3
SA 
elements
Team 
member 4
SA
elements
Figure 5.4: Team SA [Endsley 1995]
In this section, we present some models
of decision-making processes that help
to understand the Choice stage. Fig. 5.3
shows the model of Situation Aware-
ness (SA) in dynamic human decision-
making, suggested by Endsley 1995 who
defines SA as follows: “situation aware-
ness is the perception of the elements
in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of
their meaning, and the projection of
their status in the near future.” Ends-
ley 1995 distinguishes SA, as a "state of
knowledge", from the "process" applied to achieve this state which consists in three
hierarchical phases: perception of the elements in the environment, comprehension
of the current situation, and projection of the future. SA does not simply include
"perceiving information" about a situation. It also includes "comprehending the
meaning of that information", and "providing projected future states of the environ-
ment". Projection of the future is achieved through knowledge acquired in both first
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Figure 5.5: Consensus process within collaborative decision-making process [Mata+
2009]
two levels (see fig. 5.3). In this way, a decision-maker puts together information,
using various patterns to determine an action, thanks to knowledge acquired and
previous experiences, avoiding possible undesirable consequences in the future,
adapted to a situation9. SA is followed by decision-making and performance of
action. Fig. 5.3 also shows several major factors which influence this process [Endsley
1995]:
– individual factors: abilities, experience, training, long-term memory stores, au-
tomaticity which affect information processing mechanisms and consequently
the way to process goals,
– "features of the task environment": workload, stress, and complexity.
Fig. 5.4 shows the overlap between team members’ SA, in the case of collaborative
decision-making. This overlap is the subset of information which constitutes team
coordination via, for example, a verbal exchange. Endsley 1995 considers that “the
quality of team members’ SA of shared elements (as a state of knowledge) may serve
as an index of team coordination”.
The SA model highlights the cognitive processes10, implemented to achieve an
awareness state which is necessary to make a decision. It also takes into account
both individual, and "task and environment factors" that affect the decision-making
process. This model is widely used in different fields11, to improve the knowledge
management process in collaborative decision. However, the team SA details
neither the differences and similarities of the perception and reasoning of different
members, nor their interactions (see fig. 5.4). Thus, we cannot use it to describe how
a collaborative decision is formed.
A key concept that allows a collaborative decision to be made is consensus, more
precisely a state of agreement between decision-makers within a group where all
opinions have been addressed [Saint+ 1994]. The process that allows a consensus to
be reached consists in “discussion rounds where the experts provide and change
their opinions” [Mata+ 2009]. Fig. 5.5 shows a collaborative decision-making
9For example, “an air traffic controller needs to put together information on various traffic patterns
to determine which runways will be free and where there is a potential for collisions” [Endsley 1995].
10“A cognitive process is one that: 1) is required for the accomplishing of a cognitive task, 2) involves
information processing, and 3) is of the sort that is capable of yielding a cognitive state” [Rowlands
2006].
11Endsley 1995, is cited 2602 times according to Google Scholar and cited 742 times according to Web
of Knowledge.
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process, including the consensus process. In this model, the exchange aspect
of decision-making is illustrated, but the "set of individuals" is presented as a
black box (see fig. 3.4 on page 48) and we lose the SA and its influential factors on
each decision-maker(see fig. 5.3). We aim to detail the collaborative Choice stage,
considering both individual information processing and collaborative exchanges.
Endsley 1995 provides the cognitive processes used in information processing
but the nature of the objects manipulated by these processes are not explained.
In the next section, we explain the distinctions and relationships between data,
information, and knowledge as the objects of cognitive processes. This helps us
elaborate our model of the collaborative choice, taking into account the objects
which are treated differently through the cognitive processes of different actors.
5.5.2 Distinctions and relationships between data, information, and
knowledge
Fig. 5.6 shows the distinctions and relationships between data, information, and
knowledge and helps describe perception and comprehension levels of the SA model
(see fig. 5.3).
Data are the uninterpreted signals detected by senses, such as strings of numbers,Data
characters, or other symbols, a color, etc.
Information is data equipped with a meaning obtained through an interpretation.
For example, a red traffic light is interpreted by a car driver as an indication to stop,
while an alien whose shuttle has landed “near the Paris périphérique during the
Friday evening rush hour” does probably not give the same meaning to a red light12.
“The data are the same, but the information is not” [Schreiber 2000]. This exampleInformation
draws attention to the perception of the subject who receives data from an object
and transforms it to information which might be different from the information
produced from the same data by another subject. This subjectivity is tightly linked to
that in the face of uncertainty, since uncertainty is interconnected to information13.
Thus, as different information can be produced from the same data by different
subjects, the degree of uncertainty may be different for these subjects, depending on
their previous knowledge, experiences, and memory 14.
Knowledge is the whole data and information used to carry out actions, with two
important distinct aspects: 1) "a sense of purpose", because knowledge is consideredKnowledge
as the "intellectual machinery", and 2) "a generator capability", since one major
function of knowledge is to produce new information [Schreiber 2000].
The distinctions and relationships of data, information, and knowledge are useful
in understanding the mental mechanisms of the decision-makers, and to study
the factors that contribute to this transformation process and consequently to the
decision-making process.
12Another example is the acronyms and abbreviations, widely used and constantly changed in
France, for an Iranian who may perceive most of them only as a chain of characters. In these situations,
the context may help interpret data.
13“The concept of uncertainty and information studied in this book are tightly interconnected.
Uncertainty is viewed as a manifestation of some information deficiency, while information is viewed
as the capacity to reduce uncertainty” [Klir 2005]. See section 2.1.3 on page 27.
14This shows that our definition of uncertainty, presented in section 2.1.4 on page 29, appropriately
takes into consideration the role of the subject in the characterization of uncertainty.
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Figure 5.6: Distinctions and relationships between data, information, and knowledge
[based on Schreiber 2000; Qiu+ 2006]
In complex multidisciplinary drug development projects, project managers (in
collaboration with experts) interpret and contextualize the raw data and present the
interpreted data to decision-makers who may:
– more or less share this interpretation,
– have another interpretation of the same data,
– not understand some pieces of information in detail, because it is not in the
scope of their expertise.
To understand how each individual transforms data into knowledge and how
individuals interact within a group, we have refined the collaborative Choice stage of
our model (see section 5.3.1 on page 74, section 5.4 on page 79, and section 4.5 on
page 67) in a framework (see fig. 5.7). In the next sections, first, the global structure
of the refined model is presented, and then more descriptions are given in detail.
5.5.3 Global structure and assumptions in ISA and CSA
Information goes in, decisions come out and who knows what
happens in between?
Davenport 2009
The purpose of refining the collaborative Choice stage of the Go / No Go decision-
making model (see section 5.4 on page 79) is to highlight, as Roy 1996 distinguishes,
"individual reflection" and "group interaction" in this stage. The models of col-
laborative decision-making, presented in section 5.5.1, either explain clearly the
individual reflection [Endsley 1995] or visualize the collaborative aspect [Mata+
2009]. The framework for the collaborative Choice stage that we propose takes into
consideration both individual and collaborative aspects through two SA processes
(see fig. 5.7). The first one, Individual Situation Awareness (ISA) corresponds to
"individual reflection" pointed out by Roy 1996 and illustrates how an individual
processes information. The second one, Collaborative Situation Awareness (CSA)
corresponds to "group interaction" pointed out by Roy 1996 and illustrates the
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interactions between decision-makers that may motivate decision-makers to review
and change their positions.
The model is described independently of its application field - drug development
projects - and is illustrated by a pharmaceutical application.
Before detailed explanation of each cognitive process used to process information in
our ISA, we underline the organizations of these cognitive processes compared to
Endsley’s SA model.
As Endsley 1995 indicates, his SA model (see fig. 5.3) and its underlying cognitives
processes such as perception and comprehension are commonly applicable in
a wide variety of areas. Inspired by Endsley’s SA model, the ISA that we propose
includes the cognitive processes implemented by each individual to acquire the state
of awareness in the collaborative Choice stage (see section 5.5.1). This model is
enriched and verified thanks to multiple discussions with our industrial partner and
his colleagues.
Endsley 1995 indicates “the first step in achieving SA is to perceive the status,
attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment... SA, therefore, is
based on far more than simply perceiving information about the environment. It
includes comprehending the meaning of that information in an integrated form,
comparing it with operator goals, and providing projected future states of the
environment that are valuable for decision-making.” In his SA model, Endsley
1995 assigns two different boxes (rectangles) to perception and comprehension
and the last one to projection of future (see fig. 5.3). In the ISA that we propose,
perception is not a simple reception of data and thus, is equivalent of the first
two levels of the SA model proposed by Endsley 1995: "perceiving information",
including "comprehending the meaning of that information".
The next cognitive process in our ISA is evaluation of the quantitative or qualitative
value of each variable perceived. In this phase, each variable is evaluated separately
from the others. For example, for buying a new car some variables may be considered
such as power, speed, color, fuel, etc. and the value of each of them is evaluated
considering a criterion. After the evaluation of each variable, a reasoning is applied
to measure how the set of values globally satisfy the goals of a decision or project.
These last two steps, namely evaluation and reasoning, are not included in the SA
model of Endsley 1995 (see fig. 5.3). The projection of future step is that proposed by
Endsley 1995. Individual position is the equivalent of the decision box in the SA
model of Endsley 1995. We do not call it decision, since in the case of collaborative
decisions it is at the end of the collaborative phase that a decision is made. The
collaborative phase is not included in the SA model of Endsley 1995.
In fig. 5.7, the rectangles represent the cognitive processes and the lozenges represent
taking a position in the ISA and making decisions in the CSA. The circles are the
logical connectors i.e. AND (noted +), OR, and XOR. The punched tape forms contain
numbers which are used to explain the conditions related to each possibility after a
XOR operator. Traditionally in the flowcharts, as we have seen in section 3.3 on
page 54, the arrows pointing down and up respectively symbolize constraints and
resources. The framework of the collaborative choice is not to model the operational
activities, but the cognitive processes. Thus as is the case in the SA model of Endsley
1995 (see fig. 5.3), in our model (fig. 5.7) the arrows pointing down correspond to
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"task and environmental factors", specifying two sets: project goals noted Gpr o j ect ,
and contextual factors as explained in our definition of uncertainty (see section 2.1.4
on page 29). Again, as with the SA model of Endsley 1995, the arrows pointing up
correspond to individual and collaborative influential factors, respectively in the ISA
and the CSA.
Suppose a group of m decision-makers have to make a collaborative decision d ,
that is shaped by individual decisions DMi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The input of the
collaborative decision is a vector of variables [v j ], where 1≤ j ≤ n, and n is the
number of the variables that are judged, by the group in the Design stage15, to have
an impact on a decision (a Go / No Go decision for example), satisfying a set of
already determined criteria. Each decision-maker receives the same values for the n
variables and processes them through four personal cognitive processes: perception,
evaluation, reasoning, and projection of future, before coming to his individual
position di and then to the collaborative decision d . The model’s assumptions are
defined as follows.
In order to make the model "manageable" (see the description of Albright 2011
in section 3.2.3 on page 51), we state some assumptions in the framework of the
collaborative Choice stage:
1. all decision-makers are supposed to have, in/directly, some potential influence
on Go / No Go decisions,
2. the sequence (not the results) of cognitive processes are supposed16 to be
the same for all the decision-makers: perception, evaluation, reasoning,
projection of future,
3. the individual influential factors (not their degrees) are supposed to be the
same for all the decision-makers, in the ISA: memory, knowledge, experiences,Assumptions for
ISA and CSA goals, psychological properties, and responsibilities of the decision-maker
number i which are respectively represented by Mi , Ki , E xpi ,Ψi , and Resi ,
4. the collaborative influential factors (not their degrees) are supposed to be the
same for all the decision-makers, in the CSA,
5. all decision-makers receive the same data and information. Though this
model is presented independently of its application field of drug development
projects, its purpose is to examine the Go / No Go decision-making process
wherein the project manager sends the results of the tests to all the decision-
makers who also attend decision meetings wherein the results of the studies
are presented to them by the project manager.
The individual influential factors are defined as follows:
1. Mi : memory of decision-maker i helping him remember his knowledge,
experiences, and responsibilities regarding a situation of decision-making,
2. Ki : knowledge of decision-maker i of the variables included in his expertise
about which he is capable of reasoning and creating new knowledge,
15In a general vision, independent of our application field, the Design stage is refereed to the
decision-making process proposed by Simon 1960, presented in section 3.1 on page 43. This stage is
adapted to our application field, described in section 5.4 on page 79.
16Perception (interpretation, comprehension), and projection of future take root in the SA model of
Endsley 1995 (see fig. 5.3). Evaluation and reasoning are based on the descriptions of the industrial
actors.
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3. E xpi : experiences of decision-maker i in similar decision-making situations,
4. Ψi : psychological traits of decision-maker i regarding risk and uncertainty
perception and also regarding other decision-makers,
5. Resi : responsibility of decision-maker i regarding the consequences of a
decision.
5.5.4 Description of the model - third level - ISA
The (red) dotted square, on the left of the fig. 5.7, shows the cognitive processes
of the ISA process: perception, evaluation, reasoning, projection of future, and
individual position.
5.5.4.1 Perception
Perception:
– is triggered by sensory stimuli from the environment,
– is conducted by attention17 and intention,
– results in comprehension, by giving meaning to the data detected i.e. trans-
forming data into information (see section 5.5.2).
The Mi , Ki , E xpi ,Ψi , and Resi of each decision-maker i help him perceive, filter,
and select the variables that have a signification and importance to him.
The input of the perception process, noted [v j ], represents the data that is received
and processed by all the decision-makers. We call [v j ] a "situation", since it
comprises the values of the variables that characterize a situation wherein decision-
makers should decide.
The output of this process is a vector [p i j ] that represents the perception of the
selected variables by decision-maker i . A decision-maker might not take into
consideration all the variables, either because they are not meaningful to him or
because they do not concern his goals. Thus, the selected variables are not the
same for all the decision-makers and the number of the variables perceived by each
decision-maker in the vector [p i j ] may vary. This means for some j , p j may be the
empty value. The vector [p i j ] is the input of the next cognitive process.
5.5.4.2 Evaluation
Evaluation consists in comparing the value of each variable to the criteria that
concern this variable. The evaluation process of decision-maker i is influenced by
Mi , Ki , E xpi ,Ψi , and Resi .
Human evaluation of both qualitative and quantitative variables is expressed by
linguistic terms that are often not binary. For example, the value of the perceived
variable p j can be a number, an interval, or a modality. In all these cases, p j is
qualified by decision-maker i by a set of linguistic terms, such as Ei j = {bad, average,
17“Attention is intentional perception” [Racine+ 2012].
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good}. Then, for example, the evaluation of pi j (the perceived value of variable j by
decision-maker i ), noted ei j , is equal to 100% bad.
The set of linguistic terms to qualify the same variable might be different for all the
decision-makers. The representation of these linguistic terms in a formal language
allows logic operators to be applied to evaluate them. Fuzzy sets [Zadeh 1965] are
not sharp-edged, contrary to classical sets whose borders are strict and do not
allow an object to be located at the border between two sets. For this reason, the
qualifier linguistic terms that express the evaluations of variables can be modelled by
fuzzy sets. The gradual membership functions allow a value to belong to each set,
which represents a linguistic term, to a certain degree. For example, the value of the
variable of the altitude of a mountain can vary between 500 meters and 8848 meters.
The value of this variable could be evaluated by a set of qualifier linguistic terms
such as low, medium, high, very high. Each linguistic term can be presented by a
fuzzy set with a membership function. While classical membership functions of the
classical sets can only have 0 and 1 as values, the membership functions of the fuzzy
sets can have a value in [0,1]. The output of the evaluation process of 3,000 m could
be as follows: 0% low, 60% medium, 30% high 0% very high.
In this way, the output of the evaluation is a vector [e i j ] whose components are
the degrees of membership to the fuzzy sets of qualifier linguistic terms, which
express the evaluation of pi j by decision-maker i . The vector [e i j ] is the input of the
reasoning process.
5.5.4.3 Reasoning
“Reasoning consists in the application of mental inference rules to the premises and
conclusion of an argument” [Rips 1994], where inference rules are the "principles
of reasoning" applied to draw a conclusion from some premises, meaning some
hypotheses or assumptions [Veerarajan 2006]. Reasoning creates new knowledge
from information, through inference rules (see distinctions between information
and knowledge in section 5.5.2). In this step, information perceived and evaluated in
the previous steps is transformed into knowledge about a given situation.
Decision-maker i measures how the variables, evaluated separately in the previous
step, globally satisfy him. To measure his satisfaction, decision-maker i applies a set
of inference rules noted Ri . These inference rules are based on his knowledge Ki , his
experiences E xpi , using his memory Mi , depending on his psychological properties
or statesΨi , and considering his responsibilities Resi .
The inference rules, used to reason, might be implicit for a decision-maker and can
be different from the rules used by the other decision-makers. Formalizing the
reasoning process helps make these rules explicit and consequently, highlights these
differences. Human inference rules are not binary and strict.
A fuzzy inference rule has a if-then form such as: if x is A and y is B , then z is C ,
where A, B , and C are, respectively, fuzzy subsets of the universes X , Y , and Z . “A
fuzzy inference rule is interpreted mathematically as defining a mapping from fuzzy
subsets to fuzzy subsets” [Sangalli 1998]. “Fuzzy inference is a method that interprets
the values in the input vector and, based on some set of rules, assigns values to the
output vector” 18. A Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) consists of [Sivanandam+ 2006]:
18Source: http://www.mathworks.fr
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– a set of fuzzy inference rules called a rule base,
– the membership functions of the fuzzy sets used in the fuzzy rules, called a
data base,
– a fuzzification operation which transforms the crisp inputs into "degrees of
match with linguistic values",
– a decision-making unit which performs the inference operations on the inputs,
– a defuzzification operation which transforms the fuzzy results into crisp
outputs19.
A FIS makes it possible to create non-binary rules, based on the fuzzy sets that
represent the qualifier linguistic terms. Therefore, a FIS is applied to model the
creation and the aggregation of the rules used by each decision-maker.
Decision-maker i uses a set of linguistic terms, noted Di , and a set of inference rule,
noted Ri , to qualify a perceived and evaluated situation [e i j ]. The inference rule
number k, where 1≤ k ≤ |Ri |, created by decision-maker i , noted r ul ei k , is defined
as follows:
Ri :
n∏
j=1
Ei j →Di , ∀i and ∀k, (5.1)
r ul ei k : (ei 1, . . . ,ei j , . . . ,ei n)→ ri ,
where ri is a fuzzy set, representing a qualifier linguistic term in Di .
For each input (situation) such as [e i j ], several rules could be activated with different
degrees. The aggregation of these rules gives a result (ri ) for the reasoning process
of decision-maker i about a given situation. The ri is not a vector but a qualifier
linguistic term that expresses the appreciation of the situation by decision-maker i .
It represents his new knowledge about this situation thanks to his reasoning. The ri
is then the input of the individual decision.
5.5.4.4 Projection of future
Each decision-maker imagines the good and bad consequences of each option for
himself, others, and the enterprise. Construction of the image of the future state of a
situation, like the other ISA processes, depends on Mi , Ki , E xpi ,Ψi , and Resi . But,
according to some experts, the role of past experiences is crucial in projection of
future.
In this step, the result of the reasoning is examined. The output of this step is as
follows (see fig. 5.7):
– arrow number 1: either the decision-maker comes back to the reasoning
rectangle to question / modify his reasoning, noted ri ?, until the consequences
can be assumed and the individual opinion, noted oi , can be formed,
– arrow number 2: or the decision-maker confirms his reasoning and shapes his
opinion of the situation (oi ) which is the output of this step.
19For the examples which illustrate the framework of the Choice stage, we have constructed the fuzzy
inference rules and for the last three items, we use MATLAB® Fuzzy Toolbox.
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5.5.4.5 Individual position
At one point, the loop and interchange between reasoning and projection of the
future will result in forming an opinion regarding the decision. In this step, the
decision-maker examines his opinion (oi ) and takes a position, noted di . Three
outputs are then possible:
– either the decision-maker is not satisfied with his opinion oi that is weakened
and questioned, noted oi ?, and the ISA is reiterated (see arrow 3 in fig. 5.7),
– or the decision-maker is satisfied with his opinion and takes a position. But
before the decision meeting:
– either the decision-maker meets other decision-makers through the
corridor phase - before meeting and receives information about their
positions (see arrow 4 in fig. 5.7),
– or the decision-maker does not meet the others and goes directly to the
next rectangle, namely debate in meeting (see arrow 5 in fig. 5.7).
Individual position, such as the other rectangles in the ISA, is influenced by Mi ,
Ki , E xpi ,Ψi , and Resi . It marks the end of the ISA wherein each individual forms
his opinion and takes a position in a given situation, considering the balance of
benefit-risk of the options.
5.5.5 Description of the model - third level - CSA
The (blue) dotted square, on the right of the fig. 5.7 shows the cognitive processes of
the CSA process: corridor phase - before meeting, debate in meeting, collaborative
decision-making in meeting, and corridor information - after meeting.
5.5.5.1 Corridor phase - before meeting
Unofficial discussions, called corridor discussions, are those that take place out
of a Go / No Go meeting. This phase can potentially re-enforce or question the
individuals’ positions. In this step, beliefs and doubts are shared between the
individuals. New information about the position of a colleague may trigger individual
reflection. The input of the corridor phase - before meeting is a vector composed of
the positions of decision-makers who meet each other before the meeting, noted
[d i ], and its output for each decision-maker is a binary value, meaning trigger or not
the ISA :
– either the decision-maker reiterate his ISA process to question / modify his
position (di ?), taking into account new information about the positions of the
other colleagues (see arrow 6 in fig. 5.7),
– or the decision-maker does not question his position and goes to the next
rectangle, namely debate in meeting (see arrow 7 in fig. 5.7).
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5.5.5.2 Debate in meeting
A decision meeting is composed of two phases. First, decision-makers debate and
exchange their positions on decision, trying to share their beliefs and to persuade
each other. In this step, the group’s opinion, noted o, about a given situation begins
to be shaped. The input is the positions of the m decision-makers, noted [d i ]. As any
other collaborative step, new information on the interpretation or position of a
colleague may either trigger the ISA of decision-maker i (see arrow 8 in fig. 5.7)
or not. In the latter case, decision-maker i does not (re)examine his position and
accompanies the group to the next rectangle (see arrow 9 in fig. 5.7).
5.5.5.3 Collaborative decision-making in meeting
Collaborative decision-making aims at reaching a compromise between decision-
makers. This process is influenced by interactions between different decision-
makers. In a complex and multidisciplinary decision-making process, the roles and
weights of decision-makers in the decision-making are not equal, depending on the
composition of the group, the hierarchical position of each decision-maker, his
expertise levels, experiences, the phase of the project, etc.
We again need inference rules in order to formalize this inequality which is, like the
variables, qualified in the real world by linguistic terms such as "decision-maker i
has a strong influence on the decision-making in this phase of the project". These
expressions create the rules that determine the weight of decision-makers in a
collaborative decision. The CSA allows us to define and formalize these rules and
consequently highlights these difference roles.
As explained for the reasoning process, in section 5.5.4.3, human inference rules are
not binary and strict and in enterprises the different weights given to different experts
are often implicit within a decision group, even if probably every decision-maker
knows them. Again a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) makes it possible to express
the non-binary rules about the weights of decision-makers, based on fuzzy sets
that represent the qualifier linguistic terms. Additionally, fuzzy sets and a FIS have
respectively been used to model the evaluation and reasoning steps. Thus, using a
FIS to model the collaborative decision-making step facilitates connection between
these steps. In this regard, a FIS is applied to reproduce the collaborative decision.
The group of decision-makers use a set of linguistic terms, noted D, and a set of
inference rules, noted R, to qualify a perceived and evaluated situation [e j ]. The
inference rule number l , where 1≤ l ≤ |R|, noted r ul el , is defined as follows:
R :
m∏
i=1
Di →D, (5.2)
r ul el : (d1, . . . ,di , . . . ,dm)→ d ,
where d is a fuzzy set, representing a qualifier linguistic term in D .
For each input [d i ], several rules could be activated with different degrees. The
aggregation of these rules gives a result where its value for a given situation is a
degree of membership to the linguistic term represented by d . For example, it can be
a 90% good situation which translates through a defuzzification to a possible option
of the collaborative decision i.e. Go.
95
Decision process modeling
5.5.5.4 Corridor information - after meeting
After the meeting, decision-makers continue to talk about the decision in the corridor
phase - after meeting. The input of this step is the collaborative decision made, d .
The difference between the collaborative decision (d), and an individual position
(di ), expresses the degree of dissatisfaction of this decision-maker: δi = |d −di |,
where δi is a fuzzy set representing the linguistic term that expresses the difference
between the individual position of DMi , meaning di , and the collaborative decision
of the group, meaning d . The set of all δi is called ∆i .
The discussion of the corridor phase:
– either questions d and increases δi , then the ISA is again triggered for decision-
maker i (see arrow 10 in fig. 5.7). But this time, the ISA is not necessarily
followed by the CSA if the d is maintained by the group. Then, after this ISA
process, either decision-maker i accepts the decision made and maintained
by the group or intends to change it (see arrow 12 in fig. 5.7),
– or reinforces d and reduces δi , then the decision is confirmed / accepted and
the Choice stage ends (see arrow 11 in fig. 5.7).
The dissatisfaction index is used to measure the risk of invalidating a decision made.
5.5.6 Index of decision invalidation
If the dissatisfaction index is high for several decision-makers, especially those who
have an important influence, the decision may be invalidated in time. It does not
mean that if all the decision-makers agree, the decision is good. It helps measure the
risk of conflict and invalidating a collaborative decision made and thus the delays in
decision.
The index of decision invalidation for decision d , noted δ, can be qualified by a
set of linguistic terms, noted ∆, and can be obtained using a FIS based on a set of
inference rules, noted L. The inference rule number p, where 1≤ p ≤ |L|, noted
r ul ep , is defined as follows:
L :
m∏
i=1
∆i →∆, (5.3)
r ul ep : (δ1, . . . ,δi , . . . ,δm)→ δ.
where δ is a fuzzy set, representing a qualifier linguistic term in ∆.
In the next section, we apply the framework of the collaborative choice to an
illustrative simplified example of a Go / No Go decision.
5.5.7 Application of the framework to a simplified Go / No Go decision
As we have seen in section 1.2.2 on page 16, a Go / No Go decision depends on a
great deal of information about the properties and behavior of a new developing
compound which determines its benefit-risk balance. In order to give an illustrative
and understandable example which remains representative of a real situation,
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we illustrate the framework via a simplified application case on the Go / No Go
decision milestone of phase II. The purpose of this example is: 1) to show how
the framework of the collaborative Choice stage helps to understand and explain
different information processing of the same information by different experts, 2) how
decisions made by two groups composed of the same decision-makers are different,
according to the importance given to different experts in each group, and 3) to study
and analyze previous conflicts in past decisions and be able to anticipate future
conflicts, meaning when a decision is at risk of invalidating [Hassanzadeh+ 2011b].
The main goal of the tests of phase II is to establish the efficacy and safety windows
of the compound in the target population (patients), by identifying the minimal
effective and the maximal tolerated doses on this population [Julious+ 2010]. The
transition to phase III implies taking risks with human health and involves an
important time and financial investment. Therefore, a great importance is attached
to the Go / No Go decision at the end of phase II. Invalidating the Go / No Go
decision of the end of phase II, a posteriori, would have serious consequences for
the enterprise e.g. a sharp instantaneous fall in the share price. The choice of the
Go / No Go decision at the end of phase II has thus been motivated by its importance.
Additionally, at the end of phase II, the results of the tests are partially available for
the following three criteria: safety, efficacy, and quality. This helps us create a simple
example without detailed data on the numerous tests for each of these criteria.
The first assessment of efficacy is made in phase II. The minimal tolerated dose
was previously documented on healthy volunteers (aim of the studies of phase I).
Therefore, in phase II, tolerance and efficacy can both be evaluated, which define the
first two variables of our example: Tolerance which is the main measure of safety
and Efficacy, which, as its name implies, is the measure of effectiveness. Another
parameter that is evaluated is the Cost of Good (COG) based on the cost of chemical
development. COG is one important measure of the quality of a molecule and is the
third variable of our example. In this way, the Go / No Go decision milestone at the
end of phase II is based on three uncertain variables: Tolerance, Efficacy, and COG.
In order to make this example "manageable" (see the description of Albright 2011 in
section 3.2.3 on page 51), we state some assumptions concerning the Go / No Go
decision at the end of phase II:
– it is supposed that there is not any toxicity or kinetics alert in the results of
previous tests that prevents starting phase II,
– the project manager, who has aggregated the results of the tests, sends only
these three variables to the experts of the steering committee. In reality, a
Go / No Go decision is based on the hundreds of qualitative and quantitative
pieces of information which are sent and presented to the steering committee
with different levels of interpretation, regarding the raw data. We take into Assumptions in
the exampleaccount only three variables, supposing that the other variables, studied in
this phase, such as the stability of the compound and its metabolism are
incontestably good,
– the interdependencies between the variables are not taken into account,
– the steering committee is composed of only20 three decision-makers: a
toxicologist, a clinician, and an economist, respectively noted DM1, DM2, and
DM3,
20In reality, steering committees are often composed of several multidisciplinary experts.
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– the same decision-makers form two groups where the importance given to the
economist’s position is more in one of these groups, while the toxicologist and
the clinician have the same roles in the both groups21.
The input vector is:
[v i ]= (v1, v2, v3)= (Tolerance, Efficacy, COG). (5.4)
Tolerance and Efficacy can have a value between 0 and 200 mg and COG can have a
value between 0 and 10,000 €/kg. For Tolerance, a high value is appreciated meaning
a higher quantity of the compound can be tolerated, while for Efficacy, a low value is
preferable meaning a less quantity of the compound is effective. COG can still be
reduced, while Tolerance and Efficacy often cannot be changed at this phase.
The decision-makers decide22 whether: 1) to continue the project, if they find the
results good, or 2) to put the project on standby, if the results are not conclusive
enough and complementary studies are requested. Standby implies delay. It is
somehow as if a Go or No Go decision has not been made yet, or 3) to stop the project,
if the results are bad enough. Thus, the output is one of these options: Go, Standby,
or No Go. Each cognitive process is now explained for the three decision-makers and
the risk of invalidating the decision is calculated.
5.5.7.1 Perception
The value of each variable is perceived by each decision-maker and is transformed
into meaningful data. Perception works as a filter. Supposing that all variables are
meaningful for DM1 and DM2, but v2 is not meaningful to DM3. Thus, DM3 does
not retain it. The outputs of DM1, DM2, and DM3 are as follows, where the long
dash shows that the DM3 did not perceive the second variable:
[p1 j ]= (p11, p12, p13), (5.5)
[p2 j ]= (p21, p22, p23), (5.6)
[p3 j ]= (p31,—, p33). (5.7)
5.5.7.2 Evaluation
The knowledge of each decision-maker helps him evaluate the perceived variables,
in terms of satisfaction of his own criteria. The toxicologist, DM1, knows that if more
21It should be noted that, if the toxicologist finds a compound toxic and dangerous, a No Go decision
is made immediately. If the toxicology findings are satisfactory, then the competitiveness of the
compounds compared to existing drugs is discussed by the experts and toxicologist and clinician have
the same weighting.
22Referring to the proposed typology of uncertainty factors in section 2.1.4 on page 29, the three
types of uncertainty factors affected this decision-making: 1) factors relating to the object: in spite of
the obtained results, the behavior of the compound is not completely predictable, 2) factors relating to
the subject: the uncertain results of the tests are perceived differently according to the personality,
psychological properties, previous experiences, and speciality of each decision-maker. The results of
the tests, carried out on a limited number of patients, cannot be generalized to the whole target
population, 3) factors relating to the context: in a competitive industrial context, is the compound
more effective, better tolerated, or less expensive than the existing or competing products?
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Figure 5.8: Surfaces of the result of the reasoning process for DM1 and DM2
than 200 mg of the new compound is tolerated, then Tolerance is unquestionable.
The clinician, DM2, knows that if less than 50 mg of the new compound has a
significant difference on Efficacy, compared with the placebo group, it is unarguably
effective. The economist, DM3, knows if the COG is less than 2500 €/kg, it is obviously
good.
The toxicologist, DM1, is more demanding about Tolerance which is in the scope
of his expertise and responsibilities and finds it average. His evaluations of two
other variables is good. The clinician, DM2, evaluates the given values for Tolerance,
Efficacy, COG, respectively, good, average, good. In other words, he finds Efficacy,
average, but Tolerance and COG good. The economist, DM3, did not pay attention to
the v2, meaning Efficacy, in the previous step. He finds Tolerance good, and COG
average. Thus, in the same situation, DM1 and DM2 evaluate all variables, and DM3
evaluates the variables that he retained:
[e1 j ]= (e11,e12,e13)= (average, good, good), (5.8)
[e2 j ]= (e21,e22,e23)= (good, average, good), (5.9)
[e3 j ]= (e31,—,e33)= (good,—,average). (5.10)
5.5.7.3 Reasoning
In this step, we model the behaviors of decision-makers in a situation of decision-
making by using inference rules. The reasoning process is based on the inference
rules used by the decision-makers to relate their isolated evaluations of different
variables. The results of the reasoning process give the reasoning of the decision-
makers, noted r1, r2, and r3. These results are expressed, as the evaluation of the all
variables, by qualifier linguistic terms. As we have seen in the evaluation process,
Tolerance and Efficacy are respectively more important to DM1 and DM2. This
difference is expressed through two different rules (see function 5.1):
r ul e11 : (good∧average∧average)→ satisfactory, (5.11)
r ul e21 : (good∧average∧average)→ average. (5.12)
Some rules are commonly used by both decision-makers DM1 and DM2, noted
r ul ecom.12.s where s is the number of their common rules:
r ul ecom.12.1 : (good∧good∧¬bad)→ good, (5.13)
r ul ecom.12.2 : (average∧average∧good)→ average. (5.14)
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Some rules are commonly used by all the decision-makers, noted r ul ecom.t where t
is the number of these common rules:
r ul ecom.1 : (bad∧—∧—)→ bad, (5.15)
r ul ecom.2 : (good∧good∧good)→ good, (5.16)
r ul ecom.3 : (average∧average∧average)→ average. (5.17)
The first rule, r ul ecom.1, means that if Tolerance is bad, meaning the compound is
toxic, its development is stopped regardless of the two other variables. It might be
different for some special classes of drugs such as the anti-cancer medicines.
Fig. 5.8 illustrates the impact of this difference of points of view on the outputs of the
reasoning. The surface of the reasoning processes of DM1 and DM2 are respectively
presented on the left and right. As explained in section 5.5.7, Tolerance and Efficacy
vary between 0 and 200 mg and a high value is appreciable for Tolerance, while a low
value is expected for Efficacy.
The (green) striped arrows indicate the parts of the surfaces of the reasoning process
wherein both DM1 and DM2 agree i.e. when:
– Tolerance is high, meaning a high quantity of the compound is tolerable, and
Efficacy is low, meaning a low quantity of the compound is effective, then the
result of the reasoning is high for both DM1 and DM2,
– Tolerance is low, meaning only a low quantity of the compound is tolerable,
and Efficacy is high, meaning a high quantity of the compound is needed to be
effective, then the result of the reasoning is low for both DM1 and DM2,
– Tolerance and Efficacy are both average, then the result of the reasoning is
average for both DM1 and DM2.
The (red) pointed arrows indicate the parts of the surfaces of the reasoning process
wherein DM1 and DM2 do not agree i.e. when:
– on the left, DM1 is more demanding about Tolerance than Efficacy: where
Tolerance takes the values near to 100 mg, i.e. the average values, the surface
of the reasoning process of DM1 drops, even if Efficacy has a value less than 50
mg, meaning that the compound is "very" effective,
– on the right, contrary to DM1, for DM2 Efficacy is more important than
Tolerance: where Efficacy takes the values near to 100 mg, i.e. the average
values, the surface of the reasoning process for DM2 drops, even if Tolerance
attains 200 mg, meaning that the compound is "perfectly" tolerable.
5.5.7.4 Projection of future
As explained in section 5.5.4.4, the result of the reasoning can be reinforced or
be questioned when decision-makers project into the future. In this example, we
supposed that the reasoning of all the decision-makers are confirmed in this step.
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Table 5.3: Simulation results
DM1 DM2 DM3 G1 G2
[50,180,9500] 0.15 0.15 0.15 No Go No Go
[200,25,1000] 0.84 0.84 0.84 Go Go
[190,40,2500] 0.84 0.84 0.71 Go Go
[200,25,5000] 0.84 0.84 0.50 Go Go
[130,90,4100] 0.50 0.50 0.50 Standby Standby
[130,35,5500] 0.55 0.72 0.50 Go Standby
[190,100,4900] 0.70 0.50 0.50 Go Standby
5.5.7.5 Individual position
Taking a position regarding the decision to be made is strongly affected by individual
factors such as personal risk aversion and taste for risk which can lead to a situation
appreciated as average, ending up respectively as a No Go and Go option. The
three decision-makers do not review their ISA processes and do not change their
individual opinions and their positions are not changed neither during the meeting
nor in the corridor phases before and after the meeting.
5.5.7.6 Collaborative decision-making
In this step, we show how decisions made by two groups, noted G1 and G2, composed
of the same three decision-makers DM1, DM2, and DM3, vary according to the
importance given to decision-makers in each group. In G1, the importance given
to the positions of DM1 and DM2 is equal, while the position of DM3 has less
importance compared to the first two decision-makers. In G2, the importance given
to the positions of all decision-makers is equal. The two groups have to make the
Go / No Go decision, based on the same information, at the end of the phase II.
Tab. 5.3 shows the individual positions and the collaborative decisions of phase II,
made by G1 and G2, simulated by a FIS as explained in previous sections. The first
column comprises the input vectors. Each vector includes three components e.g.
[Tolerance, Efficacy, COG]=[50 mg, 180 mg, 9500 €/kg]. The inputs have been chosen
to study the behavior of the model regarding: 1) the behavior of each decision-maker
and 2) the behavior of each group. The cognitive processes of the ISA are applied
to each input for the three decision-makers. The columns 2, 3, and 4 represent
the individual positions of the decision-makers. We use a simple defuzzification
operation as follows: values less than 0.4 are transformed to a No Go decision, values
between 0.4 and 0.60 to Standby, and values more than 0.60 to a Go decision. The
two last columns show two collaborative decisions of the groups G1 and G2 (see
function 5.2). Individual position of the decision-makers and collaborative decisions
of the groups have values between 0 and 1.
In this regard, the first input represents a bad result: an intolerable, ineffective,
and high-cost compound. Everyone agrees to stop its development. The decisions
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Figure 5.9: Surfaces of the result of the collaborative decision-making process for G1
and G2
of the both groups are No Go. The two following inputs represent good results:
tolerable, effective and not expensive compounds. Thus, the decisions of the both
groups is Go. In the fourth raw, Tolerance and Efficacy are good, while COG is average.
The decisions of the both groups is Go, even if the position of DM3 (economist) is
Standby because in all cases Tolerance and Efficacy are more important than COG. In
row 5, the results are average and everyone agrees to postpone the decision, waiting
for more results. In rows 6 and 7, respectively, one of the values of Tolerance and
Efficacy is good and the other one is average, while COG is average. In these cases,
the decision of G1, wherein less importance is given to DM3, is GO. In the same
cases, G2 gives more importance to DM3 and decides to postpone the project. These
simulations validate the coherency of the results produced by the framework for this
example.
Fig. 5.9 shows the difference of the position of DM3 in G1 and G2: on the left, in G1,
when the individual position of DM2 (clinician) is near 0 i.e. when he qualifies the
situations very bad, the collaborative decision is also 0 i.e. No Go decisions even if
the position of DM3 (economist) is favorable. On the right, in G2, the harmonious
surface of the collaborative decision-making shows that the clinician and the
economist have the same weighting in the collaborative decision.
The example illustrates how the position of each decision-maker within the group
can change the collaborative decision for the same situation, made by the same
decision-makers.
5.5.7.7 Index of decision invalidation
For a given situation, [170, 30, 8900], the index of decision invalidation is calculated
for the decisions made by G1 and G2. The results show the dissatisfaction of DM3
with the decision of G1 is: δ3 = |dG1−d3| = 0.56−0.15= 0.41, while his dissatisfaction
with the decision made by G2 is: δ3 = |dG2 −d3| = 0.15−0.15= 0. Therefore, in the
first case, the economist may try to invalidate a posteriori the decision made by the
group.
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5.5.8 Questions answered in / arising from the framework of the Choice stage
The proposed framework formalizes the Choice stage, including two "periods" of a
collaborative decision-making process which are pointed out by Roy 1996: a period
of individual reflection and a period of group interaction.
The individual reflection period, called ISA, is modeled based on the SA model
proposed by Endsley 1995 who highlights the cognitive processes used by a decision-
maker to reach the state of awareness in order to make a decision. We have enriched
the SA model from both theoretical and empirical perspectives: 1) distinctions
between data, information, and knowledge allows us to specify the nature of the
inputs and outputs of the cognitive processes. It clarifies and formalizes how
the same data, throughout the cognitive processes, progressively transforms into
different conclusions, 2) thanks to the discussions with our industrial partner and his
colleagues in the pharmaceutical industry, two cognitive processes have been added
to the SA model: evaluation and reasoning. The first of these evaluates the values of
the variables separately and the second makes relationships between the evaluated
values of a set of variables and measures how a situation characterized by these
values is satisfactory to each decision-maker. Even if in simple situations, it seems
that evaluation and reasoning happen instantly but they are two distinct functions.
In the complex real world, the values of the variables are often evaluated separately
and are then related. Therefore, these two processes are necessary to explain the
functioning of the decision-makers.
The group interaction is not sufficiently elaborated in the literature. It is either
represented as a box in the models (see fig. 5.5) or only differences and similarities of
the decision-makers are illustrated and not their interactions (see fig. 5.4). More
elaborated models of collaborative decision-making do not take into account the
period of individual reflection (see fig. 5.5). Our framework of the collaborative
Choice stage takes into consideration both "individual reflection" and "group
interaction" (see fig. 5.7) and simulates the decisional behaviors of the individual
and groups (see fig. 5.8). In the CSA, we take into account three loops that may
trigger the ISA when the decision-makers meet each other: 1) in a corridor phase
through unofficial discussions before the decision meeting, 2) during the meeting, 3)
in another corridor phase after the meeting. The CSA illustrates how an individual
position may be questioned or be reinforced by the influences of the other decision-
makers.
Finally, an index is defined to measure the risk of invalidating a decision made a
posteriori, which is based on the differences of the individual positions and the
collaborative decision. This index does not reflect the quality of a decision, but
is a measure to predict whether a decision will be accepted or is at risk of being
invalidated.
This third and last level of the Go / No Go decision-making process model allow
us to understand, represent (visualize), share, and validate a framework of the
collaborative Choice stage with the industrial actors. The cognitive processes
are highlighted in the framework, but the environmental (contextual), individual,
and collaborative factors are not precise enough to study their impacts on the
effectiveness and rapidity of decision-making. But the framework can be used as a
baseline for discussion with the actors in order to examine which activities of the
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collaborative Choice stage cause delay in decision-making and what solutions are
proposed by the actors. This is the subject of an interview-based approach in the
next part.
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Conclusion - part II
In this chapter, the Go / No Go collaborative decision-making process is modeled to
be analyzed in order to investigate the problem of delay. This model is presented at
three levels of detail which are obtained through the refining loop of the modeling
process that we propose.
First, a pyramidal form of four macro stages of the decision-making process illustrates
the hierarchical structure for the main actors and the information flow: descending
information which becomes more detailed from the superior hierarchical levels to
the lower levels and ascending information which becomes more aggregated from
the lower levels to the superior hierarchical levels. The hierarchical positions of the
actors and the information flow are visualized in this pyramid, but the activities
of each stage are not sufficiently detailed. A question arises about the role of the
aggregation and a possible loss of information in delays in decision-making.
Secondly, a detailed version of these stages in BPM notation allows us to specify
the activities and their inputs and outputs, especially the activities performed on
ascending information before presentation to the steering committee. It takes
into account both descending and ascending information, while the latter, to the
best of our knowledge, is less fully considered in the literature. In this level, the
collaboration between the actors with different roles in the information life cycle is
shown i.e. between those who prepare information and those who decide. But the
collaboration between the decision-makers in the Choice stage is not clear.
Thirdly, the collaborative Choice stage is represented in a framework which includes
both "individual reflection" and "group interaction" [Roy 1996] respectively through
an ISA [Endsley 1995] and a CSA. The ISA highlights the transformation of data into
information, and then into knowledge through the individual cognitive processes:
perception, evaluation, reasoning, and projection of the future. Fuzzy sets and
fuzzy inference rules are applied to model human evaluation and reasoning with
uncertain values. The CSA represents the interactions between decision-makers
through corridor phases (informal discussions), debate (formal discussions), and
decision-making itself. An example of the Go / No Go decision at the end of phase II
of a pharmaceutical R&D project is presented to illustrate the proposed framework.
In sum, the framework: 1) makes explicit inference rules used by decision-makers to
take a position before the collaborative steps. It helps analyze their differences
and similarities, 2) highlights the interactions within a group which may reinforce
or question an individual position, propagating doubts and beliefs, 3) simulates
individual and collaborative behaviors depending on the individual cognitive
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processes and the positions of the individuals in the group, 4) calculates the risk of
invalidating a decision by measuring the dissatisfaction of the decision-makers.
It helps study and analyze previous conflicts in decisions and anticipate future
conflicts, according to the position of each decision-maker and the composition of
the group.
However, some questions remain unanswered: how do actors perform their activities
(practices)? What are they thinking and feeling about their current practices? What
are the role of the influential factors such as "task and environment factors" on
their practices? Are their current practices efficient or are some changes necessary
to make decisions more effectively and rapidly? The pyramidal form, the model
presented in BPMN, and the framework cannot directly answer these questions, but
they can be used as the baselines for discussion with the actors in order to collect
information about these questions, which is the subject of the next part, through an
interview-based approach.
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Method, application, and results
Purpose: decision-making in drug development projects implies dealing with
a high degree of uncertainty about the benefits and risks of new compounds.
Formal methods of decision-aiding reach their limits at decisional milestones
wherein decisions depend on the interpretation of the complex and multidisciplinary
results by various experts. In the case of Go / No Go decisions, if the results are not
conclusive enough, experts may either delay a decision or make and unmake it
a posteriori. In this chapter, we identify the factors that affect the collaborative
decision-making process in an organization. Then, we provide actors with a set of
efficient practices that could help them make decisions more effectively and rapidly.
Design/methodology/approach: two approaches are used in this research: a litera-
ture review and a field study through an interview approach.
Findings: our research provides a consistent and reproducible method to assess the
causes of delay in decisions and the efficient practices required to control them. It
first includes the construction of an interview grid to conduct in-depth interviews
and then, a plan of analysis of interview results. This method is applied to our field
study. Two groups of major actors in Go / No Go decision-making are identified
and interviewed: project managers and decision-makers. The results show all the
interviewees agree that Go / No Go decisions are frequently delayed or invalidated.
Fear of uncertainty, fear of hierarchy, and the difficulty of No Go decisions are
the three most frequently mentioned factors involved in decision delays. The two
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activities in the decision-making process that are most cited by the interviewees are
firstly, the Preparation and presentation of results, and secondly, Collaborative
decision-making. The same tendency is observed with both project managers and
decision-makers. We conclude that although much attention is quite rightly paid to
the way in which the tests are performed and the results are provided, little attention
is given to the way in which the results are aggregated, prepared and presented, and
to how the decisions are made. In sum, Preparation and presentation of results and
Collaborative decision-making are presumed to be natural activities that do not
need training, practice, or even the necessary time to be performed. We thus present
here some efficient practices to help improve these activities.
Originality/value: indecision has mostly been studied in its individual dimension
in clinical psychology, vocational choice, and marketing. The collaborative, and
especially the organizational dimensions of indecision have not been closely
examined in the literature. Our study concerns the problem of delay at a high level of
decision-making in pharmaceutical R&D projects, an area that is not easily accessible.
The actors who contribute to Go / No Go decisions have a high level of expertise and
are few in number. They work on very sensitive subjects that have a direct influence
on public health and on the share prices of companies. Additionally, they work in a
very competitive sector which implies a high level of confidentiality. Therefore, this
thesis, thanks to our industrial partner, has access to very sensitive information.
Another particularity of this research context is the notion of non-emergency, which
is again not widely covered in studies of decision-making. The assumption is that if
we are able to make decisions in emergency situations, such as a crisis, we are able to
make them in non-emergency situations. Our study shows that the non-urgent
nature of a situation does not actually facilitate decision-making. We investigate the
problem of delay through an exploratory approach based on in-depth interviews. A
method is proposed to annotate and analyze the interview results which allows us to
find 252 factors that affect the decision-making process. These results have been
obtained in collaboration with the major actors of the pharmaceutical industry,
without influencing them as could have been the case in a multiple-choice studies.
The proposed method seems appropriate for other industrial sectors.
Research limitations: as with all interview-based approaches, the subjectivity of
the interviewers and interviewees is an unavoidable weakness. We have tried to
reduce it by cross-referencing opinions, pointing out clearly their convergences and
divergences. The results are limited to the problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go
decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. The sample only covers the R&D actors
who contribute to these decisions.
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The safety, efficacy, and quality of potential new medicines are examined several
times by a group of actors throughout a R&D project. Each examination is based on
the results of the tests on the new molecule and ends in a Go / No Go decision which
determines the continuation or stopping of the project. If the results conclude that
the molecule is toxic, a No Go decision is rapidly made. Idem, when the results
are very good, a Go decision is rapidly made. The problem is that sometimes the
results of the tests are not conclusive enough to make a Go / No Go decision by a
multidisciplinary group of various experts who differently perceive and interpret
the complex and uncertain results. In these latter cases, Go / No Go decisions are
frequently delayed. Meetings can be held and re-held without a clear decision being
made. In the competitive context of the pharmaceutical industry, like in other
industries, it is important to make decisions effectively and rapidly in order to launch
a new product before your competitors do.
In the literature, “there is a large body of research on when and how we make
decisions, but little on when and why we do not make them” [Brooks 2011]. The
actors in drug development projects complain of delays in the decision-making
process in a general manner. However, little is known about their current practices
and their experiences.
The purpose of this part is to answer the questions that were raised in the first two
parts (see section 2.3 on page 37 and section 5.5.8 on page 103): why are some
difficult Go / No Go decisions frequently delayed? What are the current practices
used to make collaborative decisions? Are they efficient or are some changes
necessary?
First, the notion of efficient practice and how it can improve performance is reviewed
in chapter 6. Then, in chapter 7, we explain our methodology to investigate the
causes of delay and efficient practices to reduce delay in collaborative decision-
making when faced with uncertainty. Finally, in chapter 8 this methodology is
applied to the problem of delay in Go / No Go decisions, and the results are presented
and discussed.
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Efficient practices in
decision-making
Efficiency is doing things right. Effectiveness is doing the right thing.
Zig Ziglar
In this chapter, first, the necessity and importance of efficient decision practices is
discussed. Secondly, the means of identification and implementation of efficient
practices, and potential barriers to their implementation are briefly reviewed.
6.1 Necessity and definitions of efficient practices
In a competitive industrial world, it is of strategic importance for an organization
to adopt "best" practices to be more effective and more rapid [Xu+ 2012]. In the
literature, the notion of practice is usually accompanied by adjectives such as best,
good, effective, or efficient, to qualify a manner of doing something. Xu+ 2012 give a
broad definition of "best" practices, as "a technique, method, process, activity, or
mechanism" to optimize results and minimize mistakes, focusing on the results.
For some authors, optimization is related to the ways of performing a process to
obtain high performance [Bogan+ 1994]. “As a business buzzword, best practices are
commonly used to describe the most efficient and effective way of accomplishing a
task or achieving a goal” [Engle 2008]. Kreitz 2008 adopts the definition of Webster’s
New Millennium® Dictionary1 which relates a best practice to the circumstances: “a
practice which is most appropriate under the circumstances, especially as considered
acceptable or regulated in business; a technique or methodology that, through
experience and research, has reliably led to a desired or optimum result.”
A compendium of efficient practices proposes a set of "expected activities" which
have already proved their efficiency and relevance in a field. This vision connects
efficient practices and feedback, and consequently knowledge management [Penide
2011]. In this definition the notions of practice and activity are used equivalently.
Admittedly, a practice (way of performing an activity) is often2 described through
the recommended activities, for example, “use formal performance system” or
“establish risk management” [PMI 2003]. Deguil 2008 represents a business process,
its activities, and their associated efficient practices in fig. 6.1. It visualizes the
1Webster’s New Millennium® Dictionary of English, Preview Ed. (v. 0.9.7), Lexico, http://
dictionary.reference.com/browse/best+practice
2Efficient practices are sometimes listed as factors: "effective communication" or "customer
satisfaction" [Loo 2002].
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Figure 6.1: Representation of the relationship between activities and "best" practices,
noted BP [Deguil 2008]
relationship between activities and the practices and helps distinguish the main
activities of the process and practices even if they are described as "expected
activities".
Establishing databases of best practices helps store lessons learnt and makes them
accessible to others [Gunday+ 2011]. Efficient practices can be identified through
brainstorming [PMI 2003] and a “systematic and careful reflection on hard-won
practical experience” [Kreitz 2008]. They are derived from "numerous success or
failure experiences" over time. The sources of efficient practices can be found
in “industrial experiences (e.g. practitioners, company hand-books), consulting
experiences (e.g. experts), advanced information systems (e.g. enterprise resource
planning systems, technology providers) and knowledge bases (e.g. literature, field
studies, conferences and workshops)” [Xu+ 2012].
Practices are studied in various fields: in information systems through the Capability
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI®)3 by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), in
manufacturing [Vastag+ 2003; Ungan 2005], in supply chain management [Li+ 2006],
in risk management [Wyk+ 2008], in human resource management [Bellini+ 2008], in
business process redesign [Reijers+ 2005], in total quality management and Six Sigma
[Taylor 1998], in performance evaluation [Chen+ 2007], in innovation management
[Aït El Hadj+ 2006; Boly 2008; Ferchichi 2008; Midler+ 2012; Jullien+ 2012], in
innovation management under resource constraints [Penide+ 2012], and in project
management through the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®)which
is a recognized standard guide for the project management profession (first version,
[PMI 1983]) and the Organizational Project Management Maturity Model (OPM3®)
[PMI 2003]. The PMBOK® includes proven practices of management of the scope,
time schedule, cost, quality, human resources, communications, risk, and procure-
3http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/
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Figure 6.2: Routine-based view of the process of / obstacles to organizational change
[Kesting 2007]
ment, among five groups of processes: initiating, planning, executing, monitoring
and controlling, and closing.
In the pharmaceutical industry, efficient practices are studied in research, develop-
ment, fabrication, and commercialization phases for laboratory activities, clinical
studies, fabrication, and distribution [Fabre 2004]. The classic practices of cost,
resource, and time management are also implemented for these activities. But,
the classic practices of project management manuals do not focus on delay in
decision-making. We seek to investigate efficient practices in decision-making when
faced with uncertainty, in a multidisciplinary field that implies the collaboration
of various experts with their different perceptions of information that becomes
progressively more accurate.
6.2 Difficulties of implementing efficient practices in enterprises
Efficient practices should be implemented according to their importance and
achievability [Xu+ 2012]. The importance can be related to practicality and feasibility
as well as to resource constraints i.e. what would be suitable and what would
be possible to do, in the light of the constraints. The crucial role of culture in
implementation of efficient practices is emphasised by several authors. Efficient
practices emerge in an organizational culture that values and nurtures these practices
[Cooper 1998; Kerzner 1998; Charan 2001; Loo 2002; Davenport 2009]. Repetition
can help change behaviors [Charan 2001] and found a culture. Establishing changes
in a culture implies studying possible obstacles.
Ungan 2005 indicates that companies are generally not successful in implementation
of the efficient practices identified when adequate support for these practices is
not provided. In management literature, some barriers to implementing efficient
practices are mentioned, such as:
– ignorance and lack of alertness: “a precondition for any change, firms have to
realize that there is something to change” [Kesting 2007],
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– difficulties with the decision about change: Kesting 2007 explains the routine-
based view on the process of organizational change (see fig. 6.2) which
includes:
– a "culture of indecision" based on the explanations of Charan 2001: new
ideas "die" because of indecision and inaction,
– cognitive biases concerning decision-making about changes in estab-
lished routines: tendency for the alternatives that justify, favor, and
perpetuate the existing situations,
– inaccuracy in estimation of potential resistance: it is often difficult
to estimate the consequences of the changes and consequently the
resistance to it, since this involves predicting future reactions,
– resistance to changes: Loo 2002 explains two causes for this resistance: 1)
either because manager and staff do not see the need (which ties in with the
ignorance and lack of alertness mentioned by Kesting 2007), or 2) they are not
prepared for changes,
– absence of a project management "champion": who would push for the
implementation of the practices (may be the most mentioned obstacle) [Loo
2002],
– time pressures and constraints: “everyone is already busy and improvements
would require allocating even more time and energy into work at the expense
of personal and family time” [Loo 2002],
– absence of organizational learning and/or inadequate investment in training:
this ties in with the previous element i.e. (adequate) training implies funding
and time taken away from working time [Loo 2002].
This study investigates efficient practices in decision-making to reduce the lengthy
delays in decisions. In this thesis, "efficient" is chosen to qualify practices as ways of
performing an activity that help achieve results qualitatively and quantitatively,
preventing waste of energy, time, or cost, according to circumstances, taking into
account human well-being. Results can be in terms of conception, production,
delivery, or decision milestones (wherein a decision is expected). In the next chapter,
a methodology is proposed and used to identify and structure: 1) the causes of
delays in decision-making in drug development projects, and 2) efficient practices
that help make decisions more effectively and quickly, taking into account human
and contextual factors.
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There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas...
every discovery contains an "irrational element", or "a creative
intuition".
Karl Popper
In this chapter, our method to investigate the problem of delay in collaborative
decision-making under uncertainty is presented. This method is based on interviews
with the actors who contribute to decision-making. It aims to identify and structure
the causes of delay and the efficient practices that help reduce this delay. In section
7.1, first, the choice of cross-case study versus case study is explained. Secondly, we
describe the design and validation of an interview grid and a pre-test. The profiles of
the target actors are defined and the method for conducting interviews is explained.
In section 7.2, a plan is proposed for the analysis of the content of the interview
results.
7.1 Collection method
7.1.1 Approach to identifying and collecting causes of delay and efficient
practices
A main source of the information about the causes of delay is provided by actors who
have been involved for several years in decision-making and have worked in more
than one company, or have experience of several management styles, in different
periods, in the same company. An interview-based approach is appropriate to
study and analyze the processes and organizational modes of individuals, revealing
[Blanchet+ 2010]:
– a specific pathology,
– mode of performing a professional task.
An interview-based approach is taken to collect actors’ feedback, and to cross-
reference and analyze their opinions and recommendations on delays in the
decision-making process. In this regard, the actors are interviewed and asked to
think about their good / bad experiences, regarding the factors involved in delays.
Fig. 7.1 shows the different steps of our method of collecting and structuring causes
of delay and efficient practices. It is presented in the form of a process made by
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Table 7.1: Case study versus cross-case analysis, some elements come from Stokes
2007
Case study Cross-case analysis
Appropriation preventing an infrequent but
significant problem or repro-
ducing a successful experience
resolving a frequent problem
through the recurrent factors
that affect it, in similar situa-
tions
Potential motivation providing feedback on one ex-
perience because of its nega-
tive / positive particularity
capitalizing the multiple ex-
periences to improve perfor-
mance
Scope of study deep on one experience of the
actors of the same company
broad on several experiences
of the actors from different
companies
Type of information detailed on one experience in
a specific context
general on several experiences
in various contexts
Source of
information
concentrated in one company dispersed in different compa-
nies
Type of analysis simple comparative
Potential results in
the case of our study
causes of delay and efficient
practices specific to one expe-
rience
recurrent causes of delay and
efficient practices in multiple
experiences
Signavio®. This process begins when the decision-making process is modeled (see
section 5.3 on page 74).
The first step is to define what should be examined in order to study the problem of
delay (step 1, fig. 7.1). Cross-case analysis and case-study are two possible choices to
delimit a study1.
A (single) case is an example of a phenomenon and a case study is defined as “an
intensive, holistic description and analysis of a bounded system such as a singleCase study
instance, phenomenon, or social unit” [Merriam 1988].
Cross-case analysis is “an analysis that involves an examination of more than one
case” and looks “for patterns appearing across several observations that typically
represent different cases” [Babbie 2010]. Cross-case analysis consists in “groupingCross-case
analysis together answers from different people to common questions, or analyzing different
perspectives on central issues” [Patton 2001].
Tab. 7.1 shows the differences between cross-case analysis and case-study. Cross-
case analysis is appropriate to resolve a frequent problem by identification of the
recurrent factors that cause it or could prevent it. Case study is appropriate to study
an infrequent but significant problem such as an accident in order to prevent it
or to study a successful experience in order to reproduce it. Performance will be
improved in the two cases. The scope of cross-case analysis is broad and can includeComparaison
several experiences in the same company or in different companies. Case study is
1According to Stake+ 2000, “case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be
studied.” Some authors considered case study as a "method" e.g. Yin 2002.
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deeper, but limited to one experience. Information collected in cross-case analysis is
often general and multi-sources; while in a case study, information is detailed and
concentrated.
To study the recurrent problem of delay which repeatedly occurs in a specific type
of decision, cross-case analysis is more adequate than case study (useful in its Our choice
own right). Cross-case analysis allows the knowledge2 of the actors, in relation to
decision-making processes in several experiences, to be capitalized; while case study
does not allow the recurrent causes of delay in decision-making to be identified and
examined.
7.1.2 Choice of the type of questions
Multiple-choice questions and descriptive questions are two possibilities for an
interview grid. The first involves a quantitative interview and the second a qualitative
interview. Tab. 7.2 compares these two types of questions.
“Multiple-choice questions consist of a stem (i.e. a question or statement) and a
series of options or alternatives” [Blanche+ 2008]. Multiple-choice questions are Multiple-choice
questions in
quantitative
interviews
particularly relevant to quantify the "major issues surrounding" of a research topic
[Grossnickle+ 2000] and implies these issues are known. A fixed range of answers are
proposed in quantitative interviews [Bryman 2001], with multiple-choice questions.
One advantage of multiple-choice questions is that they are rapid to answer and
more actors will agree to answer them. It also makes statistical analysis possible.
One disadvantage is that interviewees might be influenced by the proposed choices.
Descriptive questions are "general requests for information" about the experiences
and beliefs of interviewees regarding a research topic [adapted from Allen Portsche
2008]. Descriptive questions are relevant when performing exploratory research
[Grover+ 2006] i.e. when the factors that affect a phenomenon are not known.
Descriptive questions are proposed in qualitative interviews, also called in-depth Descriptive
questions in
qualitative
interviews
or intensive interviews [Adler+ 2010]. “An in-depth interview is a way of gaining
information and understanding from individuals on a focused topic... the in-depth
interview is a very particular kind of interaction, similar to a conversation” [Hesse
Biber+ 2010]. In-depth interviews are potentially powerful to explore complex
experiences [Longhurst 2009] and subjective and complex decision-making processes
[Broom 2005]. One advantage of descriptive questions is that they avoid influencing
interviewees. A second advantage is their utility in the study of new research topics.
Descriptive questions and in-depth interviews make it possible to concentrate on
each individual [Koenigsmann+ 2006]. One disadvantage of descriptive questions
is the complexity of recording and analyzing in a large "survey" [Grover+ 2006;
Koenigsmann+ 2006]. “Due to the large amount of information provided by each
interview and the in-depth character of the analysis”, a large number of interviewees
is not practicable [Koenigsmann+ 2006].
Thus, an in-depth interview style with descriptive questions was chosen for this
study. It takes a lot of time, but reduces the possibility of influencing the interviewees Our choice
and helps identifying some causes of delay and some efficient practices that might
be ignored through a pre-defined multiple-choice questions.
2Here, knowledge of the actors means what they know about the way of doing their activities and
not their scientific knowledge.
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Table 7.2: Multiple-choice questions versus descriptive questions
Multiple-choice questions Descriptive questions
Appropriation relevant to quantify the fac-
tors that affect a phenomenon
[Grossnickle+ 2000]
relevant to identify the factors
that affect a phenomenon
Size of sample large small [Koenigsmann+ 2006]
Type of interview quantitative interviews qualitative interviews also called
in-depth or intensive interviews
[Adler+ 2010]
Type of analysis statistical analysis qualitative analysis
Advantages rapid to answer and also to ana-
lyze the results
avoid influencing interviewees
by the choices proposed
Disadvantages influencing interviewees time-consuming to answer and
also to analyze the results, com-
plexity of analysis [Grover+ 2006;
Koenigsmann+ 2006]
7.1.3 Design of the interview grid, its thematic axes and questions
After specifying the approach of the interviews, an interview grid should be con-
structed to help conduct the interviews (step 2, fig. 7.1).
The identification of the thematic axes and the construction of the interview grid are
both determined by the research questions and hypotheses [Blanchet+ 2010]. In the
study of delay in decision-making under uncertainty, interview questions should
provide the opportunities for interviewees to explain their dis/comfort regarding
current practices in decision-making and point out the causes of delay and efficient
practices to reduce delay, related to:
– decision, as the main subject of the interviews,
– uncertainty and the four main classes of the factors which create or affect
uncertainty (see our definition of uncertainty presented in section 2.1.4 on
page 29):
– object class i.e. information about the projects on which the decisionsThematic axes of
the interview grid are based,
– subject class i.e. human factors regarding who prepares, makes, and
executes the decisions, and the collaboration between actors,
– context class i.e. work environment wherein the decisions are made,
– time class i.e. time to decide.
The axes of the interview grid are: decision, uncertainty, information, human factors,
and work environment. Each (human) decision is based on the information which
might be uncertain, and is made by one or several actors in a context (not in a
vacuum). Thus, these six axes are general enough to be considered in the study of a
collaborative decision-making process when faced with uncertainty. According
to which industrial sector is being studied, other axes may be added to the grid,
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including other characteristics of the delayed decisions, specificities of the projects
or the sector, and their impacts on delays.
The questions should be neutral enough to avoid influencing the interviewees in
any particular direction. Each question should be on one, and only one, factor
that affects decision. The first question of the grid can be about the opinion of
interviewees on the effectiveness and rapidity of the decisions under study, to verify
whether all actors agree that there is a problem in decision-making manifested by
recurrent delay.
In each axis, the first question is about the most important aspect of the axis theme.
In this way, the interviewees can begin to reply to the most important aspects,
according to their own experiences. The last question is an open question that gives
the interviewees the opportunity to add points that are not included in the questions.
Between these two questions, the other questions should bring out different aspects
of the axis theme: its impacts on the decision-making process, its role in delaying
decisions, current practices, efficient practices, and the possible obstacles.
A pre-test with our industrial partner is performed in order to validate the interview
grid (step 3, fig. 7.1). The clarity of the questions can be examined at this stage. SomeA pre-test
interview improvements can be made, such as removing the ambiguities and adding some
definitions or precision, using the words that industrial actors are acquainted with,
and adding questions, if necessary. The test interview also gives an estimation of the
required time that should be allocated for interviews.
7.1.4 Identification of target actors
The actors who are in charge of making decisions should be identified (step 3, fig.
7.1). Each decision is constrained and conditioned by information [Simon 1960;
Pomerol+ 2008]. In a company, the actors who make important strategical decisionsInformation life
cycle as a key to
identify target
actors
are not often those who provide information. One way to identify target actors is to
examine their contribution in the information life cycle: from search / production,
selection / filtering, transformation / aggregation, communication, until finally
consumption / decision.
Identifying the points of convergence and divergence of different actors helps to
understand the eventual difficulties encountered by each group of actors when
seeking to improve their mutual understanding and collaboration. One purposeWhy group the
actors? of these interviews is to verify whether the actors have the same perception of
the problem of delay, its causes and solutions or whether their perceptions vary
according to their different roles in the information life cycle or their various
backgrounds and jobs.
There are at least two ways to group the target actors: 1) the information life cycle,
by which target actors can be identified, also offers the possibility of grouping
them according to each stage in the life of the information, 2) different actors whoPossible actor
groupings contribute to the information life cycle can also be grouped according to their
different jobs, such as: R&D actors, economists, marketeers, board of directors, etc.
The choice of how actors are grouped depends on our knowledge of the problem of
delay in decision-making in an industrial sector or an organization. If we do not
have any information about the possible misunderstandings between actors, we can
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begin by the first grouping option and conduct interviews with the groups of actors
who play important roles in the information life cycle. If, in the interview results,
divergence points between different jobs emerge, the second grouping option may
prove helpful to improve the collaboration between groups of actors with different
jobs.
Samples of interviewees should preferably contains juniors, seniors, and retirees,
since each population may have some advantages regarding the information that
can be collected:
– interviewing a retiree is potentially valuable for three reasons: 1) a broad
vision due to a wide experience that allows different aspects of a subject to be
analyzed, 2) the benefit of hindsight that allows analysis of phenomena with
less subjectivity and emotion, 3) freedom of speech, which allows openness in
speaking, 4) being free of the usual time constraints of the people with a high Asctors’ age
bracketsdegree of expertise,
– juniors have less experience but they may have a different and new perception
of the problems and solutions,
– seniors are still involved in the decision-making process and often have
important responsibilities and may provide interviewers with information on
current experiences.
7.1.5 Conducting semi-directive interviews
The interviews are performed with the target actors (step 4, fig. 7.1). The objective is
to collect the unspoken information related to the difficulties of decision-making
and possible improvements.
The interviewees should feel free from their strict duty of confidentiality, so as to ana-
lyze the current practices candidly. One of the difficulties is to create an atmosphere
of confidence for the industrial actors. Audio-video recording and note taking are
two possibilities to collect information during interviews. Recording interviews
allows the interviewer to concentrate on listening and observing interviewees during
the interviews and facilitates a faithful transcription of the statements and the tones
of the interviewees after the interviews. The main disadvantage of recording is that
the interviewees may feel uncomfortable being recorded [Longhurst 2009], and this
can adversely affect a candid and forthright dialogue. In this regard, three measures
are taken in our study:
– taking notes instead of recording the interviewees to avoid harming their
confidence, Gaining the
confidence of
interviewees
– conducting the interviews outside of their companies,
– assuring the interviewees that the transcription of the interviews will be
anonymized, eliminating the names of the companies, the actors and the
molecules under discussion.
In order to take notes faithfully, more than one person should attend the interviews.
One person (the principal interviewer) asks the questions and guides the interview.
The other mainly take notes but can also ask questions.
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The interviewees should feel comfortable about talking openly. So as not to interrupt
or influence them and in order to collect the maximum amount of information,
the in-depth interviews are semi-directive. In in-depth interviews, the interviewer
begins an interactive conservation3 by asking a question, but then says very little and
remains an "active listener" encouraging interviewees to continue speaking [Hesse
Biber+ 2010]. The questions are there to highlight some important factors that
influence decisions, and encourage actors to give their feedback on these factors.
As Bryman 2001 describes, the flexible style of the in-depth interviews allows an
open dialogue that is not limited to the questions on the grid. Thus, in answering a
question, an interviewee may spontaneously evoke some other factors that are
related to the other questions or not taken into account in the grid. The interviewers
can intervene, when:
– an interviewee points out a cause of delay, but does not give explanations
concerning its mechanism and its eventual underlying causes,
– an interviewee proposes an efficient practice, but does not explain why it is
efficient or does not specify whether during his career the proposed practice
has been implemented in another company or in the same company in
another period,Strategy of the
intervention – an interviewee outlines a factor that affect decision-making, but his analysis is
different from (even contradictory to) another impact analysis by another
interviewee. In this case, the interviewer let the interviewee come to the end of
his reasoning and then gives the different / contradictory points of view, in
order to generate a debate and understand the differences.
In this way, as Adler+ 2010 describe in qualitative interviews, the interviewer adapts
the interview to each interviewee.
All the interviewers take notes. After each interview, all the notes should be compared
and merged. As Longhurst 2009 mentions, the transcription should be done after
conducting the interview, when it is foremost in the minds of the interviewers.
Semi-directive interviews imply that the results are not as structured as the grid and
thus, need to be reorganized. The analysis of the interview results is the subject of
the next section.
7.2 Content analysis of the verbatim report
The full transcriptions of each interview by different interviewers are cross-referenced
to the transcription made by the principal interviewer, in order to complete it (step 5,
fig. 7.1). Thus, only the most complete transcription (meaning the transcription of
the principal interviewer) is considered. The combination of the transcriptions of all
interviews is constructed into a verbatim report.
In the verbatim report, all the names of companies, people, projects, services,
products should be eliminated to respect the confidentiality of the interviews. In
addition to names, all indications that may allow a company or a person to be
recognized should also be eliminated. It should be noted that some indications
3Hesse Biber+ 2010 distinguish an in-depth interview from a "normal" conversation wherein there is
more "back-and-forth interactions" and two people express their ideas.
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might be revealing only to the experts in the field. Thus, identification of these
indications should be assisted by an actor of the industrial field that is being studied.
We introduce here the notion of key factor, a term that will be used frequently in the
rest of this document. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 4, a factor is “a
circumstance, fact, or influence that contributes to a result.” In our study, a key
factor is a "thing" (a circumstance, a fact, an influence, an emotion, a relationship,
etc.) that can affect decision-making.
The purpose of section 7.2.1 is to identify the key factors that in/directly affect
decision-making and the purpose of section 7.2.2 is to classify the key factors in
order to measure the importance of the impact of each class.
7.2.1 Identification and analysis of the key factors in decision-making
Based on the interview results, a verbatim report is established, including the exact
expressions of the interviewees. The purpose of this step is, first, single out (in the
verbatim report) the key factors that affect in/directly decision-making, their impacts,
and their particular contexts (step 6, fig. 7.1). Then, the key factors, underlined by
different interviewees, are cross-referenced and the repeated and controversial ones,
in terms of impacts on decisions, are identified.
In the verbatim report, some statements contain the key factors outlined by the
interviewees, and some other statements give more explanations about the key
factors. These two types of statements are distinguished: 1) elementary statements
which contain only a key factor, 2) secondary statements which explain the main
idea of elementary statements. Each secondary statement focuses on one of these
elements:
1. an observation which is where an interviewee draws attention to the key factor,
because of its perceived in/effectiveness. Typology of the
secondary
statements
2. the impacts of a key factor in terms of delay in decision-making,
3. the context wherein a key factor can impact on decision-making,
4. an illustrative example.
First, each elementary statement is grouped with its associated secondary statements.
The first output of this step is a partition of the set of all statements into subsets
which contain one and only one elementary statement (key factor) and potentially
some secondary statements.
Secondly, the key factors repeated by the same interviewee (in the same way) are
deleted.
Thirdly, the key factors repeated, exactly in the same way, by different interviewees
are considered as the salient factors. A specific analysis is reserved for these salient Two degrees of
frequency for each
salient factor
factors, which is based on two degrees of frequency associated with each of them:
– exact frequency index: the number of the exact repetitions of a salient factor,
meaning with the same words or synonymous terms,
4http://www.oxfordreference.com
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impacts how  to do a task.  
Figure 7.2: Three levels of the key factors
– total frequency index: the exact frequency index plus the number of key
factors that are not exactly the same as the salient factor, but are related to
the salient factor because they consider different aspects of the same theme,
called the central theme.
The total frequency index shows the importance of a central theme, and the exact
frequency index shows which aspect of a central theme affects decision-making
most significantly.
Finally, the controversial factors are detected, meaning those that can have different
or even contradictory impacts on the decision-making process, according to different
interviewees. The different perceptions of the controversial factors can be analyzed
according to the various actors interviewed who evoked them, or according to their
contexts, etc.
The key factors identified through the verbatim report - those most cited and also the
controversial ones - give information about the causes of delay and about efficient
practices. But they do not determine the causes of delay and the efficient practices
related to each activity, the actors who should implement efficient practices, and the
areas to improve. Identified key factors should thus now be classified according to
these elements. It helps provide each group of actor with a compendium of efficient
practices that they should implement to perform their activities. It is the subject of
the next section.
7.2.2 Categorization of the key factors in decision-making
Content analysis stands or falls by its categories... since the categories
contain the substance of the investigation.
Berelson 1952
In content analysis, categorization is an operation to classify the elements of a set
(into subsets, called categories), by differentiation and then grouping by analogy,
according to predefined criteria5 [Bardin 1997], where a criterion is a condition by
5« La catégorisation est une opération de classification d’éléments constitutifs d’un ensemble par
différentiation puis regroupement par genre (analogie) d’après des critères préalablement définis »
[Bardin 1997].
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which an element is judged to belong to a subset6. A criterion may be semantic,
synthetic, lexical, expressive, etc. [Bardin 1997].
In the case of our study, categorization is performed on the set of the identified key
factors, noted F . Categorization partitions F into categories of the key factors that
share common properties7 [adapted from Bardin 1997]. Categories are determined
by the semantic criteria e.g. the category of all the key factors that concern a given
activity (step 7, fig. 7.1).
A "correct" categorization should also satisfy five conditions according to Bardin
1997:
1. mutual exclusivity: in each point of view of the content analysis, each key
factor must belong to one and only one category. The definitions of the
categories and the criterion of the membership should clearly be defined,
2. homogeneity: the exclusivity condition depends on the homogeneity of the
categories. The operation of the categorization is the same for the all key Conditions of a
"correct"
categorization
factors,
3. pertinence: categories should reflect the research intentions and analysis,
4. objectivity and fidelity: a very important condition that can be supported by
the previous ones,
5. productivity: this pragmatic condition implies that the definitions of the
categories help the new research hypotheses emerge.
“The categories chosen must reflect and be sensitive to the research problem”
[Longhurst+ 2008]. Thus, research hypotheses and questions lead to the identification
and definition of relevant categories. In the case of our study, the research questions Identification of
the relevant
categories
are as follows. What are the causes of delay related to each activity? For a given
activity, what are the efficient practices that need to be implemented in order to
reduce delay in decision-making? Who are the actors involved in the causes of delay?
What are the efficient practices destined towards each group of actors? etc. The
answers to these questions will divide the set of the key factors (F ) into categories.
For example, the last question partitions F into categories where each of them
includes only the practices destined towards one group of actors. Thus, to answer
this question, we have as many categories as there are groups of actors. In this way,
research questions offer different points of view to categorize the key factors. A
point of view of categorization is defined as a particular "way of considering"8 that
orients categorization so as to answer a question. In the next lines, we formalize the
operation of categorization according to different points of view.
The set of all points of view is noted Π. The point of view number i is noted Πi ,
where 1≤ i ≤ I and I = |Π|. The key factor number l is noted fl , where 1≤ l ≤ n, and
n = |F |. The category number j of the point of view number i is noted Ki j , where Formalization of
the categories of
each point of view
1≤ j ≤ J and J = |Πi |. Six points of view are proposed to answer six questions by
categorizing the key factors:
6Adapted from the definition of criterion by the Oxford English Dictionary: a principle or standard
by which something may be judged or decided, available in http://www.oxfordreference.com
7« Les catégories sont des rubriques ou classes qui rassemblent un groupe d’éléments (unités
d’enregistrement dans le cas de l’analyse de contenu) sous un titre générique, rassemblement effectué
en raison des caractères communs de ces éléments. » [Bardin 1997].
8Adapted from the definition of point of view by the Oxford English Dictionary: a particular attitude
or way of considering a matter, available in http://www.oxfordreference.com
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1. is the factor a cause of delay in decision-making or an efficient practice to
reduce it?
Formulation point of view: Π1= {Cause, Practice}:
– K11=Cause= {key factors that are cited as the causes of delay},
– K12=Practice= {key factors that are cited as the efficient practices to
reduce delay},
– criterion: this depends on the formulation of the elementary statement
that contains the key factor,
2. is the key factor related to a way of doing, thinking, or being?
Level point of view: Π2= {Doing, Thinking, Being}:
– K21=Doing= {key factors concerning a manner of doing an activity},
Doing is the manner to carry out an activity,
– K22=Thinking= {key factors concerning a manner of thinking},
Thinking concerns mental representations that are flexible and can be
modified,
– K23=Being= {key factors concerning a manner of being},
Being is the essence, the most important properties of people that make
them who they are and how they act, according to rigid patterns that are
difficult to change9,
– criterion: this depends on the semantics of the key factor10(see fig. 7.2),
3. is the key factor related to the object, subject, or context?
Sector point of view: Π3= {Object, Subject, Context}:
– K31=Object= {key factors concerning information processing about the
project},
– K32=Subject= {key factors concerning the actors and their interactions},
– K33=Context= {key factors concerning internal and external environment
of an organization},
– criterion: these categories, which take root in our definition of uncer-
tainty (see section 2.1.4 on page 29) and the typology of uncertainty
factors (see fig. 2.4 on page 30), helps determine the sector of a key factor
from this point of view,
4. which activities of the process are concerned by the key factor?
Process point of view: Π4 = {Activity1, ...,Activityt , ...,ActivityT }, where T is the
number of the activities in the model of the decision-making process11 that
are mentioned by the interviewees, called critical activities. A first reading of
9Subjective values are strongly involved in this level.
10We identify these three levels through the reading of the verbatim report. The interviewees
implicitly distinguish these levels in the formulation and semantics of their statements, when they
analyze each other’s practices: “they do..., they think..., they are...”. We noticed, a posteriori, that these
levels are considered in philosophical and religious texts: “Good thoughts, good words, good deeds” in
Zoroastrian ethics [Clark 1998], “Be, think, do what feels right” in Buddhism [Hansard 2011], “...a
perfect standard which prescribes being, thinking, doing...” in Christianity [Carroll 1980], “...a historical
investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as
subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” in Foucault’s philosophy [Foucault+ 1984].
11This can be provided following the method explained in chapter 4 on page 63, as is presented in
fig. 5.7 on page 88 for Go / No Go decision-making process.
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the interview report is necessary to determine the activities pointed out by the
interviewees to constructΠ4.
– K4t = Activity number t = {key factors that concern activity number t of
the model},
– criterion: the activity of the model, in which a cause of delay is identified
or an efficient practice should be implemented,
5. which group of interviewees underline the key factor?
Interviewees’ point of view: Π5 = {Group1, ...,Groupg , ...,GroupG }, where G is
the number of the groups of interviewees, depending on their roles in the
decision-making process:
– K5g = group number g of interviewee who identified the key factor,
– criterion: the role of the interviewee in the decision-making process,
determined in section 7.1.4 on page 120,
6. who is the actor (or group of actors) that should consider the key factor in
implementing the critical activities?
Actors’ point of view: Π6 = {Actor1, ...,Actora , ...,ActorA}, where A is the number
of the actor (or group of actors) involved in the causes and practices mentioned
by the interviewees. A first reading of the interview report is necessary to
establish the list of actors:
– K6a = actor (or group of actors) number a who is involved in a cause of
delay or should implement an efficient practice,
– criterion: actors mentioned by the interviewees, regarding their positions
in the Resource Breakdown Structure (RBS)12 of the enterprise.
The categories of the first three points of view do not depend on the application case.
The categories of the last three do depend on the application case, its model of the
decision-making process, and the actors who contribute to the process. Additionally,
a first reading of the verbatim report is necessary to identify the potentially relevant
categories which are not taken into account in the primary hypotheses [Blanchet+
2010].
Each key factor is annotated by a sextuplet of the categories to which it belongs. The
annotation function, noted a, is defined as follows:
a : F →Π, a( fl )= [Ki j ] (7.1)
where ∀ fl ,Πi , ∃!Ki j ∈Πi such that fl is annotated by Ki j .
From each point of view, the categories are mutually exclusive and they cover all the
factors, meaning that they give a partition of the verbatim report.
Other categories can be added, according to the characteristics of the indecision
problem. They should satisfy the mentioned conditions for a "correct" categorization.
After that, the categories constitute a stable analysis grid that should help to
decompose the information as much as possible, as should be the case in the
interview grid [Blanchet+ 2010]. In this way, categorization of the key factors that
affect decision-making helps cross analysis, for example:
12“A hierarchical structure of resources by resource category and resource type used in resource
leveling schedules and to develop resource-limited schedules, and which may be used to identify and
analyze project human resource assignments” [PMI 2008].
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– causes / practices versus activities: the causes of delay and efficient practices
related to each activity,
– causes / practices versus group of actors: the efficient practices that should
be implemented by each group of actors (step 8, fig. 7.1),
– group of actors versus object / subject / context: the similarities and differ-
ences between opinions of different groups of actors,
– causes / practices versus object / subject / context: the area to improve,
namely factors relating to the object e.g. information research, factors relating
to the subjects e.g. mutual expectations, and factors relating to the context e.g.
culture of enterprise.
These elements help each actor to step back from his role in the decision-making
process, being conscious of the perceptions and expectations of the other actors.
Finally, the causes outlined and the practices recommended should be validated by
the actors (step 9, 10, fig. 7.1).
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Application to problem of delay in
difficult Go /No Go decisions
Indecision is often worse than wrong action.
Henry Ford
In this chapter, the methodology outlined in chapter 7 on page 115 is applied to the
indecision problem in drug development projects. This application is accompanied
and assisted by our industrial partner.
In section 7.1.1 on page 115, we explained the reasons for choosing cross-case
analysis in order to study a recurrent problem of delay in decision-making in an
organization or in an industrial sector. In addition to these general reasons, some
specific reasons reinforce this choice in the case of our field of study:
– the length of a doctoral thesis does not allow a case study on one drug
development project to be performed since such projects last on average more
than 13 years [Paul+ 2010] and their consequences might only be known over
the long term,
– as explained in section 1.2.2 on page 16, the problem of delay occurs in difficult
Go / No Go decisions, of which two or three are made during the life of a
project. Therefore, observation of only one project may not be sufficiently rich
when compared to feedback from experienced actors on several delayed - and
also on time and effective - decisions.
8.1 Designing and conducting interviews
The axes and the questions of the interview grid and the profiles of the target actors
are described in this section.
8.1.1 Six thematic axes of the interview grid
An interview grid is constructed to collect information about the causes of delay, the
current practices of the actors in the decision-making process, and the efficient
practices recommended by the actors.
Six thematic axes are proposed in section 7.1.2 on page 117 to construct an interview
grid in order to investigate the problem of delay in collaborative decision-making
under uncertainty: decision, uncertainty, information, human factors, work environ-
ment, and time. In this way, our interview grid includes 35 direct questions and 6
open-questions, in six axes (see the axes of the grid in fig. 8.1):
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Go / No Go 
DECISION	  	  
(11	  ques(ons)	  
Group	  of	  
actors	  	  
(4	  ques(ons)	  
Non-­‐emergency	  
situa:ons	  	  
(2	  ques(on)	  
Organiza:onal	  
Culture	  	  
(5	  ques(ons)	  	  
Uncertainty	  	  
(4	  ques(ons)	  
Informa:on	  	  
(9	  ques(ons)	  
Figure 8.1: Thematic axes of the interview grid
– decision: the main topic of the interviews is decision. Eleven questions are
asked about the postponement, invalidation, and difficulties of Go / No Go
decisions, storage of the history of making/delaying these decisions, and the
factors that stimulate decision-makers to finally make a decision that has been
lengthily delayed (see appendix B.1 on page 177),
– uncertainty: despite a large number of tests on the molecule, the degree of
uncertainty remains high. Four questions are asked about the frequency ofThematic axes of
the interview grid uncertainty, its sources, its impact on decisions and the way uncertainty is
dealt with (see appendix B.2 on page 177). More questions in each class of
factors of uncertainty are also asked:
– object class i.e. information: Go / No Go decisions are based on infor-
mation about the properties of the potential new medicine. Information
has an important role in shaping Go / No Go decisions. Nine questions
are asked about the importance of presentation of information by project
managers to decision-makers, its quality, quantity, objectivity, and
accessibility for the decision-makers in various fields (see appendix B.3
on page 177),
– subject class i.e. human factors: Go / No Go decisions are collaborative,
which implies taking into account collaborative factors in human rela-
tionships. Four questions are asked about the influences of the group on
individuals and vice versa (see appendix B.4 on page 178),
– context class i.e. culture of the enterprise: the characteristics and
culture of enterprises have an important impact on the ways decisions
are taken. Five questions are asked about the type of governance,
structure and functioning of decisional system, flow of information, and
other implicit and explicit rules (see appendix B.5 on page 178),
– time class i.e. non-emergency of situations: Go / No Go decisions with
long-term consequences are often considered non-emergency. Two
questions are asked about the impact of the non-emergency of decisions
(see appendix B.6 on page 178).
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…
Figure 8.2: General R&D actors in composition of steering committees
The questions of the grid have been validated by our industrial partner who helped
to reformulate some questions in order to make them clearer, using the keywords of
the field such as benefit-risk balance, decision recycling, and jargon translator. In the
axis of information some questions on the quality and time of the presentation of
information are added.
8.1.2 Decision-makers and project managers as target actors
The model of the Go / No Go decision-making process, provided in fig. 5.2 on page 81,
shows the contribution of actors to the information life cycle. In the last stage,
difficult Go / No Go decisions are often delayed. The actors who play two main
roles in the last stage of the model are: 1) decision-makers (members of steering
committee) who make decisions about projects and have to be convinced of the
value of projects, 2) project managers who present the projects and provide the first
group with the information they need to decide. These roles determine the choice of
the target actors: decision-makers and project managers.
In this study, a small sample size was intended because of:
– the rarity of difficult Go / No Go decisions, since a project portfolio rarely
contains more than 10 projects and there are only 2 or 3 difficult Go / No Go
decisions during the life of a project1,
– the rarity of decision-makers and project managers who are the actors with a
high level of expertise and are few in number,
– the sensitivity of the subject (public health),
– a high degree of confidentiality in R&D projects in general and in the pharma-
ceutical sector particularly,
– the nature of our questions (pathological study of decision-making) that
implies criticizing oneself, colleagues, companies, and even banks and
politicians,
1It should be noted that difficult Go / No Go decisions are not frequent but they are frequently
delayed. They often concern innovative projects that, in the case of success, develop an effective and
safe medicine for patients and a profitable product for companies. Thus, it is important to make these
decisions quickly and effectively for both public health and the pharmaceutical industry.
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– the form of the questions (open, neutral and descriptive ones) that are more
difficult to answer compared to multiple-choice questions,
– the number of the questions (35) that are time-consuming to answer.
Seven actors of the pharmaceutical industry agreed to give an interview. These
actors can be grouped according to their last roles in the decision-making process: 3
project managers, 4 decision-makers. Decision-makers have more experiences and
three of them were project managers before becoming decision-makers.
This sample covers the main R&D actors in the steering committee (see fig. 8.2):
chemists / pharmacologists, toxicologists / pre-clinical experts, pharmaceutical
developers, clinicians, and also project managers. The interviewees are 2 juniors, 3
seniors, and 2 retirees.
Most of the interviewees have worked in more than one company during their career.
These are the companies with more than 50 subsidiaries and usually with export
sales that represents around 80% of their total turnover.
8.1.3 Conducting interviews
Seven interviews were performed during the summer and fall of 2011. The interviews
were semi-directive and lasted at least two hours, at most eight hours (on two
occasions), with an average duration of 3:40 hours. At least two and sometimes three
people took notes during the interviews. Then, the notes were cross-referenced
in order to reduce the subjectivity of the interviewers and to provide a faithful
transcription of the interviews. Some interviewees were solicited by email to expand
upon their opinions and some of them spontaneously contacted us to add other
reflections or the points of view of their colleagues.
8.2 Interview analysis
A verbatim report was constructed from the combination of the full transcription
of each interview, made by the principal interviewer and completed with the
transcriptions of two other interviewers. The verbatim report comprised 18,200
words.
As explained in section 7.2, the verbatim report was anonymized. Additionally, all
indications that could have helped identify a company or a person were eliminated.
This was done in collaboration with our industrial partner who, through multiple
collaborations with different companies, knows the specificities of each company and
the elements that may reveal a confidential name to the actors of the pharmaceutical
industry.
In this section, first, the key factors are outlined in the verbatim report. Then they are
classified into categories, according to the properties shared.
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8.2.1 Identification and analysis of the key factors in Go / No Go decisions
All the interviewees agree that Go / No Go decisions are frequently delayed in drug
development projects. Each interviewee, according to his functional role and
feedback, identifies some key factors that affect the decision-making process.
The objective of this section is to identify and analyze the key factors that affect the
Go / No Go decision-making process, the salient factors that are pointed out exactly
in the same way, the related factors that consider different aspects of a same central
theme, and the controversial factors with different impacts on decisions.
In the verbatim report, 362 key factors (elementary statements) are identified, 22 of
them (6%) are repeated by the same interviewees (in exactly the same way) and are
deleted and are not the subject of any analysis. From 340 which remain, 197 factors
are mentioned only once (exact frequency index=1) and 55 factors are repeated
a total of 88 times (in exactly the same way) by different interviewees, with 2 ≤
exact frequency index ≤ 4. These are the salient factors which are the subject of a
particular analysis. The number of the key factors, without the repetition of the
salient factors, is 252. The percentages announced hereafter in our analysis are
based on these 252 factors (see fig. 8.4). Two examples of key factors are given.
"Fear of uncertainty", is evidenced from this elementary statement: “Uncertainty of
biology scared decision-makers” and its secondary statements are as follows:
1. observation: “inability to act under uncertainty”,
2. impacts: “deferring decisions, expecting information that may reduce uncer-
tainty”,
3. context: “particularly in the companies with several decision-makers who are
afraid of uncertainty”,
4. example: “someone who comes from another industry, the car industry for
example, has difficulty in decision-making faced with the high degree of
uncertainty in biology.”
"Affective attachment to projects" is evidenced by the following elementary state-
ment: “A project is difficult to stop, a project is like a baby”:
1. observation: “difficulty of making, accepting, and executing No Go decisions”,
2. impacts: “deferring No Go decisions”, “trying to change No Go decisions”,
3. context: “particularly in the companies with a low throughput in the pipeline”,
4. example: “the actors wept, after a No Go decision.”
8.2.2 Salient factors in Go / No Go decision-making process
Tab. 8.2 shows the first salient factors with their exact and total frequency indexes.
The last column shows the group of actors who underlined the key factor: Project
Managers (PM), and Decision-Makers (DM).
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Table 8.2: Salient factors sorted by total frequency
Salient factors Exact
Frequency
Total
Frequency
Pointed out
by (Group of
actor)
Fear of uncertainty 4 22 PM & DM
Fear of hierarchy 4 15 PM & DM
Difficulty of No Go decisions 3 14 PM & DM
Taking into account
belief/conviction-sharing process
4 11 DM
Sending the results to decision-makers 4 10 PM & DM
Lack of complete interpretation of the
results
1 10 PM & DM
Information overload in decision
meetings
1 9 DM
Short and ill-organized debate 3 7 PM & DM
Difficulties caused by jargon 3 6 PM & DM
Analyzing risks 3 5 PM & DM
Collecting comments by round table
discussion
3 5 PM & DM
Applying a template for presenting the
results
4 4 PM & DM
Sending the agenda of the meeting 4 4 PM & DM
Lack of communication of the decisions
made
4 4 PM & DM
Taking necessary time in shaping
decisions
3 4 PM & DM
Wearing effect of the steering committee 3 3 DM
Redefining the decision-making process 3 3 PM & DM
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8.2.2.1 Fear of uncertainty related to biology
Fear of uncertainty is repeated exactly in the same way 4 times. Thus, its exact
frequency index is 4. The central theme of this salient factor is "uncertainty" which is
repeated 18 times in other key factors, developing its different aspects, such as:
– perception: the interviewees consider that uncertainty is mainly perceived
negatively by their colleagues, especially those who are unfamiliar with
uncertainty: “For some actors, working with uncertainty is like being on a
rudderless ship”, as one interviewee puts it. For some actors, it is confused
with risk; they call for a quantitative evaluation of uncertainty. However,
uncertainty is inherent in decision-making, especially in innovation. The
positive aspects of uncertainty are ignored. For example, it is a source of
challenge, opportunity, and innovation and gives actors a degree of freedom in
their actions.
– evaluation and treatment: to process uncertainty, the interviewees propose a
primary qualitative evaluation of uncertainty that can progressively becomes
quantitative, up-to-date evaluation of uncertainty, dilution of uncertainty by
developing the back up and follow up molecules (a tree of similar molecules),
and belief-sharing to combat fear of uncertainty.
The total frequency index of "Fear of uncertainty" is 22, which is the total number of
the key factors with "uncertainty" as the central theme.
8.2.2.2 Fear of hierarchy
Fear of hierarchy is also exactly repeated 4 times. Its different aspects are mentioned
11 other times in different key factors. According to the interviewees, fear of hierarchy
is problematic at two levels:
– for project managers: who do not give a clear interpretation of the raw
results, since a bad result can be considered by their superiors as "a lack of
sufficient effort", as one interviewee affirms. It is particularly problematical in
a multidisciplinary field such as the pharmaceutical sector wherein a project
manager is considered as a "jargon translator". Consequently, decision-makers
are not provided with adapted interpretations of the results to make decisions.
– for decision-makers: who do not express themselves in the presence of
their superiors at all or at least not before knowing what their bosses think
about a project. Consequently, unofficial corridor discussions become richer
than official ones during the meetings. Therefore, the composition of the
steering committee, meaning the existence of different levels of hierarchy in
the steering committee, has a direct impact on the way and order in which
decision-makers talk.
Fear of hierarchy harms the "team psychological safety" defined by Edmondson
1999 as “a shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking”; a safe
team climate is characterized by interpersonal trust and mutual respect wherein
team members are comfortable being themselves, asking a question, pointing out a
mistake, or proposing an idea, without being embarrassed or punished.
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8.2.2.3 Difficulty of No Go decisions
Difficulty of No Go decisions2 is mentioned by the interviewees. Explaining a No Go
decision relating to a lack of safety is always easy and rapid. However, it is difficult to
make a No Go decision relating to a potential lack of competitiveness, regarding the
existing medicines on the market. In these cases, the interviewees explained:
– the degree of this difficulty: “a project is like a baby”, “stopping a project is
perceived as a tragedy”, “everything breaks down, everything collapses, like a
shipwreck”, “a particular difficulty for the project manager”.
– the reasons for this difficulty: affective attachment i.e. considering the project
as "human", stopping a project can be considered as a lack of effort, it is
considered as interest-free, past costs of the project, low flow of the pipeline,
list of the projects for the banks.
– the solutions to manage the end of the life of the projects that are going to fail:
– to develop a tree of back-up and follow-up (similar) molecules instead of
only an opportunist R&D strategy. In this way, a "dead project can be
reborn in a more competitive form, in another therapeutic indication"
on which human resource can be mobilized.
– to prepare the actors for a No Go decision, avoiding the surprise effect.
To give the actors a programmed time to digest a No Go decision.
Royer 2003 explains that a deeply held conviction is needed to get a project up and
running, but “as the project moves forward, faith can blind you to increasingly
negative feedback”. She proposes putting in place well-defined review processes
to evaluate projects, questioning prevailing beliefs, demanding hard data on the
viability of the projects, and “if necessary, forcefully making the case that it should be
killed.” Royer 2003 draws attention to the fact that the role of the "project champion"
is well studied, while the role of the "exit champion", who is able to kill projects
before they become "money sinks", is not appreciated.
8.2.2.4 Taking into account belief/conviction-sharing process
This key factor is exactly repeated 4 times. Its central theme, "sharing conviction" is
mentioned in 5 other key factors, underling its importance in vanquishing the fear of
uncertainty and in shaping a decision as well as its mechanism which is compared to
a "viral propagation". Belief/conviction-sharing should be taken into account by:
– project managers in presenting results: project managers present the results of
the tests to decision-makers who do not know the detail of the project and
whose opinions are shaped by the way results are presented. Decision-makers
cannot be convinced by a project manager who is not convinced himself, or
who does not communicate and share his conviction by using convincing
sentences, appropriate wording, and also non-verbal communication such as
eye movements, head movements, facial expressions, gesture, posture, sounds,
proximity, and distance [Croucher 2004],
2As explained in section 1.2.2 on page 16, this thesis focuses on Go / No Go decisions which are
difficult to make, meaning when the results are neither very good nor very bad. The results show that,
in these difficult Go / No Go decisions, the No Go ones are more difficult to make.
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– decision-makers between themselves in debate and discussion.
Interestingly, belief-sharing is mentioned a total of 9 times, by all decision-makers
but by none of the project managers. This shows that project managers are not
aware of the importance of the belief-sharing process for their interlocutors, namely
decision-makers3.
Charan 2001 underlines three reasons why people “speak their lines woodenly and
without conviction”: 1) they are intimidated by the group dynamics of hierarchy,
2) they are constrained by formality, 3) lack of trust. In a collegial structure, by
definition, hierarchy and formality are trivial and relationships are often based
on trust. Thus, people share their convictions more easily, compared to a formal
structure wherein sharing conviction is less natural and requires an effort in terms of
communication.
8.2.2.5 Sending the results to decision-makers
Sending results is mentioned by both project managers and decision-makers. The
objective is to give decision-makers enough time to prepare the decision meeting.
The problem is that some senior managers and decision-makers expect to receive
the results of the studies the day after the tests have finished. “The preparation and
presentation of the results is not considered as a real activity and the necessary time
and resources are underestimated and not allocated to it”, as one decision-maker
affirms. Project teams and especially functional managers should participate in
preparing the presentation of the results, according to another decision-maker.
But one project manager considers that even if the presentation is sent to the
decision-makers, some of them do not read it4. Project managers expect to be helped
by the decision-makers who read the presentation, ask questions when they do not
understand something, and suggest improvements.
8.2.2.6 Lack of complete interpretation of the results
As Jarrosson 1994 indicates, “it is not raw information that is used in decision-making,
but rather the meaning given to the information”5. In Go / No Go decisions, project
managers give meaning to complex and multidisciplinary information that should be
understandable for the various experts on the steering committee. Thus, complete
interpretation of the results, meaning that information adapted to the steering
committee is necessary to make informed decisions.
Lack of complete interpretation is underlined by both groups of actors. Different
forms of subjectivity in the interpretation of the results is described by the decision-
makers and the reasons for this subjectivity is explained by the project managers:
3It is often difficult for a lecturer to measure how convincing he is. Politicians are aware of the
importance of sharing conviction in their speeches. They ask their consultants whether they sound
convincing. In the case of pharmaceutical R&D projects, only decision-makers who listen to the
presentations of the project managers can measure their credibility and their power to share their
conviction.
4The fact that some decision-makers do not read the presentation of the results (sent by project
mangers), is mentioned in only one company. We cite it but do not generalize it as a common cause of
delay, as is the case for sending results.
5« Ce n’est pas l’information brute qui sert à décider mais plutôt le sens qu’a cette information »
[Jarrosson 1994].
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– forms of subjectivity:
– do not always present a bad result,
– give a bad result uninterpreted, in the form of raw data or using too much
technical jargon, so that it is not understandable by all decision-makers,
– give a bad interpreted result, but minimize its presentation on the slide,
compared to good results,
– give the contradictory results in different slides, without linking them,
– reasons of subjectivity:
– a possible fear or a sense of guilt, since a bad result can be considered as
a lack of effort,
– it is "taboo" to talk about a bad result,
– a bad result may lead the project to its end (tragedy of No Go decision),
– a possible fear of displeasing or upsetting their colleagues or their
superiors by announcing a bad result.
8.2.2.7 Information overload in decision meetings
Information overload is only mentioned by decision-makers. It occurs when the
amount of available information for decision-makers is more than they are able to
process during a decision meeting. It is often related to rapid changes of a great
deal of information where relationships are difficult to discern [Tweedale+ 2008].
Selectivity of information helps decision-makers avoid confusion, misunderstanding,
and consequently, the waste of time and human resources [Janis+ 1977]. Decision-
makers complain about the abundance of information during the decision meetings
caused by:
– project managers who:
– mix information relevant to the quantity of work performed on the
project and information relevant to Go / No Go decisions, in order to
"show that they have worked hard", according to one decision-maker,
– enjoy presenting results and "they have also the backup slides", according
to another decision-maker,
– decision-makers who:
– need detailed information because of their speciality such as cardiolo-
gists, immunologists, and biochemists,
– want and enjoy showing their expertise in interpreting the raw data and
ask the project manager to give raw data concerning their specialities,
– the chairman of the board who takes the meeting as an opportunity to be
informed about the other projects.
The abundance of information is not taken into account by the project managers as
the major producers of information for Go / No Go decisions. It is perceived by the
consumer of this information, meaning decision-makers, who cannot find accurate
decision-related information easily among a large amount of information presented
or discussed in the meetings.
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8.2.2.8 Short and ill-organized debate
Both project-managers and decision-makers agree that, after the presentation of the
results, debate and discussion is short and ill-organized. But the reason for this is
different according to each group of actors:
– project managers think that decision-makers tend to skip debate and discus-
sion. They ask project managers to begin the presentation of the results by the
conclusions and recommendations in order to avoid a real debate,
– decision-makers think that a lot of time is spent on the presentation of the
results and consequently, they do not have enough time to debate.
Decision-makers add another point that concerns lack of deliberation as a "fulcrum"
of a decision, before its determination. "Distinction between the process of delibera-
tion, and the act of decision determination" is also cited in the health field, in the
evaluation of "good" decision-making [Elwyn+ 2010].
8.2.2.9 Difficulties caused by jargon
The consequences of overusing jargon in the presentation of the results are:
– decreasing the attention and concentration of the decision-makers who have
different areas of expertise,
– hiding the interpretation of a bad result, by using technical words.
Using too much technical wording is contrary to the role of a project manager,
called a "jargon translator" in the pharmaceutical industry. One decision-maker
proposes establishing cross languages between different fields that are involved in
drug development projects to favor mutual understanding.
8.2.2.10 Some other examples of salient factors
Some other salient factors, presented in tab. 8.2, are explained in this section. Risk
identification and analysis is recommended by the interviewees, taking into account
human factors in risk perception. High risks increase hesitation in decision-making.
“The problem is not risk evaluation. There are tools that evaluate risks. The problem
is how to manage risks?”, according to one project manager.
One of the decision-makers should manage the meeting, asking opinions of the
others in order to ensure that everyone can express his view.
Using a template for presenting the results is mentioned by both project managers
and decision-makers. But project managers add that even when a template is chosen
with the agreement of decision-makers, they feel that the project managers want to
influence them by a predefined template.
Sending out the agenda of the meeting is important to recall the questions that
should be answered and the decisions that should be made, and helps actors to
prepare the decision meeting.
Lack of communication on decisions made is “very frustrating for the people
who have worked on a project” as one project manager puts it. This factor is also
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mentioned by a decision-maker. Using an appropriate and clear formulation of
a made decision, explaining and communicating it to project team, help in the
execution of the decision.
Taking necessary time to shaping decisions may seem paradoxical, regarding the first
statements of the all interviewees regarding the delay in decision-making. It reveals a
lack of time management specific to the decision-making process. According to one
retiree decision-maker, “a difficult collaborative decision is not triggered suddenly, it
is shaped, matured, shared, and digested little by little” by decision-makers. The
speed of this process depends on the sub-processes of the all decision-makers. If
a decision is bluntly made, it risks to be unmade and remade several times and
sometimes during several months. This lost time can be more than the necessary
time to shaping a decision.
The wearing effect of the steering committee is only mentioned by the decision-
makers. They consider that in some companies a ritual has been established: “in the
same office, the same people take the same seats and play the same roles in the
same play, with the same lighting. It is as if the play has already been written”, one
decision-maker describes.
Redefining the decision-making process is proposed by both project managers
and decision-makers. In order to redefine this process and enrich it with efficient
practices, the key factors that affect decision-making should be analyzed and
structured. In the next section, incoherent key factors are outlined in the verbatim
report.
8.2.3 Controversial factors in Go / No Go decision-making process
Tab. 8.3 shows the controversial key factors (2% of the key factors). In this section,
the controversial factors and their positive and negative aspects are identified, but
selecting one or both of them depends on each organizational context.
8.2.3.1 Presentation format
Presentation format (e.g. PowerPoint®) is synthetic, practical, structuring, illustrative,
and thus, suitable to present the results of the tests, according to one decision-maker.
However, one project manager does not agree: in text format (e.g. Word®), the results
can be presented in-depth, in contrast to the presentation format.
Some studies, carried out in the education and organizational fields, criticize the
use of a presentation format: it induces a weak analysis, since the information is
parcelled into bullet points [Gabriel 2008; Hill+ 2012].
In Go / No Go decisions, this divergence of points of view can be explained by the
role of each group of actors. On the one hand, the project managers produce a great
deal of information from the raw data that cannot be easily presented in a few slides
and criticize the decision-makers for preferring "easy information". On the other
hand, decision-makers cannot discuss all the results at the time of the meeting.
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8.2.3.2 Formal and collegial decision structures
The impact of formal and collegial decision structures is also a subject of disagree-
ment among the decision-makers. Decision-makers with an Anglo-Germanic culture
recommend a formal structure; while those with a Latin background prefer a collegial
one.
The effects of collegiality are also discussed in judicial decision-making by Edwards
2003 who affirms that in a collegial structure, judges “are willing to listen, persuade,
and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect.” In American
presidential decisions, the formal structure is described as a hierarchical pyramid,
with the president at its apex and the collegial structure is compared to a wheel: “the
president at the hub with advisers at the end of the spokes, directly connected to the
president, and, along the rim, to each other” [Howell+ 2009]. Collegiality is also
studied in airplane crashes and the results show that collegial decision-making in
cockpits reduces the number of accidents [Morel 2012].
Go / No Go decisions, contrary to the cockpit decisions studied, are non-urgent and
involve a larger number of experts, compared to a pilot and co-pilots. Collegiality
creates a safe working environment for individuals to express themselves, but when
the group of decision-makers is not small and decisions are not urgent, one side
effect of collegiality may be a cacophony of opinions. Collegiality also implies
reciprocal confidence between decision-makers which is easier to reach in small
groups.
8.2.3.3 Number of decision-makers
For some decision-makers, the number of members of the steering committee is not
important in decision-making, as long as they know how to make decisions. But
according to others, it is difficult to make a decision within a group of more than 5 or
8 people.
As Morel 2012 puts it, it is important that each decision-maker has the time to
express himself, and this is usually difficult with a large number of decision-makers.
8.2.3.4 "Corridor" discussions
For some interviewees with a Latin background, the unofficial discussions (corridor
discussions) about the results of the tests help shape and digest a decision. Some
others with an Anglo-Germanic culture believe that discussions about the results or
decisions must officially take place and be shared in a formal meeting. Corridor dis-
cussions imply confidence and collegiality between people who discuss difficult and
sensitive topics in private. Corridor discussions are not problematic by themselves, if
the actors participate in formal discussions as well as in informal ones. But it is a
decisional pathology if the fear of hierarchy leads the actors to participate only in
informal discussions outside of meetings.
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Table 8.3: Controversial factors
Controversial factors First point of view Second point of view
Format of the results of the
tests and studies
Presentation format is
superficial. Text format is
more appropriate.
Presentation format is
synthetic, and structuring.
Type of collaborative
decision
Formal decision-making is
more appropriate.
Collegial decision is
appropriate.
Number of
decision-makers in the
steering committee
A limit is needed. The number of
decision-makers is not an
important factor.
Corridor discussions Limiting corridor
discussions about results
and decisions.
Corridor discussions help
shaping and maturing
decisions.
Management of
non-emergency situations
To consider non-emergency
situations as emergency.
Not to consider
non-emergency situations
as emergency ones.
8.2.3.5 Managing non-emergency situations
Non-emergency is considered as "a brake on decision-making". All the interviewees
confirm this fact. The concept of non-emergency in Go / No Go decisions recalls
the concept of "hidden emergency"6 introduced by Lenfle+ 2004 in innovative
projects wherein the superposition of the various design processes makes projects’
milestones less visible. In drug development projects, as explained in section 1.3 on
page 19, Go / No Go decisions are often considered as non-emergency ones because
of the long duration of the projects.
In order to manage this lack of urgency, some interviewees proposed that a non-
emergency situation should be considered as an emergency one, in order to decide
more rapidly. For others, this approach could harm the effectiveness of a decision
and increase the risk of invalidating a decision. This difference of points of view
might be related to difference of personalities.
8.2.4 Categorization of the key factors in Go / No Go decisions
8.2.4.1 Presentation of the categories
After identification of the key factors, their categorization help to determine the
critical activities that need to be improved, and the actors who should be involved in
this improvement. The different points of view and the categories, proposed in
section 7.2.2 on page 124, form the basis of this categorization. A first reading of the
whole verbatim report and also of the model of the Go / No Go decision-making
process, presented in fig. 5.7 on page 88, help to adapt the proposed categories to
our corpus:
6« Une temporalité particulière : urgence masquée ... la superposition des différents processus de
conception rend difficilement lisibles les échéances temporelles » [Lenfle+ 2004].
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1. Π1 = {Cause, Practice},
2. Π2 = {Doing, Thinking, Being},
3. Π3 = {Object, Subject, Context-Organizational factors, Context-Strategical
factors, Context-External factors},
4. Π4 = {Preparation and presentation of results and recommendations, Percep-
tion / interpretation of results, Evaluation and reasoning of results, Debate,
Collaborative decision-making, Post-decisional activity, Process management},
5. Π5 = {Project manager, Decision-maker},
6. Π6 = {Project managers, Decision-makers, Board of directors, Chairman of the
board, Project team, Marketers, Human Resource Direction, Everyone}.
The two first categories (Π1,Π2) are exactly the same as proposed in section 7.2.2 on
page 124.
Regarding the third point of view,Π3, a first reading of the verbatim report shows
that about 50% of the key factors concern the Context category. Three sub-categories
are distinguishable within the Context category in the verbatim report: strategical,
organizational, and external factors. Therefore, in the case of our study, these
sub-categories partition the Context category. This decomposition gives a richer
categorization, adapted to our corpus, which helps to identify more precisely the
areas in need of improvement.
The three last categories are adapted to the Go / No Go decision-making process in
pharmaceutical R&D projects and to the actors who are in/directly involved in this
process.
The categories ofΠ4 are the critical activities mentioned by the interviewees in the
verbatim report. Five of these activities are those in the model of the Go / No Go
decision-making process, presented at two detail levels in fig. 5.2 on page 81 and
fig. 5.7 on page 88. Interviewees also pointed out the causes of delay and the efficient
practices related to the post-decisional activity and process management. Fig. 8.3
shows these activities:
– Activity1: Preparation and presentation of results and recommendations,
which is the last activity of the "New Information Analysis stage" (see fig. 5.2
on page 81) wherein the project manager prepares and presents the result of
the tests and studies to decision-makers,
– in the ISA process, causes and practices mentioned by the interviewees mainly
concern the expertise that allows actors to understand information and the
decisional capacities of individuals that allow them to take a position. But
these causes / practices are not clearly related to each mental activity in the
framework of the collaborative choice. Therefore, in the ISA, we distinguish
only two main activities that are clearly distinguishable in the interviewees’
descriptions:
– Activity2: Perception of results, concerning comprehension of the results,
– Activity3: Evaluation and reasoning of results, concerning the capacity
to decide, including evaluation of the results, reasoning, projection of
future, and taking a position,
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– in the CSA process, the interviewees point out two main activities7:
– Activity4: Debate, concerning the influences between the actors,
– Activity5: Collaborative decision-making: concerning decision-making
itself after the debate,
– Activity6: Post-decisional activity, some causes of delay and efficient prac-
tices, pointed out by the interviewees are post-decisional, concerning the
communication of decisions made,
– Activity7: Process management, some causes of delay and efficient practices,
pointed out by the interviewees, do not directly concern the activities of
the decision-making process. They concern process management, broadly
defined as “the management of the processes by removing existing barriers
among organizational units in enterprises or among enterprises, sharing
information and management resources” [Lee+ 2010].
The set of target actors to interview, identified in section 8.1.2 on page 131 constitutes
theΠ5.
A first reading of the verbatim report allows us to specify the actors who are involved
in the causes of delays, or who should implement the efficient practices. These
actors constructΠ6.
This annotation is illustrated by an example on a key factor, f192 = "mixing the
information relevant to the difficulty and quantity of work performed on the project
and the information relevant to Go / No Go decisions, in the presentation of results".
This key factor is a cause of delay. It mainly concerns how information about the
project is processed, and thus, it is related to the object. It criticizes a way of doing
the activity of "Preparation and presentation of results". This key factor is pointed
out by a decision-maker and is destined towards project managers. Therefore,
a( f192)={Cause, Object, Doing, Preparation of results, Decision-maker, Project
managers}.
8.2.4.2 Results of categorization in simple categories
From the 252 key factors pointed out by the interviewees, 44% are the causes of delay
and 56% are efficient practices. This trend is the same for each group of actors,
meaning that they pointed out more positive practices than causes of delay, while
the questions of the grid are neutral.
Most of the key factors (77%) concern a way of doing. Only 8% of the key factors
concern a way of being and 15% concern a way of thinking. A manner of doing is
observable and it is easier to identify a cause of delay in decisions related to manner
of doing than one related to a manner of thinking or being. At "thinking" and
especially "being" levels, the key factors are not directly observable and identifiable
and may be induced from a manner of doing. Additionally, identifying a key factor at
"thinking" and "being" levels implies developing inner awareness, compared to the
"doing" level which involves external awareness, which is easier to attain. This trend
is the same for both project managers and decision-makers (see fig. 8.5).
7As to corridor phases, the interviewees do not propose any practices. They either consider these
phases helpful to process information and make or digest a decision, or consider them as harmful to
decision-making (see section 8.2.3).
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Figure 8.5: Distribution of the key factors, pointed out by project managers and
decision-maker, from the point of viewΠ2
Almost half (49%) of the key factors outlined by the interviewees are related to the
context, 31% to the subject, and 20% to the object. Fig. 8.6 shows the distribution of
the questions of the interview grid and the answers of the interviewees, forΠ3. In the
interview grid, the highest percentage of the questions is on the object (32%) (see
section 8.1.1 on page 129), but the highest percentage of the answers concerns
the context of the companies. Decision, uncertainty, and non-emergency are the
thematic axes of the interview grid but they are not the categories for the key factors.
It should be noted that the key factors pointed out in answering the questions
(including those about decision, uncertainty, and non-emergency) are related to one
of these three categories: object, subject, and context. Thus, decision, uncertainty,
and non-emergency do not appear in the pie chart of the answers. Fig. 8.6 illustrates
that, in spite of the general tendency of the grid for the object, the interviewees
mostly pointed out the factors related to the context. This shows a relatively weak
role for the rational part (factors relating to the object) in the difficulty and delay
of Go / No Go decision-making, compared to factors relating to the context and
subjects which need to be resolved. The high number of contextual key factors leads
us to categorize them in order to understand what points cause the problem in the
context and what areas need to be improved. In this regard, we distinguish three
categories within the Context category:
– Context-Organizational factors (11%): factors that concern organization in
terms of time, resources, and especially, the holding of decision meetings -
such as how to begin and end these meetings,
– Context-Strategical factors (35%): factors related to strategy and governance of
an enterprise that create its culture,
– Context-External factors (3%): factors related to the external environment of
enterprises such as the market, regulation, etc.
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Figure 8.6: On the left, percentages of the questions in the thematic axes of the
interview grid: object, subject, context, decision, uncertainty, and non-emergency of
the situations, and on the right, percentages of the key factors in the verbatim report
regardingΠ3: object, subject, and context categories.
The same trend is observed for both groups of actors, regardingΠ3: fig. 8.7 shows that
both project managers and decision-makers underlined roughly equal percentages
of the key factors in each category.
The distribution of the key factors regarding the critical activities of the decision-
making process shows that 79% of the causes and practices underlined concern
three activities which are thus, considered the most problematic: Preparation
and presentation of results 28%, Collaborative decision-making 32%, Process
management 19%. The other factors concern: Perception of results 4%, Evaluation
and reasoning of results 5%, Debate 8%, Post-decisional activity 4%. This distribution
shows the importance of the collaborative activities (Decision-making itself preceded
by Debate) and Process management, which defines the working environment.
In sum, 96 and 187 key factors are pointed out respectively by 3 project managers
and 4 decision-makers.
Most of the key factors are aimed at decision-makers: Project managers 21%,
Decision-makers 42%, Board of directors 21%, Chairman of the board 4%, Project
team 2% Marketeers8 3%, Human Resource Management 2%, Everyone 6%. Tabs
8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 show some examples of the causes and practices aimed at project
managers, decision-makers, and the board of directors.
8.2.4.3 Results of categorization in cross-referenced categories
In this section, by cross-referencing the categories of different points of view, we
answer the following questions. Are the key factors concerning the critical activities
8The role of marketing in the pharmaceutical industry is different from its role in developing
new products in other industries. In this regard, Becker+ 2006 highlight six traditional roles of the
marketeers which differ in the field of developing new medicines: 1) understanding consumer needs,
2) marketing as source of innovation, 3) translating consumer needs into workable products, 4)
testing product concepts and prototypes, 5) forecasting. The different roles of marketeers in the
pharmaceutical industry cause some difficulties between them and the R&D actors.
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Figure 8.7: Distribution of the key factors, pointed out by project managers and
decision-maker, from the point of viewΠ3
mostly to be found in object, subject, or context categories? What are the common
key factors pointed out by both project managers and decision-makers? What are
the mutual criticisms of project managers and decision-makers?
Factors related to the Preparation and presentation of results are mainly related to
the object class (65%). Factors related to Collaborative decision-making and Process
management are mostly contextual (respectively 69% and 72%). This is explained
by the fact that the Presentation of the results is an individual activity, based on
factual results wherein the key factors are related to information, while Collaborative
decision-making and Process management involve more factors relating to the
context and subjects.
Collaborative decision-making involves some factors relating to the subjects (28%),
but depends more significantly on the context (69%). Analysis of the contextual
factors shows that 3% of them are external, 21% organizational, and 44% are related
to the governance and culture of the enterprise. In the same way, the analysis of the
contextual factors related to Process management shows that 2% are external, 4%
organizational, and 65% are related to governance. This same trend is observed for
both project managers and decision-makers with respectively 51% and 47% of the
key factors related to the context.
The important role of a leadership and organizational context, which can value and
nurture the emergence and implementation of efficient practices, is outlined in the
literature [Cooper 1998; Kerzner 1998; Charan 2001; Loo 2002; Davenport 2009].
This study confirms the important role of the context in delays in decision-making,
identifies the causes of delay directly related to the context, and proposes efficient
practices to reduce this delay.
150
Application to problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go decisions
Table 8.4: Examples of causes of delay and efficient practices, destined towards
project managers
Causes of delay Efficient practices
Mismatching of the interpretation of raw
data with the level of expertise of
decision-makers.
Adapting the contents to the knowledge
level of the audience (decision-makers).
Mixing information relevant to the
quantity of work and that relevant to
Go / No Go decisions.
Selecting only the information relevant to
Go / No Go decisions.
Inappropriate level of detail. Adapting the level of detail
non-homogeneously, emphasizing the
questionable results.
Lack of link between contradictory
information.
Highlighting eventual contradictions.
Delay in sending the results to
decision-makers.
Sending the results to decision-makers in
time in order to prepare decisions.
Amplification of positive results. Presenting both negative and positive
results with the same emphasis.
Lack of belief-sharing. Presenting the results with conviction.
From 252 key factors, 31 are pointed out by both project managers and decision-
makers, such as: difficulty of jargon in such a multidisciplinary field, difficulty of
No Go decisions, and lack of management of the end of life of stopped projects. This
last factor, against all expectations when the purpose is to reduce delay, consists in
delaying No Go decisions to allow time for detachment from the projects and to
digest their past costs. Some "planned" lost time is better than invalidating a brutal
No Go decision a posteriori.
The main mutual criticism of the decision-makers and project managers is as follows.
On the one hand, while much attention is quite rightly paid to the way in which the
tests are performed and the results are provided, little attention is given to the way in
which the results are interpreted, aggregated, prepared, and presented. “Preparation
and presentation of the results is not considered as a real activity and the necessary
time and resources are not allocated to it”, as one decision-maker affirms. On the
other hand, as one project manager emphasizes, “decision-makers skip debate and
discussion. They are not trained to make collaborative decisions, especially when
faced with uncertainty”.
Project managers outlined twice as many key factors destined towards decision-
makers (42%) as those destined towards themselves (21%). This trend is reversed for
decision-makers with 43% of the factors aimed at themselves and 23% towards
project managers. Three explanations are possible: 1) the role of the project manager
in the critical activities is contained only in Preparation and presentation of results,
while decision-making is represented through several activities, 2) the self-criticism
of the decision-makers can be explained by the maturity and broad experience of
this group of actors. It can be illustrated by some key factors related to "Collaborative
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Table 8.5: Examples of causes of delay and efficient practices, destined towards
decision-makers
Causes of delay Efficient practices
Lack of preparation of the decision meet-
ing.
Reading the results sent and prepare the
decision meeting.
Silence in the case of lack of understand-
ing caused by technical jargon.
Asking questions, in the case of lack of
clarity of the presentation.
Lack of reciprocal interactions in the steer-
ing committee.
Listening, but also express opinions and
argue.
Conformism in the steering committee. Expressing one’s opinion, even if it varies
from the tendency of the group.
Inevitable loss involved in each decision. Accepting that making a decision implies
losing an option.
Difficulty of No Go decisions. Giving the project team enough time to
digest a No Go decision.
Lack of clarity in the formulation of deci-
sions.
Formulating decisions clearly at the end
of the meetings.
decision-making", underlined by decision-makers only: lack of concern from some
decision-makers whose participation lasts less time than the duration of the projects,
"fastfood decisions" due to the lack of deliberation and maturation processes, etc., 3)
decision-makers participate jointly in the Choice and Review stage (see fig. 5.2 on
page 81) and therefore, can observe and criticize the practices of their colleagues,
contrary to a project manager who is the main actor of his own activity (Preparation
and presentation of results) and does not have the opportunity to participate in
meetings with other project managers. Therefore, project managers have more
opportunity to criticize the decision-makers.
Tab. 8.4 shows some examples of the practices destined towards the project
managers, concerning the activities of Preparation and presentation of results and
recommendations. Tab. 8.5 shows some examples of the practices destined towards
decision-makers for the activity of Collaborative decision-making.
Some practices destined towards project managers and decision-makers cannot
successfully be implemented without the necessary contextual and organizational
support. For example, "psychological safety" [Edmondson 1999] should be in
place to allow each individual to be direct in expressing opinions. The important
role of leadership and organizational context is also outlined in the literature.
Efficient practices emerge in an organizational culture that values and nurtures these
practices [Cooper 1998; Kerzner 1998; Charan 2001; Loo 2002; Davenport 2009].
Project managers and decision-makers destined respectively 21% and 20% of the
factors to the board of directors. Tab. 8.6 gives some examples of efficient practices,
concerning governance of an enterprise, destined to the board of directors, in three
classes: strategy, work environment, and organization.
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Application to problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go decisions
As with any interview-based approach, the subjectivity of the interviewers and
interviewees is an unavoidable weakness. We have tried to reduce it as much as
possible by cross-referencing different the points of view of the interviewers at three
points in the study: 1) designing the study, interview grid, and analysis plan, 2)
conducting interviews, and 3) analyzing results. As for interviewees, we have tried to
identify and clearly the convergences and divergences of their opinions regarding
their roles in the decision-making process. For example, the multiple repetitions of
the different aspects of fear of hierarchy, fear of uncertainty, lack of belief-sharing,
etc. are the relevant indicators of the problems concerning these factors.
These practices have been reviewed and validated by the actors of the both groups
(decision-makers and project managers) and also by our industrial partner. The
results of the interviews help each group of the actors to take into account the
expectations of the other group and help make collaborative decisions more effective
and faster.
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Collecting and structuring practices
Table 8.6: Examples of causes of delay and efficient practices destined towards the
board of directors
Causes of delay Efficient practices
Strategy
Ambiguity of the global strategies. Clarifying, communicating, and explaining
global strategies to decision-makers and
project managers and ensure their
comprehension.
Mismatching of the composition of the
steering committee with the global
strategies.
Adapting the composition of the steering
committee to global strategies.
Wearing effect of the steering committee. Reviewing the composition of the steering
committee.
Lack of clarity of the modality of
decision-making.
Specifying clearly who really make/s the
final decisions.
Lack of communication on the decisions
made.
Communicating and explain the decisions
made.
“Putting all your eggs into one basket in an
uncertain environment”, as one
decision-maker puts it.
Diluting uncertainty by developing the
back up and follow up projects or diversify
the portfolio by licensing opportunities.
Lack of clarity of the responsibilities of
different committees.
(Re)defining, communicating, and
explaining the perimeter and scope of each
committee.
Work environment
Fear of hierarchy, especially since there are
several hierarchical levels within the
steering committees.
Creating a safe environment, especially
within the steering committee.
Lack of confidence. Trusting and asking for responsibilities.
Lack of implementation and respect of new
measures by the superior hierarchical
levels.
Implementing efficient practices at all
hierarchical levels.
Organization
Lack of time and resources to prepare the
presentation.
Allocating sufficient resources to prepare
the results.
Tele-decision-making. Avoiding tele-decision-making.
Short and ill-organized debate. Organizing four key periods in decision
meeting: debate, deliberation, decision,
communication.
Lack of traceability of decisions. Storing a summary of the information
related to decisions and also the way
decisions were made.
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Conclusion - part III
This part investigates the causes of delay in difficult collaborative Go / No Go
decision-making, when faced with uncertainty, in pharmaceutical R&D projects and
also the efficient practices to reduce delays.
A methodology, based on in-depth interviews, is proposed to identify and structure
the key factors that affect the decision-making process. This methodology includes
the construction of an interview grid, the identification of the target actors, and an
analysis plan of the verbatim report of the interviews. This plan is composed of two
steps: 1) identifying the salient factors and controversial factors that are involved in
delays in the decision-making process, 2) structuring the key factors according to the
activities of the decision-making process, the actors who pointed out these key
factors, and those who should take these factors into account in performing their
activities. This helps to identify the activities that should be improved, specifying
who should improve them and how.
This methodology is applied to the problem of delay in Go / No Go decisions in drug
development projects. Two groups of major actors in Go / No Go decision-making
are interviewed: 3 project managers and 4 decision-makers. A verbatim report of
18,200 words is constructed which highlights the causes of delay. In the verbatim
report, 111 causes of delay are identified and 141 efficient practices are proposed
that are based on the feedback of actors with many years of experience.
The results show all the interviewees agree that Go / No Go decisions are frequently
delayed or invalidated, or some of them are never made and the projects are "left to
rot", as one project manager puts it. Two activities of the decision-making process,
most cited by the interviewees are Preparation and presentation of results and
Collaborative decision-making. The same tendency is observed within project
managers and decision-makers. We conclude that while much attention is quite
rightly paid to the way in which the tests are performed and the results are provided,
little attention is given to the way in which the results are aggregated, prepared and
presented, and to how decisions are made. In sum, Preparation and presentation of
results and Collaborative decision-making are presumed to be natural activities that
do not need training, practice, or even the necessary time to be performed.
Inadequate interpretation of the results of the tests, information overload during the
decision meetings, lack of debate and deliberation are some causes of delay directly
linked to the activities of the model of Go / No Go decision-making process. But the
three most-mentioned factors involved in decision delay are not directly related to
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Collecting and structuring practices
Collaborative 
decision
Objective factors 
expertise of methodology    &    expertise of interpretation
Subjective factors
Contextual factors
confidence in the person    &    capacity of belief-sharing
Raw data
Figure 8.8: Trajectory of a collaborative decision
the activities of the decision-making process: fear of uncertainty, fear of hierarchy,
and difficulty of No Go decisions.
Three compendiums of practices are destined towards the project managers,
decision-makers, and the board of directors that would allow collaborative decisions
to be formed, matured, digested, respected, and finally executed. Fig. 8.8 summarizes
the trajectory of a collaborative decision from the raw data to the decision itself.
When the raw data is interpreted and presented by a project manager to decision-
makers, factors related to the object and subjects are involved in forming the decision.
The factors related to the object include the expertise of the project manager in the
methodology of producing data and its interpretation. The factors related to subjects
include the confidence of decision-makers in the project manager, which is based on
previous experiences, and also the capacity of the project manager to share his
beliefs and convictions when faced with uncertainty.
The causal factors and efficient practices, identified by the actors, are at three levels:
being, thinking, and doing. The congruence of these levels helps: 1) a project
manager or a decision-maker to share knowledge and belief and reach a compromise,
2) in making a decision effectively and rapidly, and communicating, explaining,
executing, and respecting it. If there is no congruence, a sense of conviction is not
established within a group, and decision-makers may look for excuses to postpone
the decision, or try to change it. Thus, dissonance in these levels slows down
belief-sharing and the decision-making process and the alignment of these stages
helps in implementing efficient practices. This may explain why efficient practices
cannot sometimes be successfully implemented. It is not enough to change a
practice at the "doing" level. It should be explained in order to be changed (at least)
at the "thinking" level. However, we think that changes are more difficult (if not
impossible in certain cases) at the "being" level.
The results are limited to the problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go decisions in the
pharmaceutical industry. The sample covers only the R&D actors who contribute to
these decisions. The size of the sample is limited, because of: 1) the rarity of difficult
Go / No Go decisions, 2) the rarity of decision-makers and project managers who
are the actors with a high level of expertise, 3) the sensitivity of the subject (public
health), 4) a high degree of confidentiality in R&D projects in general and in the
pharmaceutical sector particularly, 5) the nature of our questions (pathological
study of decision-making) that implies criticizing oneself, colleagues, companies,
and even banks and politicians, 6) the form of our questions (open, neutral and
descriptive ones) that take a lot of time and are more difficult to answer, compared to
multiple-choice questions, and the number of questions (35).
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General conclusion
A conclusion is the place where you get tired of thinking.
Arthur Bloch
Pharmaceutical R&D projects are composed of several phases of trials wherein the
safety, efficacy, and quality of new compounds are progressively tested. Trials and
studies are piloted by a project manager who presents the results of the studies
to a group of various experts who have to decide whether the new molecule’s
development should be continued or stopped. These Go / No Go decisions are based
on benefit-risk balances that can be very easy to assess if the results are very bad, for
example when a molecule may be toxic and its safety is questionable, or if the results
are very good.
In the other cases, benefit-risk balances are very difficult to assess. This difficulty
is due to the uncertainty and complexity of the multidisciplinary results of tests,
involving the contribution of several experts which may delay reaching a compromise.
Additionally, the results of the tests of a new compound on thousands of patients are
sometimes not predictive enough to assess the risks and benefits for the millions
of patients who may use a drug after its commercialization. Another point that
complicates these decisions is the competitiveness of molecules compared to the
existing medicines on the market or to products being developed by competitors.
Moreover, Go / No Go decisions are made throughout long-lasting projects and in
non-emergency situations, which may induce decision-makers to defer decisions
and tolerate some delays.
In this context, a recurrent delay is manifested either by lengthy suspension of
decisions or by frequent invalidation of decisions made. Delay in decision-making
adversely affects meeting the goals of these high-cost, high-risk, and long projects.
To improve public health and to push projects forward, delays in decision-making
should be reduced. The aim of this thesis has been to identify the causes of delay and
the efficient practices (the way the actors perform their activities) that help reduce it.
In the first part, we presented an overview of the increasing pressures on decision-
makers in the pharmaceutical industry caused by rapid changes that, while offering
new perspectives in R&D, also complicates Go / No Go decisions. We described
the difficulties in assessing benefit-risk balances of new compounds on which
Go / No Go decisions are based. We distinguished two types of difficulties in assessing
a benefit-risk balance: objective difficulties, meaning those related to the quality
and quantity of information that should be taken into account in the balance, and
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subjective difficulties, meaning those related to personal visions and preferences
which make this judgment, like any other, subjective. All these elements help
understand the context wherein Go / No Go decisions are made.
To better understand delay in decision-making when faced with uncertainty, we
have reviewed the notion of uncertainty. Through an etymological study, we pointed
out that uncertainty and decision have the same root, coming from a Latin verb
literally meaning "to cut off". A notion of loss, not possessing a whole after cutting, is
implicit in decision and uncertainty.
We underlined two approaches to defining uncertainty: object-based and subject-
based approaches, and propose an encompassing definition of uncertainty that
brings together these approaches, since, in the study of the causes of indecision
under uncertainty, both causes relating to the object and those relating to the
subject should be considered. Context and time are two other key elements that we
have taken into account in our definition, for the same reason: they may have an
impact on delay. As regards uncertainty, it may be that object-based approaches are
appropriate in mathematics, AI, or economics, and subject-based approaches are
pertinent in psychology. But we defend the idea that in project management, we
cannot separate subject (actors), object (project), context, and time. Therefore, for
us,“uncertainty is a subject’s conscious lack of knowledge about an object, which is
not yet clearly known, in a context requiring a decision (an action) within a certain
time frame”.
We have reviewed the notion of indecision in the literature. We classified the causes
of indecision according to subject (decision-maker(s)), object or event (available
information about the state of an object or the occurrence of an event), and context
(situation of decision-making).
This classification led us to four conclusions: 1) contrary to uncertainty which has
a history as old as the Antiquity, indecision is a more recent notion which is less
widely considered in the literature, 2) existing studies are mostly performed in
psychology and focus on the individual causes of delay relating to subject. Indecision
is less studied in the context of groups, 3) limits on the quality and quantity of
information about an object or an event are mentioned as a cause of indecision by
some authors in the indecision literature. With no link to human indecision, limits
on the quality and quantity of information have been widely studied in AI, 4) as
some recent research works indicate, the role of the organizational context is less
widely considered in the literature. This bibliographical study confirms the need to
improve and accelerate decision-making in organizations and the lack of studies
about indecision.
In the second part, to investigate the problem of delay, the Go / No Go collaborative
decision-making process was modeled. This model presented, in three levels of
detail, the stages of the Go / No Go decision-making process: 1) Intelligence and
Design stage, 2) Test stage, 3) New Information Analysis stage, and 4) Choice and
Review stage.
In this model, at the first level, the hierarchical positions of the actors and the
information flow are visualized, including both descending and ascending in-
formation, from the superior hierarchical levels to lower levels and vice versa.
Descending information becomes more detailed and complete when arrives at
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the level of the technicians, who will carefully perform tests, following certain
protocols. Ascending information becomes aggregated when it arrives at the level
of the steering committee who make the decision. In the second level of detail,
the activities of each stage are detailed. These two levels of detail highlight the
collaboration between the actors who produce and prepare information and those
who consume it in order to decide. To take into account the collaboration between
decision-makers and also to describe how they process information and interact
with each other, a third level of detail is needed for the Choice stage.
A framework of the collaborative Choice stage was thus proposed which includes
both "individual reflection" and "group interaction", respectively through Individual
Situation Awareness (ISA) and Collaborative Situation Awareness (CSA). The ISA
formalizes the transformation of data into information, and then into knowledge
through the individual cognitive processes: perception, evaluation, reasoning,
and projection of the future. Fuzzy sets and fuzzy inference rules were used to
model human evaluation and reasoning with uncertain values. The CSA visualizes
the interactions between decision-makers through corridor phases (informal
discussions), debate (formal discussions), and decision-making. The framework:
1) makes explicit differences and similarities of the information processing by
different decision-makers who take a position before the collaborative steps, 2)
reveals the interactions within a group which may reinforce or question an individual
position and propagate doubts and beliefs, 3) simulates individual and collaborative
behavior which depend on the individual cognitive processes and the positions of
the individuals in the group, 4) measures the risk of invalidating a decision through
the dissatisfaction of the decision-makers. Thus, we have been able to analyze
conflicts in past decisions and anticipate future conflicts.
However, in the collaborative Choice stage, some questions remain unanswered and
some influential factors remain to be determined: are their current practices efficient,
or are some changes necessary to improve and accelerate the decision-making
process? What are the roles of the influential factors such as "task and environment
factors" on their practices? The model of the decision-making process cannot directly
answer these questions, but it can be used as a baseline to collect information about
them through an interview-based approach.
In the third part, we thus aimed to identify the key factors that affect decision-making
in an enterprise through interviewing industrial actors. In-depth interviews with
descriptive and open questions are powerful tools to explore complex experiences,
in that they reduce the possibility of influencing the interviewees. Therefore, an
in-depth interview-based approach was taken to collect actors’ feedback, and to
cross-reference and analyze their opinions and recommendations on delays in the
decision-making process.
In this study, a small size sample was used, because of: 1) the rarity of difficult
Go / No Go decisions, 2) the rarity of decision-makers and project managers, who are
those actors with a high level of expertise, 3) the sensitivity of the subject (public
health), 4) a high degree of confidentiality in R&D projects in general and in the
pharmaceutical sector particularly, 5) the nature of our questions (pathological
study of decision-making) that implies criticizing oneself, colleagues, companies,
and even banks and politicians, 6) the form of our questions (open, neutral and
descriptive ones) that take a lot of time and are more difficult to answer, compared to
multiple-choice questions, and the number of questions (35).
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The sample covered only the R&D actors who contribute to these decisions. The
results were limited to the problem of delay in difficult Go / No Go decisions in the
pharmaceutical industry. As with all interview-based approaches, the subjectivity of
the interviewers and interviewees is an unavoidable weakness of this study. We have
tried to reduce it as much as possible by cross-referencing opinions, pointing out
clearly their convergences and divergences.
Two groups of major actors in Go / No Go decision-making were interviewed: 3
project managers and 4 decision-makers. A verbatim report of 18,200 words was
then constructed from 26 hours of interviews wherein 111 causes of delay and 141
efficient practices were identified based on the actors’ feedback.
The results show all the interviewees agree that difficult Go / No Go decisions are
frequently delayed or invalidated. The three most-mentioned causes of delay are not
directly linked to the activities of the decision-making process: fear of uncertainty,
fear of hierarchy, and the difficulty of No Go decisions. The other factors that affect
delay, sorted in order of their total frequency in the verbatim report, are: lack of
belief / conviction-sharing process, not sending the results to decision-makers
early enough before the decision meeting, lack of complete interpretation of the
results, information overload in decision meetings, short and ill-organized debate,
difficulties caused by jargon, lack of risk analysis, and lack of round table discussion
to collect comments. Different aspects of all these factors were pointed out between
5 to 22 times by the interviewees.
The most cited factors concerned two activities of the decision-making process:
Preparation and presentation of results performed by project managers and Collabo-
rative decision-making done by decision-makers. We conclude that while much
attention is quite rightly paid to the way in which the tests are performed and the
results are provided, little attention is given to the way the results are interpreted,
aggregated, prepared and presented, and to the way decisions are made. Preparation
and presentation of results and Collaborative decision-making are presumed to be
natural activities that do not need training, practice, or even the necessary time to
be performed.
In sum, this thesis contributes to:
– identifying and clarifying the problem of delay in decision-making where
an immediate decision is not necessarily needed, as it would be the case in
crisis situations. Sometimes, researchers and industrial actors may not take
into consideration the need to improve decision-making in non-emergency
situations, supposing that “if we know how to make decisions in emergency
situations, we know how to do it non-emergency ones”9. However, our study
shows that this is not always true and the mechanisms that intervene in
decision-making in non-emergency situations are a worthy subject of research,
– clarifying the notions of uncertainty in project management and indecision in
organizations, taking into account the role of object, subject, context, and time
in their generation and treatment,
– visualizing and analyzing the information used and the process applied to
making collaborative decisions, as this process is modeled, including its
underlying information life cycle,
9We have heard this argument used during a debate in a conference.
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– identifying 252 factors that affect the quality and speed of decision-making
processes in organizations. Based on these factors, three compendiums
of practices are destined towards the project managers, decision-makers,
and the board of directors that would allow collaborative decisions to be
formed, matured, digested, respected, and finally executed, in non-emergency
situations in a safe work environment,
– highlighting the collaborative decision trajectory from information to decision
via both methodological expertise and capacity to create confidence and share
beliefs when faced with uncertainty,
– distinguishing three levels of being, doing, and thinking in the factors that
affect decision-making. This helps in understanding the different levels of
difficulty involved in implementing efficient practices.
Possible future directions for this study might include first, developing a multiple-
choice questionnaire on the key factors identified, in order to examine the results
obtained on a larger number of actors. Secondly, constructing an evaluation grid
of the quality of the decision-making process in organizations, to anticipate the
problem of indecision. Thirdly, identifying the obstacles to implementing efficient
practices, so as to develop an action plan for these changes, and to adopt change
management methods in order to assist the actors in making the changes.
161

Résumé des travaux en français
La langue anglaise est un fusil à plombs : le tir est dispersé. La langue
française est un fusil qui tire à balle, de façon précise.
Otto von Habsburg
Cette thèse est organisée en trois parties. La première partie commence par la présen-
tation de la problématique de retard dans la prise de décision face à l’incertitude. Les
décisions étudiées concernent la poursuite ou l’arrêt de développement de nouveaux
médicaments. Ces décisions, appelées Go / No Go, sont ensuite modélisées dans la
deuxième partie. Le processus modélisé est utilisé pour une étude de terrain sur les
causes du retard, dans la troisième partie de ce travail.
Retard dans la prise des décisions Go / No Go
Dans la première partie, les particularités des projets de développement de nou-
veaux médicaments sont expliquées. Ces particularités impliquent une forme très
particulière d’innovation, qui rend la prise de décision de plus en plus difficile. Une
étude bibliographique est ensuite présentée sur les thèmes clés de cette étude :
incertitude et indécision.
Particularités des projets de développement de nouveaux médicaments
Un médicament, avant d’arriver sur le marché, passe par plusieurs phases de tests et
d’études qui visent à démontrer sa sécurité, son efficacité et sa qualité. Les projets de
R&D pharmaceutiques sont de longue durée (plus de 13 ans), très coûteux (près
de 900 M$) et très risqués (avec un taux de succès de seulement 4 %) [Paul+ 2010].
À la fin de chaque phase, un comité d’experts de différents domaines se réunit
pour statuer sur la poursuite ou l’arrêt du développement de la nouvelle molécule.
Une décision Go / No Go doit donc être prise sur la base des résultats des tests qui
deviennent progressivement plus complets et exacts lorsque les projets avancent.
Cependant, pour faire évoluer les projets, les décisions Go / No Go doivent parfois
être prises sur la base de résultats incomplets et d’informations incertaines.
Dans ces situations, l’information incertaine est souvent perçue différemment
par les experts des différents domaines impliqués dans le processus de prise de
décision. En conséquence, les décisions peuvent être soit ajournées jusqu’à ce que
les décideurs atteignent un compromis, soit invalidées a posteriori.
Les coûts de R&D pharmaceutiques sont très élevés comparativement à d’autres
industries : ils représentent plus de 12 % des Chiffres d’Affaires (CA) des entreprises
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pharmaceutiques. Cette valeur ne représente que 4,2 % de CA dans l’industrie
d’automobile [LEEM 2008]. De plus, ces coûts ne cessent d’augmenter et atteignent
une moyenne de 17 % de CA en 2010 [Bohineust 2010]. « Pour limiter l’augmentation
des dépenses de santé liées à la multiplication de nouveaux médicaments, les
autorités régulatrices tendent aujourd’hui de plus en plus à refuser l’autorisation de
mise sur le marché de produits dont les effets sont proches d’autres qui existent
déjà » [Midler 2004]. Selon la Food and Drug Administration (FDA), le seul habilité à
autoriser la commercialisation des médicaments sur le territoire des États-Unis, « sur
250 molécules au stade préclinique, nécessitant déjà 6 ans environ de recherche,
seule une sera approuvée. Et sur 5 molécules entrant en phase clinique, après 16 ans
de R&D seule une sera approuvée par la FDA »10 [Weinmann 2008].
Dans ce contexte, la vitesse devient un critère tout à fait déterminant. Arriver le
premier sur le marché des nouveaux médicaments pour une indication thérapeutique
donnée est donc décisif, pour « la prime économique que donne naturellement cette
position » [Midler 2004], mais aussi pour compenser les coûts des molécules dont les
développements ont été arrêtés. Le coût considérable induit par les retards finaux
ou les invalidations de décisions, en termes d’effort humain, d’investissements
financiers et de temps, crée un besoin de révision de processus de décisions
Go / No Go. Et donc pour répondre à ce besoin, notre étude porte sur les causes du
retard et les pratiques actuelles dans la prise de décision sous incertitude, de même
que les pratiques efficientes qui aident à réduire ce retard.
Caractéristiques des décisions Go / No Go
La prise de décision est un ensemble de processus cognitifs visant à choisir une
option parmi un ensemble de choix. Le décideur effectue son choix en comparant
les conséquences des différentes options. Dans le cas de notre étude, les dimensions
qui caractérisent le contexte d’un tel choix, sont les suivantes :
– incertitude : la balance bénéfice-risque des différentes options est d’autant
plus sujette à discussion lorsqu’on se trouve en situation inconnue. Le manque
de connaissance des choix possibles et de leurs conséquences entraîne
l’incertitude chez les décideurs, ce qui met en danger l’efficacité et la rapidité
de décision. Ce réflexe de reporter la décision dans l’attente d’une nouvelle
information réductrice de l’incertitude est très souvent observé afin d’orienter
le choix vers une option,
– aspect non urgent : la décision à prendre ne semble pas présenter de degré
d’urgence apparent, mais un danger pourrait apparaître à long terme. D’où
l’originalité de ce travail, car plusieurs travaux de recherche sont menés
sur le thème du risque et de l’incertitude dans une situation d’urgence tel
que l’on peut rencontrer dans le cas d’une crise économique [Sinclair 1985],
politique [McDermott+ 2002], humanitaire [Charles 2010], etc. Par contre,
les phénomènes du risque latent et non menaçant sont relativement peu
étudiés. Les choix d’investissements, de renouvellement d’équipement, de
modernisation d’unité, la mise en place de nouveaux dispositifs de sécurité
sont autant de situations qui peuvent relever de ces décisions sans degré
d’urgence. Il est tout à fait possible de surseoir à la décision et de différer dans
l’attente d’éléments plus probants dans un contexte de prise de risque. Dans
10 http://www.dgcis.redressement-productif.gouv.fr/files/files/archive/www.
industrie.gouv.fr/biblioth/docu/dossiers/sect/etude_pharma.pdf
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le cadre des projets de développement de nouveaux médicaments, la longue
durée des projets peut laisser penser que les décisions Go / No Go ne sont pas
urgentes. Ici, contrairement aux situations urgentes, les conséquences des
décisions ne peuvent être connues qu’après dix ans,
– aspect collaboratif : la décision collaborative est le résultat d’un débat d’experts.
La personnalité de chacun, son mode de raisonnement, son goût pour le
risque ou son caractère prudent et précautionneux, son intérêt personnel
et son degré d’implication dans la suite de projet constituent autant de
possibilités d’influences sur le collectif et contribuent à des interactions entre
les décideurs, ce qui complexifie le processus décisionnel.
État de l’art
Pour comprendre le problème du retard dans la prise de décision sous incertitude,
nous étudions tout d’abord les notions d’incertitude et d’indécision.
Définitions de l’incertitude
Notre étude montre que l’incertitude a la même racine étymologique que la décision ;
toutes les deux viennent du verbe couper / trancher. Il est frappant de constater que
l’incertitude et la décision, qui sont deux concepts fortement liés dans la pratique,
proviennent de la même racine. Notons que cette racine révèle la pénibilité de
l’action de décider causée par la perte (il n’est jamais agréable de trancher quelque
chose).
Nous identifions ensuite deux approches dans la définition de l’incertitude :
– une première approche, adoptée en économie, qui définit l’incertitude en
mettant l’accent sur le manque d’information à propos d’un objet dont
l’état évolue ou à propos de l’occurrence mal connue d’un évènement :
manque d’information sur la probabilité des différentes issues [Knight 1921],
la différence entre l’information dont on dispose et celle dont on a besoin
[Galbraith 1973],
– une deuxième approche, adoptée en psychologie, qui définit l’incertitude
en mettant l’accent sur l’état mental d’un sujet caractérisé par un manque
de connaissance : la réaction mentale d’un humain face à l’environnement
extérieur, accompagné d’un sentiment de doute qui bloque ou retarde l’action
[Thompson 1967 ; Head 1967 ; Lipshitz+ 1997].
En management de projet, l’objet, le sujet et le contexte jouent des rôles importants
dans la génération, la caractérisation et le traitement de l’incertitude. Nous proposons
donc une définition élargie de l’incertitude, qui prend en compte les facteurs relatifs
à l’objet, au sujet et au contexte.
L’incertitude est un manque conscient de connaissance d’un sujet,
relative à un objet, non encore parfaitement défini, dans un contexte
nécessitant une décision / action dans un certain laps de temps. [Has-
sanzadeh+ 2012a].
Si après un certain temps attendu le sujet n’arrive pas à décider et à mener une
action, il peut être dans le cas d’indécision.
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Causes d’indécision
L’étude bibliographique sur l’indécision montre que cette notion, par rapport à la
décision et à l’incertitude, est nouvelle en recherche. À titre d’exemple, si on effectue
une recherche avec « indecision OR indecisiveness » comme mots clés sur le site
ScienceDirect, on n’obtient que 35 articles. Sur le même site, il existe 17 154 articles
avec le mot clé « decision » et 8 922 articles avec le mot clé « uncertainty ». La même
tendance a été observée sur les autres sites de recherche des articles scientifiques
comme Springer.
Les études existantes sur l’indécision ont majoritairement été effectuées, en di-
mension individuelle, en psychologie. Les causes liées à la qualité et la quantité
de l’information sont largement étudiées en Intelligence Artificielle (IA). Nous
classifions les causes d’indécision selon les éléments clés suivants : sujet, objet et
contexte (cf tab. A.1 en annexe).
À cet égard, des articles récents indiquent un manque d’études sur l’indécision dans
les entreprises et les organisations [Charan 2001 ; Davenport 2010 ; Denis+ 2011 ;
Brooks 2011 ; Akdere 2011 ; Patalano+ 2011].
Modélisation de processus de décisions Go / No Go
Afin de décrire, visualiser et formaliser le processus de prise de décision, ainsi que la
problématique du retard, nous modélisons le processus de prise de décision dans les
projets de R&D pharmaceutiques. La Figure 5.1 illustre la vision globale du modèle.
Dans ce schéma, nous distinguons trois dimensions qu’il convient d’étudier pour
modéliser ce processus de décision :
– les quatre macro-étapes du processus de décision, illustrées par des grandes
flèches qui entourent la pyramide :
1. collecte de l’information et conception,
2. réalisation de tests,
3. analyse de nouvelles informations et
4. choix,
– les acteurs qui participent au projet, comme les techniciens, les chefs de
métier, les experts internes ou externes, le chef du projet et le comité de
pilotage,
– le flux d’information entre les acteurs, illustré par des petites flèches.
Le schéma permet de visualiser le rôle de chaque acteur dans la création, la
circulation et l’évolution de l’information qui :
– descend du comité de pilotage vers l’opérationnel sur le côté gauche de la
pyramide : l’information devient de plus en plus précise en descendant,
– remonte dans le sens inverse sur le côté droit : l’information perd sa précision
en remontant.
Étant donné que l’information est traitée différemment par les décideurs, qui
peuvent par ailleurs interagir, nous proposons un cadre pour la dernière étape
(l’étape du choix) du processus de prise de décision collaborative qui intègre ces
différences et ces interactions (cf. fig. 5.7). Afin d’analyser des conflits relatifs à des
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décisions passées et anticiper des conflits futurs, en se fondant sur ce cadre, un
indice est défini, qui mesure l’insatisfaction individuelle de chaque décideur à
propos de la décision collaborative. L’agrégation de ces indices individuels donne un
indice pour mesurer le risque d’invalidation d’une décision a posteriori (cf. section
5.5.6).
Ce processus, premièrement, met en évidence le cycle de vie de l’information
dès sa génération jusqu’à sa consommation c’est-à-dire la décision elle-même.
Deuxièmement, ce modèle permet de mesurer le risque d’invalidation de décision a
posteriori. Troisièmement, ce modèle est utilisé comme une base pour collecter
l’information sur les causes du retard via les entretiens avec des acteurs sur le terrain,
ce qui est l’objet de la partie suivante de la thèse.
Étude des causes du retard
Nous avons effectué sept interviews approfondis avec trois chefs de projet et quatre
décideurs en tant qu’acteurs majeurs du processus de la prise de décision. Figure 8.1
montre les axes thématiques de notre guide d’entretien. Ces entretiens ont durés au
total 26 heures et nous ont permis de construire un compte rendu de 18 200 mots.
Nous avons identifié 252 facteurs clés qui influent la qualité et la rapidité des
décisions collaboratives. Près de 50 % de ces facteurs sont liés au contexte : liés à la
culture et à la gouvernance des sociétés. 30 % de ces facteurs sont liés aux sujets
(aspect collaboratif) : liés aux attentes mutuelles des acteurs qui jouent des rôles
différents dans le processus de décision. 20 % de ces facteurs sont liés à l’objet : liés à
l’information à propos de l’état de projet (les propriétés de la molécule).
Parmi ces facteurs, nous avons identifié les facteurs saillants c’est-à-dire les plus
cités par les interviewés. Le Tableau 8.2 montre les facteurs saillants les plus cités, qui
sont triés par rapport à leurs fréquences totales (le nombre de fois où les différents
aspects d’un facteur clé ont été cités) et leurs fréquences exactes (le nombre de
fois où un facteur clé a été exactement cité de la même manière). Les résultats
montrent que trois facteurs les plus cités en tant que causes du retard sont : la peur
de l’incertitude, la peur de la hiérarchie et la difficulté des décisions d’arrêt. Nous
constatons que quelques facteurs saillants n’ont été répétés que par une catégorie
des acteurs. Par exemple, les deux facteurs suivants n’ont été répétés que par les
décideurs : 1) le partage des convictions, et 2) la surcharge d’information lors de la
présentation des résultats des tests par le chef de projet. Ce qui montre que, dans le
cadre de ces exemples, les chefs de projet ne sont pas conscients des problèmes et
des attentes des décideurs.
Ainsi, les facteurs controversés, sur lesquels les opinions des interviewés divergent,
ont été identifiés (cf. section 8.2.3) :
– management de la situation non-urgente : la situation de la prise des décisions
Go / No Go devrait être / ne devrait pas être considérée comme urgente. Dans
le premier cas, le risque est de précipiter au lieu d’anticiper. Dans le deuxième
cas, le risque est de repousser la décision,
– type de prise de décision : collégial / formel. Les décideurs avec une culture
latine sont pour une prise de décision de façon collégiale et les décideurs avec
une culture anglo-germanique sont pour une prise de décision de manière
formelle,
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– discussions de couloir : les discussions informelles en dehors du contexte
formel des réunions sont jugées pénalisantes / avantageuses selon différents
interviewés,
– nombre des décideurs : les différents interviewés sont pour un nombre limité /
pas limité des décideurs dans le comité de pilotage,
– format de la présentation : les différents interviewés sont pour le format
textuel (Word®)) / présentation (PPT®)) pour présenter les résultats des tests
aux décideurs.
Les deux activités les plus citées du processus de la prise de décision sont la
préparation et la présentation des résultats des tests effectués par les chefs de projet
et la prise de décision collaborative effectuée par les décideurs.
Conclusions
Les projets R&D pharmaceutiques sont très longs, coûteux, et risqués. Tout au long
de ces projets, une série de décisions Go / No Go doit être prise pour statuer sur la
poursuite ou l’arrêt des projets en fonction des résultats obtenus. Ces résultats
contiennent souvent des informations incomplètes, voire contradictoires, qui
deviennent progressivement plus complètes et exactes lorsque les projets avancent.
Or, l’avancement des projets dépend des décisions Go / No Go. Dans ce contexte et
vu les enjeux importants des décisions Go / No Go, certains retards se manifestent
parfois sous forme de suspension ou l’invalidation des décisions. Nous étudions le
problème de retard dans la prise de décision collaborative face à l’incertitude, en
situation non-urgente.
Dans la première partie de ce travail, nous soulignons les traits des projets de
développement de nouveaux médicaments. Les difficultés et les complexités des
décisions Go / No Go sont présentées et structurées. Ensuite, une étude bibliogra-
phique sur l’incertitude et l’indécision est présentée. Nous proposons une définition
de l’incertitude adaptée au management de projet en prenant en compte le rôle du
sujet, de l’objet et du contexte dans la génération et le traitement de l’incertitude.
Dans la deuxième partie, le processus de décisions Go / No Go est modélisé. Ce qui
permet de visualiser et expliciter le cycle de vie d’information, d’illustrer comment
l’information incertaine est traitée différemment par les différents décideurs et
de calculer le risque de l’invalidation d’une décision collaborative a posteriori. Ce
modèle nous sert de base pour mener une étude sur les causes du retard.
Dans la troisième partie, sept entretiens approfondis avec des acteurs majeurs de
processus de décision sont réalisés : 3 chefs de projet et 4 décideurs. 252 facteurs clés
qui influent le processus de décision sont identifiés, dont près de 50 % sont des
facteurs liés au contexte. Les trois causes les plus citées sont : la peur de l’incertitude,
la peur de la hiérarchie et la difficulté des décisions No Go. D’autres causes et
pratiques abordées par les interviewés sont liées aux attentes mutuelles des chefs de
projet et des décideurs et concernent majoritairement deux activités du processus
de décision : la préparation et la présentation des résultats des tests effectués par les
chefs de projet et la prise de décision collaborative effectuée par les décideurs. Si, à
juste titre, beaucoup d’attention a été prêtée par le monde industriel à la façon
d’effectuer les tests et de fournir les résultats, peu d’attention est portée à la façon
dont on agrège, prépare et présente les résultats et dont on prend les décisions. En
complément, afin de surmonter dans une large mesure le problème du retard et de
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l’invalidation des décisions collaboratives, cette thèse propose la formalisation du
processus de prise de décision et l’identification de causes du retard et de pratiques
efficientes associées aux activités de ce processus.
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A
Indecision
In this appendix, the results of our bibliographical study about indecision are
presented. Three tables classify the causes of indecision according to subject(s),
object or event, and context.
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Table A.1: Causes of indecision related to the subject(s)
Individual causes:
– personality of decision-makers:
– instability [Germeijs+ 2002] or not knowing what one wants [Frost+ 1993],
– responsibility avoidance [Janis+ 1977] or divestment of responsibility [Bacanli
2006],
– perfectionism [Frost+ 1993; Bacanli 2006], a maximizing tendency, especially in
components of information search [Reed 1985; Schwartz+ 2002; Diab+ 2008],
– tendency to consider the negative consequences of decision more harmful than
negative consequences of inaction [Brooks 2011],
– low self-esteem [Effert+ 1989],
– low life satisfaction [Rassin+ 2005b],
– low competitiveness [Effert+ 1989].
– negative experiences of decision-makers:
– experience of difficulty [Chartrand+ 1990] or negative experience [Elaydi 2006]
– needs and emotions of decision-makers:
– hypersensitivity to threat [Rassin+ 2005a],
– inherent fear of (responsibility for) change [Rassin+ 2005a],
– fear of mistakes and missing opportunities [Bacanli 2006],
– doubt about the accuracy and completeness of the available information [Frost+
1993],
– doubt about the pertinence of the eventually / selected alternative [adapted
from Reed 1985],
– worry about the consequences of the decision (undesirable effects) [adapted
from Germeijs+ 2002],
– lack of clarity as to what the worry is about [Germeijs+ 2002],
– post-decisional doubt / worry / regret about what would be lost (missing
opportunities) [Frost+ 1993; Germeijs+ 2002; Bacanli 2006],
– intolerance of uncertainty [Buhr+ 2002] or need for certainty [Bacanli 2006],
– difficulty and panic under time pressure [Bacanli 2006].
Collaborative causes:
– ambiguity of the responsibility [Freeman 1999; Harris 2005]
– lone heroes and self-interest [Charan 2001],
– misfiring in personal interactions [Charan 2001],
– intimidation by the group dynamics of hierarchy [Charan 2001].
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Table A.2: Causes of indecision related to the object / event and options
Causes related to information about the state of an object or the outcomes of some
events:
– difficulty in searching for information [Bacanli 2006],
– limits on the quantity and quality of information [Paivandy 2008] such as:
– absence: information is totally unavailable,
– incompleteness: information is partially unavailable,
– contradiction (incoherence): existence of paradoxical information,
– noise: information is subject to random errors [Dubois+ 2001],
– bias: information is subject to systemic errors [Dubois+ 2001],
– imprecision: information is not exact,
– volatility: information can change rapidly,
– randomness: information is subject to “variability of observed repeatable
natural phenomena” [Dubois+ 2010a],
– ambiguity: existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations for the same
information [Thiry 2002],
– multidisciplinarity: information that concerns multiple domains. Multidis-
ciplinarity is not a defect in itself, but may make information difficult to
understand,
– reliability: information whose source is not reliable,
– redundancy: existence of several forms for the same information. Redundancy
is not always a defect and may makes information explicit [Dubois+ 2001],
– abundance: a great deal of information is available.
– information processing in an inefficient manner [Chang 2007].
Causes related to possible options:
– lack of option quality i.e. absence of a satisfactory option [Brooks 2011],
– lack of option clarity i.e. unclear or ambiguous options [Brooks 2011],
– conflict between equally attractive alternatives [Osipow+ 1976],
– option similarity, since decisions between similar options are difficult to make and
also to justify to others [Brooks 2011], not accepting that the options are equally
desirable [Neumann+ 1944],
– external barriers to preferred choices [Osipow+ 1976].
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Table A.3: Causes of indecision related to context
Causes related to work environment:
– lack of intellectual honesty which harms open, honest, and decisive dialogue and
decreases mutual trust [Charan 2001],
– lack of trust to protect oneself in an unsafe environment [Charan 2001],
– lack of conviction, meaning people “speak their lines woodenly” [Charan 2001],
– lack of emotional commitment, meaning people do not perform planned actions
decisively [Charan 2001].
Causes related to leadership:
– strategic ambiguity [Denis+ 2011],
– “pluralistic settings characterized by diffuse power and divergent interests and
conceptions” [Denis+ 2011],
– lack of candid dialogue and lack of emotional fortitude in leaders [Charan 2001],
– lack of follow-through [Charan 2001],
– constraints of formality [Charan 2001],
– lack of closure coupled with a lack of sanctions [Charan 2001].
Causes related to the status of decision and the process of decision-making:
– consideration of decision as "the prerogative of individuals - usually senior executives"
[Davenport 2009],
– lack of clarity of the information, logic, and process used to make decisions [Davenport
2009].
Causes related to external environment:
– external barriers to preferred choices [Osipow+ 1976].
Causes related to time:
– time pressure [Bacanli 2006].
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Interview grid
B.1 Decision
1. Are Go / No Go decisions easy to make?
2. During your career, have you often seen decisions deferred? If yes, what were
the reasons?
3. After a number of times of decision postponements, what trigger decision-
making (a new information which facilitates or reaching a consensus on the
same information)?
4. Invalidation of decisions is common? If yes, what were the reasons? (decision
recycling)
5. Is it difficult to stop a project? If so, what are these difficulties? Have you
participated in a No Go decision? Could you share your experience?
6. Are the trace of decisions saved?
7. Do you have enough time to decide?
8. Is there a repeatable agenda for the Go / No Go decision meetings?
9. Does intuition play a role in decision-making?
10. What are the causes of delay in collaborative decision-making?
11. What are the efficient practices that facilitate collaborative decision-making?
B.2 Uncertainty
1. Are Go / No Go decisions made under uncertainty? If so, how frequent is it?
2. What are the sources of uncertainty?
3. What are its impacts?
4. How uncertainty is treated?
B.3 Information
1. On what factors are Go / No Go decisions based? (benefit-risk balance and
what else?)
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2. Does the presentation of the results influence the decision? If yes, what aspects
and how?
3. What is the format of the results of the studies on which the decision is based?
Is there a standard and repeatable format?
4. Do you have all the necessary information to make decisions?
5. Does the level of detail meet your expectations?
6. What do you think of the quantity of information presented? Is there any risk
of information overload?
7. Do you think the results are presented objectively?
8. Is the steering committee specialized in different fields? Do you think that the
presentation of the results is understandable to all the various specialists who
contribute to decision-making or is there any problem with jargon? (jargon
translator)
9. Do you have access to the results before the decision meeting or do you
discover them during the meeting? If yes, how much time in advance? Do you
have enough time to read?
B.4 Collaborative factors
1. What effect does it have that there are several people making the decision?
2. What are the mutual influences of individual and group?
3. What is the impact of hierarchical relationships on collaborative decisions?
4. Are some decision-makers’ opinions overweighted ? (according to their
specialities, for example)
B.5 Organizational culture
What are the impacts of the following elements on decision-making within an
enterprise:
1. type of governance?
2. composition of the steering committee?
3. mode of information circulation?
4. explicit rules?
5. implicit rules?
B.6 Non-emergency of situations
1. Do you think there is an urgent need to decide? If so, what is the impact? If not,
why are some decisions postponed?
2. How do you analyze this aspect?
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